


VOL. I.

NOVEMBER, 1888.

No. 3.

JOURNAL
OF THE
United States Cavalry
ASSOCIATION.

LEAVENWORTH, KAN.
STEAM PRESS OF KETCHESON & REEVES.
1888.



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NO. III.

SHERIDAN.

"As a commander of troops, as a man capable of doing all that is possible with any number of men, there is no man living greater than Sheridan. I rank him with Napoleon and the great captains of history. He had a magnetic quality of swaying men which I wish I had."—U. S. GRANT.

WITH these words for text and with cavalrymen for readers it ought not to be difficult to write fluently of him who for years was the leader of our choice. It is not the lack of material; it is not the want of information that bids one pause. Who of our Association is there to whom the story of SHERIDAN is not "familiar as household words"? What man of all our number has not felt the thrill of exultation, the glow of soldierly enthusiasm in reading or recounting the campaign of the Shenandoah or the nine days grapple from Dinwiddie to Appomattox? It is the sense of incompetence—the dread of total failure to treat the subject with half its just desert that causes pen to halt and tongue to falter. It is as though the sparrow had been set to sing the praises of the nightingale—the terrier to laud the strength and valor of the lion.

And yet, who that ever lowered sabre in salute to that keen-eyed leader or served with him in either peace or war, can withhold his tribute to the soldier of all others between whom and the cavalry there throbbed

the living link that only Death has severed? Men whose lips are seldom opened, troopers whose silence is a by-word in their regiments, and old campaigners to whose eyes tears were strangers until they heard the wail of "taps" that August afternoon at Arlington—all yield to the potency of the spell. The magnetism that swayed whole armies in his vehement life still triumphs over the grave, and pulses thrill and fading eyes rekindle and tongues unloose at mere mention of the days when he rode forth to stem the torrent of disaster or lead the way to glorious victory. What cavalryman can sit in silence when comrades bid him speak of SHERIDAN?

Some years ago there came to the writer a letter from an accomplished officer of the German War Academy at Berlin in which, speaking of FREDERICK CHARLES—"the Red Prince"—it said: "He always kept in his own room a portrait of STUART, your great raider, and was wont to refer to him as the greatest cavalry general of modern days."

It is not an estimate to cause surprise, coming as it does from one of the soldierly HOHENZOLLERNS, reared in the traditions of the Prussian Light Cavalry and imbued with the teachings of ZIETHEN and SEIDLITZ; it is not a sentiment held only by the whilom leader of the old RUDORFER—"the Red Hussars"—and cherished as gospel truth throughout the South. Three years of hard campaigning had taught the Army of the Potomac a world of respect for the plumed cavalier who led the Southern Horse on many a wild raid around its flanks and rear; cutting its communications, burning its trains, blowing skyward its reserve ammunition, feasting at its sutler's expense, "swelling" in its generals' uniforms, playing the mischief everywhere and always getting back unscathed. Sixty-One, Sixty-Two and Sixty-Three went by—year after year of humiliation to our arms despite the resolute stand at Gettysburg along an almost perfect battle line—a stand made possible, by the way, only by JOHN BUFORD and his stubborn troopers who barred the westward pikes and held on "fighting like the devil," indeed, against the thronging advance of LEE, until the rearward infantry could come up and reach it undisturbed. From first Bull Run through all the campaigns that followed—the Peninsula, Cedar Mountain, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Mine Run—what aggression was there on our part that bore not its fruit in disappointment or disaster? What were Antietam and Gettysburg but stubborn, stand-up fights—superb indeed in courage and devotion, yet ineffective in one great quality, as battles from which the foe retired unpursued, leaving our leaders to thank GOD for that much luck and content to let well enough alone? What was the sentiment of the mass of the Army of the Potomac but an echo of the sneer which HOOKER levelled at the corps he knew not how to use: "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"

What was the status of the mounted force of the army in Virginia, despite its dashing charges at Beverly Ford, its heroic stand at Seminary Ridge? It was well nigh friendless, with all its eagerness and daring. It had to suffer though, year after year that cruelest of soldier woes—the consciousness of being utterly misunderstood, if not of being utterly sacrificed. Small wonder that it heard with apathy of the two new men, called from western fields to lead the hitherto unlucky Army of the Potomac. Small wonder that the younger of the two, he who had been chosen as the new commander of the cavalry, should hear in answer to his question of General MEADE the words, "Well, never mind about STUART; he'll do pretty much as he pleases anyway."

With this as the ruling faith at headquarters, with the commander of the Army of the Potomac entertaining and expressing the view that it was useless for the Union cavalry to hope to thwart their opponents, it was but a natural consequence that, throughout the great array of foot—thanks to HOOKER's sneering epigram; thanks, partially, to the lack of independent leadership; thanks, too, to the lack of faith at headquarters—there had grown up that deeply-rooted theory that the cavalry was of no account. There dropped a pall upon the corps when BUFORD died and the man had not yet come to lift it.

Whosoever may have been at fault, whatever may have been the cause, certain it is that the troopers of the eastern army had enjoyed but little luck in those three years; certain it is that throughout the Army of the Potomac, despite Brandy Station and Beverly Ford, despite Gettysburg and STONEMAN's raid, despite BAYARD and "GRIMES" DAVIS and FARNSWORTH and ULRIC DAHLGREN, there was still afoot that covert sneer: "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"

"I want a man to organize and command the cavalry of this army," was one of the first things GRANT said to the President after reaching Virginia. "It demands energy, vim, dash, enthusiasm," he went on to explain, and HALLECK named the man. "The very one I was thinking of," said the new General-in-Chief, and so it happened that the little, black-eyed soldier, whose division was foremost in the rush on Mission Ridge, was summoned to quit the men who had learned to love and follow him, to cut loose from the plucky westerners, who had long since "sized him up" after their own fashion, and report for duty with the Army of the Potomac.

Soldiers would not be human if they observed without comment that the two most important posts were now to be filled, not by selections from their own generals but by strangers from the west. No wonder, therefore, that SHERIDAN should have felt reluctance at leaving his fighting division and the prospect of speedy command of the corps, to take up the sword among strangers who might resent his promotion over the leaders

they had known. But misgiving implied no hesitancy, he obeyed at once, and from that instant dates the turning of the tide. From the day of his coming the cavalry held their guidons fluttering ever in the foremost line and victory and triumph perching on their standards. HOOKER's slur was flung in his teeth, MEADE's mournful prophecy turned to naught, and STUART—he who time and again had circled our hosts, laughed at our futile counterstrokes and burst through our bewildered lines—STUART had led his last raid. In their first fierce grapple at Todd's Tavern the southern leader found he had met his match at last and recoiled stunned and shaken, and then when the glad order came to "cut loose and make for the James," the horsemen of the Army of the Potomac leaped to the front under a leader whose soul was in his work. In two days he had reached the railways and ripped them up for miles. In vain STUART flew at his rear and strove to make him turn from his purpose; in vain he raced him to the very walls of Richmond, and still more in vain, with fatal impulse, he charged at Yellow Tavern. When the sun went down the Southern Horse were scattered to the winds, the Union guidons were flaunting in the very teeth of flurried Richmond, and STUART, cavalier and bold raider, had flashed his sabre for the last time; the flower of Virginian chivalry had gone down before the fierce leader from the West, and he who had indeed "done as he pleased" for three long years had met his fate in three short weeks of SHERIDAN.

That one campaign wrought wonders for the cause of the nation and the good repute of the cavalry, but it was but prelude to the deeds that followed—the raid up the Virginia Central, the dashing attack on HAMPTON and FITZ LEE at Trevillian, the relief of ABERCROMBIE at White House on the perilous return, the sharp fighting across the Peninsula and then—then with the news of EARLY's repeated triumphs in the Valley of the Shenandoah and his rush at the walls of Washington, then, at last, the order that gave to the man who led and fought and handled cavalry to the admiration even of the Army of the Potomac, a separate and an independent command.

Who can recall the crisis of that summer of '64 without a shudder? Sixty thousand of our best and bravest *hors du combat* in the series of desperate battles from the Rapidan to the James, and still between GRANT and Richmond were the undaunted lines of LEE. EARLY had swept the Shenandoah and was thundering at the outer lines of our capital, the nation despondent, the peace party clamoring for summary stop to the war; "Copperheads" openly jubilant; gold soaring to 2.90; the Secretary of the Treasury resigning in dismay; the white-haired but weak-kneed editor of the *Tribune* pleading for concession; a presidential election close at hand, and the campaign orators proclaiming "The war a failure" and urging the claims of the Democratic candidate and the over-

throw of a Union loving administration. One more disaster to the national arms might mean the death-blow of the Republic. The triumph of the South meant the dissolution of the Union—a divorce that is but the prelude to speedy disintegration.

It was in this crisis that SHERIDAN, despite his youth, despite the timorous protests of STANTON and HALLECK—who thought he might handle cavalry but couldn't command a department, forsooth—it was in this supreme moment that SHERIDAN was ordered to go in and win on a field where hitherto none had “gone in” but to lose. FREMONT, BANKS, MILROY, MILES and HUNTER, all had tempted their luckless fate and come out worsted. The Valley of the Shenandoah up to August, 1864, was but the valley of humiliation for the Union arms—a broad and welcoming thoroughfare for the passage of the soldiers of the South whosoever it pleased them to tramp that way. JACKSON and JUBAL EARLY, STUART and ASHBY, marched hither and thither as they pleased, but JACKSON had met his soldier death in the moment of supreme triumph at Chancellorsville; STUART, who rode “monarch of all he surveyed” until that western trooper came, had found his grave before the guidons of the Union cavalry. Twas time for JUBAL EARLY to take heed: a man of mettle such as the Shenandoah had not yet seen had come to try conclusions with him.

Why dwell upon it? Who can describe the thrill of hope, of almost incredulous delight, with which all loyal hearts waked from their despond at the tide of triumph that came surging up with the news from the Shenandoah? Hardly had the nation dried its tears—tears of gratitude over SHERMAN’s capture of Atlanta—when there came that marvelous despatch from Virginia. We were used to news of victory from the West. We looked for it; expected it. It was here—here in front of our ever-threatened capital we craved success and had ever been denied it. “Wait till they tackle LEE and STUART,” croaked our cynics, “then you’ll see how your western generals will go under. Wait till old JUBAL EARLY gets his grip on SHERIDAN and you’ll see how he’ll drop his tail.” There had been a few weeks of suspense; there was strained watching and waiting in hope and fear and fervent prayer, and then, sudden as the leap of panther, the furious blow; then that marvelous despatch, electric in effect, vivid, pulsing with soldier spirit, telling of glorious victory on the very fields where all before had been disaster, telling—wonder of wonders!—of EARLY driven back “whirling through Winchester,” with our sabres at his heels.

How the joy bells rang and cannon thundered! How that new name flew from lip to lip. “SHERIDAN—SHERIDAN—Cavalry SHERIDAN” everywhere! How loyal men and loving women joined in praise and blessing and thanksgiving! No laggard he! No general such as we had

seen too oft before, wiring the tidings of success where success was sometimes a vivid lie, or halting after partial victory to receive congratulations. The thunder of the salvos had not died away before there came the second jubilee—another fight; another triumph; another wild scramble up the valley. EARLY whipped again from his chosen vantage ground at Fisher's Hill. The loyal North went wild with joy forthwith and the centre of despond was shifted then and there from Washington to Richmond, where the southern mob in derision seized the guns hurried forward to replace those lost along the Shenandoah and lettered them: "General SHERIDAN, care of JUBAL EARLY."

Then how the croakers changed their tunes! How the Copperheads slunk to their holes! How the hindering hands of old fossils at Washington clacked feeble applause at mention of this young general, of whom but a month before they could but mumble, "Too inexperienced; too impetuous; too immature." Those were the counsellors who would have buried GRANT under the comprehensive accusation of being "a drinking man," until that marvel of a president struck them dumb with the unlooked for answer—"I wish I knew where he got his whiskey," and the intimation that there were eastern generals whom it might benefit. They found brief comfort in the tidings that LEE had gone to see EARLY and brace him up for further effect. They began to nod their wise old pates when SHERIDAN was reported falling back, but the people went wild a third time over the cavalry fight at Tom's Brook, where our troopers turned like tigers on their foe, chasing them "on the jump" full twenty miles.

Then—then came Cedar Creek. "It never would have happened if I'd been here. Face the other way, boys; we'll lick them yet!" Where—where in the annals of modern war was ever victory snatched from disaster half so grave? What can parallel that sunset triumph following such ghastly rout at dawn? NAPOLEON, beaten back from the walls of Marengo, had utterly lost the field when greeted by the welcome voice of DESAIX. 'Twas DESAIX who fell upon the Austrian flank, strung out in the ardor of the chase, who turned pursuit into panic and won the day. 'Twas his strong division that marched from early dawn to save the wreck hurled back from the banks of the Bormida. Marengo was NAPOLEON's disaster—DESAIX's great victory, but the tide at Cedar Creek was turned by no shock of fresh battalions, 'twas met and stemmed and checked, then lashed and driven by a living force in the spirit of one daring and indomitable man, and that man SHERIDAN.

"He dashed down the line 'mid a storm of huzzahs,
And the wave of retreat checked its course there, because
The hand of the master compelled it to pause."

Thank God for "the swift hoofs thundering south" that day! Brave and determined as was the final stand of the men who had not left their

colors, bold and ready and eager as were the troopers of MERRITT and CUSTER, there was none until he came to order, and above all *inspire* the counterstroke that whelmed all before it, retrieving all that was lost, seizing guns, battle flags and whole battalions, turning national disaster into glorious victory, all just in the nick of time

November brought to the young general the double stars in the regular service—the nation's tribute to the trooper who in thirty days had won three pitched battles, sixty guns in open field, half a hundred battle flags and more prisoners, if EARLY is to be believed, than EARLY had men. Most effectually had he employed the little time he took "to settle this new cavalry general."

STUART, honored in his soldier grave, EARLY, relieved and degraded by his own government, the Southern cavalry scattered and dispirited, the Shenandoah freed at last and for all time, hope and faith restored to the Union, respect and confidence established between the cavalry and so much of the army at least as served in the Shenandoah, these were some of the fruits of SHERIDAN's achievements in the Valley where victory had perched only on southern flags before he came. Once more the nation's heart leaped high with hope, and then with prayer and patience awaited the lapse of the slow dragging winter, the coming of the glad and budding spring—the coming of the end.

But if SHERIDAN had been equal to every emergency before, what can one say of the part he played in the great and final campaign? Things had not been going blithely in the bomb-proofs and trenches before Petersburg through the black and dreary months of winter. Just as plucky, just as skillful as ever were those half-starved foemen in the tattered butternut or gray. Let a head but show itself above the logs and there came a shot. All through the besieging lines the tendency to stalk erect and carry high the martial front seemed to have fallen into disuse; a slouching gait was becoming prevalent as better befitting the peculiarities of the situation. Men consumed their rations, went on picket, talked about the mine fiasco and strolled over and paid curious visits to the Sixth Corps, back from SHERIDAN and the Shenandoah, and then returned to their own camp fires and stirred up the latent cynicism of their comrades by repetition of what WRIGHT's fellows had to say about "Little PHIL" and the cavalry. All the long winter they had been hugging those breastworks, learning to set rather too much store on shelter and probably getting soft and bilious, and out of condition for lack of exercise; and so when the end of March drew nigh and the news flashed from camp to camp that PHIL SHERIDAN with all his bold troopers had ridden down the James from the upper valley, ripping and tearing things as he came, and was now crossing at City Point, was it not natural that there should be some apparent jealousy as the whole army roused up to have a

look at them. What a ride that was when the cavalry corps, bronzed, tough, elastic, ready for anything after three months in the saddle, trotted around the rear of the encircling infantry, following the lead of that red and white, swallow-tailed guidon! How the woods rang with chaff and billingsgate! How the Second and Fifth Corps whooped and cat-called! How the Sixth sprang to their feet and cheered and shouted welcome and recognition to many a favorite officer or regiment! How full of fight, how full of confidence and self-reliance they looked as they jogged along, laughing at their jeers from the trenches! "Oh, we've got a feller that can fight all around you mud crushers," was the reply of a Michigan trooper to some blatant detractor; "Come out of your rat holes and we'll learn ye how." Time had indeed changed. The horsemen had found out what it was to campaign and fight under a born cavalryman and it was their turn to lord it in the Army of the Potomac.

Who has forgotten the gloom and ill omen that attended the opening moves of the days that followed—the march by the left flank into the thick and boggy forests wherein lay Dinwiddie and Five Forks and the coveted line of the South Side Railway? Roads all deep with mud and mire, woods all adrip with pouring, pelting rain, clouds hanging in chilling masses, obscuring the very light of heaven, horses floundering to their bellies, mules plunging to the roots of their ears in quicksand, wagons capsized, caissons stalled, officers and men wet, bedraggled and ominously silent! Who was there around headquarters that first dismal night to say one word of hope or cheer to the grave, indomitable General-in-Chief? Aye, were there not corps and division commanders who hung around, counselling retreat, preaching of disaster, urging "Back to the trenches," and when the great commander looked to his second as though for some expression of hope or confidence, is it not history that even loyal MEADE was silent and depressed? What gleam of light, what word of soldierly pluck or cheer, what scintilla of encouragement did GRANT find in all his array until, back from the distant front, covered with mud, dripping with rain, but bubbling over with energy and fight, bristling with eagerness and enthusiasm, came SHERIDAN—SHERIDAN to protest that all was going well; to beg for orders to push ahead; to urge that we "should end this thing right here"? What wonder GRANT could never forget the magnetic force of his great subordinate! All headquarters seemed illumed—all athrill with the trooper's glowing spirit. If ever for an instant thought of "giving up" obtained it vanished then and there at the soldier voice of SHERIDAN. *On* was the word; *on* the deed, and with the early, misty dawn the troopers had plunged boldly into the unknown wilderness before them, striking for the South Side rails, and LEE had hurried forth one-third of all his force to surround and crush the man who had downed his best and bravest.

Even then LEE failed. Where were troopers ever better handled? Where were horsemen ever more skillfully, pluckily, daringly, fought than in that long day's grapple with the guns, the carbines, the rifles of thronging Confederates, while SHERIDAN was slowly slipping out of the meshes they had woven for him, falling steadily back towards Dinwiddie and luring the Southern left into its counter snare? How the guidons clung to every copse and thicket, stinging like hornets the charging foe! How every ridge, every fence, every ditch and tree and stump and fallen log was manned and held by plucky skirmisher, while the trumpet calls rang through the misty forest aisles and the smoke wreaths veiled the tree tops, and the supporting lines trotted hither and yon, giving ground only when orders came and dashing in with whirling sabers at every open glade! How MERRITT's tried regulars and CUSTER's "Wolverines" battled all day long against combining arms of a gallant foe! How CROOK and GREGG and DEVIN backed them in every rush or cheered with every charge! When at last the sun went down behind the veiling clouds every standard, every guidon, was in its place, though many a gallant bearer had fallen. SHERIDAN bivouacked his men around Dinwiddie and set his trap to spring with dawn upon the Southern force, whose efforts had been all unsuccessful.

Then came the glad morrow with sunshine and supports. Not as he hoped—not as he deserved, 'tis true—but even in his disappointment that a night march had been too much for foot troops who had done no marching in so long a time—even though he chafed over the escape of PICKETT from the snare he planned, there was still time before the sun went down to plan and fight another battle.

Then came the crowning proof of his skill and brilliancy in the field. The Shenandoah had demonstrated his ability to handle foot as well as horse, but here, against the veteran infantry of LEE, intrenched in the heart of a Virginia forest, he dared to assault the front with long lines of dismounted troopers, while to the Fifth Corps was assigned the easier task of turning the flank. Tactically no more brilliant battle had been planned or fought on the soil of Virginia, and for the cavalry 'twas a glory greater even than Winchester. MERRITT's "impetuous charges" from the south, CUSTER's headlong dash at FITZ LEE on the western flank—these and all their work that April afternoon he left to his skilled subordinates. He and the cavalry knew each other thoroughly and with them he had but to order—they obeyed. It was the infantry that needed the inspiration of his presence and with them he rode into battle. Who that saw him that memorable day will ever forget the picture? SHERIDAN dashing in among the foremost ranks of the wavering footmen, his flag gleaming in his hand, shouting, cheering, swearing in wrath at the skulkers, raging at the nerveless advance, reckless of hissing lead or bursting shell, furious

at the needless delay, and finally, the incarnation of battle, by the very force and vehemence of his nature, hurling the men of AYRES' division on that fire-flashing parapet and doubling up the Southern left even as MERRITT's men came leaping over the breastworks along the front. Five Forks was SHERIDAN's crowning fight and the death-blow of the Confederacy.

And still he was not done! Recall the matchless energy of the pursuit—the race on parallel lines to Appomattox, the searching raids of his troopers through every lane and by-path, the incessant dogging of the Confederate flank, the daring stand of his foremost brigades across the front of the now starving and desperate foe, the wild dash at Farmville and Sailor's Creek, the capture of all supplies, the sleepless vigilance, the relentless hammering. Who—who in all our army from Chieftain down could match him in energy or excel him in purpose? What man of all our leaders, when at last the worn and wearied foe surrendered, had done so much to bring that foe to bay as he whose troopers blocked all hope of escape—"SHERIDAN, the inevitable."

Late in the month that followed, when the armies of the Union passed in final review at Washington and shared a triumph such as CÆSAR might have envied, when the broad avenues rang with martial music, the blare of bugles and the tramp of serried columns, when all the Capital was fluttering with the colors of the flag, and joy and thanksgiving beamed on every face, when many a noted general was greeted with acclamations from every side, there were still two circumstances that tempered the universal jubilee. The people could not forget—could not but miss the kindly, homely, patient and pathetic face of him whom God had spared only long enough to guide the nation through a storm such as it had never yet encountered, and then be stricken down at the very entrance of the harbor where all was peace and safety. They mourned the absence of the tall, commanding form of him who having been ever "constant in our ill," could not now be with them, "joyous in our joy." They looked with eager eyes, but all in vain, for another form—for the keen black eyes and the bronzed, swarthy features of the greatest cavalry leader of the age, the soldier whose deeds had aroused the whole nation from its despond and kindled a flame of enthusiastic homage in every heart. "Where is SHERIDAN?" "When are we to see him?" "Why is he not here?" These were the cries on every side.

No triumph for him while stern duty called him from afar. Even as his great commander and his comrades of the East and West were receiving the acclamations of hoarse-throated throngs in Washington, turning his back on all the sweet reward of soldierly achievement, SHERIDAN was speeding to the Rio Grande. Not until the last armed foe was conquered could our leader rest. Not until long years afterward, not until he had

reached the pinnacle of his ambition — the highest rank in the army — the very zenith of his fame; not until his name had been carved enduringly on the lasting monuments of the ages and spoken in praise by soldier tongue in every land; not until as citizen and as man he had developed those traits which won him honor and esteem from a people who gloried in his battle deeds; not until he had still further strengthened the ties that bound him to the cavalry — sharing danger and privation with us in the snows of wintry campaigns, joining us in march and bivouac in the heat and thirst of summer suns, guiding us in many a stirring gallop on the Indian trail, showing by word and deed his faith in the corps he led to victory; not until throughout the length and breadth of the land no name was better known than his, and spoken by no loyal voice except in honor; not until the hearts of all our people were drawn to him through the brave and patient abiding of a mortal struggle, and the old admiration of his soldier pluck and spirit kindled anew at the heroic fight he made against the only foe that ever downed him; not until all this and far, far more had been achieved, did SHERIDAN come for his triumph to the Nation's Capital.

Fairer day sun never blessed; clearer skies or bluer waters never smiled above or reflected back the white walls of the thronging city. Under the deep foliage of the fringing trees, bare-headed, silent, reverent thousands lined the broad avenues along which he rode. All the great dignitaries of State were in his train; all the great soldiers of the nation followed the wheels of his triumphal car — that sombre, flag draped caisson. Guidons of his faithful horsemen, banners of the red artillery, crape-twined, bowed above the helmets of his escort; solemn strains of martial music rose and fell in mournful cadence as with muffled tread we bore him on. Up the broad thoroughfare with its bordering ranks of sorrowing faces, white and black, over the graceful arches that span the blue Potomac, through the winding aisles to Arlington we followed our old commander, halting at last where the declining sunlight slanted down that beautiful green slope. At its crest the stately portico of the old Virginian mansion, and the roadway, ranked with silent troopers; at its base the fringe of thick-leaving trees, through whose foliage came the glint of arms and the scarlet colors of the batteries; beyond them the broad, peaceful valley, the winding sweep of noble river; beyond them all the gleaming white shaft of the distant monument, the shimmering dome of the Capitol, all bathed in August sunshine. Near at hand a silent, reverent group of uncovered heads, from whence there rises presently the chanting ritual of the Church of Rome. The solemn service is soon complete; the reverend clergy fall slowly back, the Loyal Legion sadly take their last look upon the shrouded form of their honored Chief, and then — then tears gush forth from eyes long unaccustomed, and strong

men bow their heads or turn aside as, with tender care, a soldier's daughter, a sorrowing woman, is led away from the grave of him who was her hero and her pride. Down beyond the trees there is a quick, yet noiseless, movement, then the earth trembles with the sudden concussion; gun after gun the battery booms its parting salute to the General-in-Chief. A few low-spoken words from the aides-de-camp and the throng falls back to the very crest; the smooth green carpet of the slope is now one great unbroken square, save for that narrow cleft in its fair surface, bordered by those ridges of new-turned clods. Another stir and rattle down beyond the trees and then as suddenly the leaves all leap and quiver as a flashing volley shoots aloft—another—another, and the pale blue clouds come drifting slowly up above the foliage, and then—last scene of all—there appears at the head of the grave one silent, statuesque, solitary form, clad in the full dress uniform of the trooper. A moment's pause until the echo of the final volley has died away in the distance and then he raises the trumpet to his lips. Soft, tremulous and low as we have heard it many a time in windy nights on the far frontier, and in mountain bivouac in the old campaigns, the first notes of "taps" float out upon the hushed and pulseless air; then louder, throbbing, wailing, well-nigh passionate, it thrills through every heart—a sobbing requiem, the trooper's one adieu to cherished comrade, then, sinking, fading, falling, it slowly dies away and all is done.

Aye, though statesmen, soldiers, priests and delegates thronged to take their part in the mournful ceremonies of the day; though from far and near were gathered the nation's highest names, the closing rite of all is paid by the hands of those whose sabres he had led to fame and victory: the cavalry bade the last good night to SHERIDAN.

C. K

A HORSE ARTILLERY GUN.

BY FIRST LIEUTENANT A. D. SCHENCK,

2d U. S. ARTILLERY.

IN the first number of this JOURNAL there appeared an article under the caption of the "New Field Artillery Gun and Carriage," in which the idea is boldly advanced that "from its lightness it is suitable though not especially designed for horse batteries." The idea that any gun not especially designed for horse artillery purposes is suitable therefor, must from the nature of things, and the practices of every military nation, be denied absolutely. The services required of horse and field batteries are quite distinct and widely separated in their character. It need hardly be specified that in one, mobility is of vital importance, without which a horse battery possesses no value to a cavalry leader; in the other, power of fire is of the first importance, as field batteries have less trouble in keeping pace and place with the movements of infantry, while power and volume of fire are required to meet inanimate as well as more powerful animate obstacles. Without this virtue the infantry commander has little use for artillery. In field batteries both of these elements can be, and frequently are combined, and in several nations a single gun is made to do duty for a single battery which performs the functions of both light and heavy batteries. But in no nation is the same gun designed to do duty as both a horse and a field gun. Everywhere the horse artillery gun is especially and carefully designed and constructed for this particular service alone. The reasons for this are perfectly obvious. The services required must first conform to the demands of the cavalry commander. His all important requisite is, that a horse battery shall under no reasonable circumstance impede his marching and manoeuvring abilities, and further that in keeping pace with his arm the horses of the artillery shall maintain as good condition as those of the cavalry. In other words, that in a field of operations practicable for horse artillery its mobility shall be fully equal to that of the cavalry. Naturally the power of the gun is a matter to which he gives less consideration, as celerity of movement is the secret of his power. By this means he gains his position, and par-

ticularly requires of his artillery that it shall get there with him, leaving the power of the gun and the method of fighting it to the artilleryman.

In horse artillery, then, the matter for first consideration is manifestly that of mobility. What its measure should be is not a matter of doubt, although it varies considerably in different armies, owing to the conditions of country, its roads, horses, and the manifold special requirements of the service in general; each country being governed by what particularly exists therein. In general the measure of mobility for horse artillery purposes is determined by the usually conceded power of a horse.*

LOADS PER HORSE FOR HORSE ARTILLERY.

Nation.	Gun.	Caisson.	No.	Rounds.	
				In Limber.	Per Gun.
U. S. 6-pounder.....	531 lbs.	582 lbs.	6	50	200
U. S. 3-inch Rifle.....	535 "	580 "	6	40	160
Austria	570 "	713 "	8	40	152
France.....	583 "	675 "	9	29	160
U. S. 3"2.....	604 "	736 "	9	30	160
Russia	635 "	787 "	9	30	165
England.....	656 "	763 "	6	36	148
Germany.....	660 "	690 "	8	38	154

While there is considerable difference as to the measure of mobility in European services, there naturally exists a wide one as compared with what has been deemed necessary for our own. That our predecessors thoroughly understood our requirements, and adopted wise measures to meet them can hardly be denied. These conditions remain practically the same, and there is no apparent or valid reason for our departing from them. Most certainly is this true if we are to accept as the marching possibilities of cavalry, those fixed by General MERRITT in the same number of the JOURNAL. The limit of load of 570 pounds per horse is based upon the ability of a good horse under favorable circumstances as to condition, to draw a load of 1,100 pounds twenty-three miles a day at most, and here comes the General with the very positive assertion that "experience in marching cavalry commands in this country establishes the fact that the distance laid down by Europeans as a forced march for that arm (twenty-five miles a day), is no more than well-marched cavalry can accomplish for six days in every week in a campaign." The General may be accepted as an authority, and if such marching as is here indicated is to obtain in the future the necessity for at least maintaining our old measure of mobility for horse artillery, admits of no discussion.

*See "Matériel for Field Artillery," by the author, *Journal of Military Service Institution*, September, 1888.

After making all due allowance for such marching with possibly a small cavalry command only, it must at once be conceded that we have absolutely no room for any increase in the weight behind our teams. In fact, if General MERRITT intends to have us understand that such marching is within the powers of large cavalry commands, a division, or even a brigade, it apparently becomes a matter of grave consideration whether it be not in order to reduce the old measure. If there be any increase it becomes obvious that the horse artillery will at once become an incumbrance to such a leader, consequently he will have none of it. It may here be well to call attention to a fact in connection with this limit not generally considered even in this country. The ordinary conditions of service and ability to secure forage, etc., enables the cavalryman to maintain the condition of his horse much more readily than can the artilleryman, especially of his team horses, even though the former be more constantly active, this very fact most frequently working to his advantage in this respect. As this condition of the horses is the matter of most vital importance to the efficiency of the battery, it was deemed necessary that the weight of the carriage should be within limits, in order that a small reserve of grain might be carried upon it, and thus in a measure secure equality with the cavalry.

It would thus appear that the conditions of the service of horse artillery with the cavalry are exceedingly rigorous in limiting the weight of the carriages. But when those connected with its services with infantry have been duly considered, the limiting conditions are, if anything, even more stringent. An inspection of the organization of a modern army reveals the fact that one-half or more of the home batteries serve with the infantry. Their chief function is to accompany the attack of that arm, to form points of support for the flanks of the assaulting body if successful, or from its flanks to cover temporarily the position gained if it can be held, or to cover the retreat if necessary. Such batteries are held in reserve until the proper time, and then have to cover 1,500 yards or more under fire in the shortest possible time. In times past the horse battery with its cannoneers mounted on their horses could go into action at short range with little or no danger from musketry fire. This is all changed now, and the battery may be under a heavy fire from this arm from the very moment it breaks cover. To have the cannoneers mounted upon their horses is only to increase the size of the target, and whenever a horse goes down, possibly to leave a cannoneer behind. Such an advance occupies but four or five minutes at most, but within this short time may be bound up results of the utmost moment. The battery of the present is literally stripped for the fight, the guns are accompanied by probably only three caissons, the lead teams of the others with a man on

each horse are taken along to replace disabled horses, which from numbers alone, as well as from position, will be lead or swing, more than two to one. To insure a gun detachment being with the gun for its service when it comes into action, and to aid in quickly replacing disabled horses during the advance, two cannoneers are carried upon the gun-limbers and three more upon the off horses, and with all of these precautions the battery commander who promptly gets into action with four or five of his guns and men enough to efficiently serve them, will be in good luck.

The horse batteries of advance or rear guards, whether of the cavalry or corps service, meet with numberless circumstances when it is advisable to not only retire most of the caissons, but the horses of the cannoneers also, in order to secure reasonable safety from loss through the killing or disabling of the horses. The character of this most important service necessitates frequent, and often sudden and rapid changes of position, where the only way to transport the gun detachment is by the means indicated.

The two men upon the gun-limbers weigh at least 300 pounds, and thus reduce the weight for a gun-carriage equipped for service to 3,120 pounds, or 520 per horse, and this too under the further unfavorable condition that every horse in the team has to carry a man. Hence it is seen that the horse batteries serving with the infantry are, if anything, more rigidly restricted as to mobility than those with the cavalry. This restriction is not so constant in its application. But the measure of efficiency is the supreme test of battle. The battery may go for twenty years with fifty pounds per horse less weight than is ordinarily permissible, but it does this in order that, at the decisive moment, it may cover the 1,500 yards within the few moments necessary and in a manner to insure effective service.

It thus becomes apparent that, whether we are to meet General MERRITT's requirements as to marching abilities, or those of a corps or army commander for celerity of movement and efficiency upon the battle-field, the measure of mobility is rendered exceedingly stringent, so much so in fact that if it be not perfect, the result is inevitable and absolute inefficiency, and consequently the battery will be worthless for horse artillery purposes, and neither the cavalry nor the infantry commander will have any use for it. Both will be deprived of what is now everywhere held to be one of the most valuable commands which a modern army brings upon a battle-field. To the cavalry assigned to the duty of destroying bridges, communications, etc., it has, since the advent of machine guns, become absolutely indispensable, as without it a bridge, for instance, covered by block houses or other slight defences and protected by machine guns, could bid defiance to any cavalry unaccompanied by a much more powerful form of artillery. But here again comes up the ever present

necessity for perfect mobility. Such raids will be made by small bodies of troops, naturally seeking to move by unfrequented and generally anything but good roads, and the natural consequence will be to put the powers of the artillery to the severest test. Its failure will mean that of the cavalry, and the result will be that they may have just cause for damning the artillery for a generation to come.

Now as to the suitability of the 3".2 gun for horse artillery purposes. Possibly it has been made to appear that the question of mobility is one of very considerable importance in connection with the efficiency of a horse artillery gun. At least that has been the intention. In the article alluded to in connection with this gun, no mention is made as to weight, other than that it is such as to permit of its use for horse artillery purposes. It is a matter of no little interest to know upon what authority this statement is advanced. The weights of the gun and carriage are incorrectly given and compared, with those of foreign guns. But the weight of the element, either gun or caisson—the mobility, does not appear, and is left to conjecture. The very fact that this gun was not especially designed for this particular service, when as possibly may have been seen, the requirements are so rigid in their nature, would at once prove the gun to be a failure.

From the Reports of the Chief of Ordnance it appears that the gun weighs 800-804 pounds, and the carriage complete 1,300, of which latter sixty are for the seats which are not required for a horse artillery gun. From the Report of 1885, the limber-body weighs 405 pounds, wheels 200, old wooden chest 185, projectile (proposed but doubtful as this would be in the line of decided improvement) 13.5, charge 3.5 pounds, and with thirty rounds in the limber we will have:

Gun	800 pounds,
Gun carriage, complete	1,240 "
Limber, complete	990 "
Ammunition, thirty rounds	510 "
Equipments, water buckets, etc.....	28 "
Paulin	54 "
Total	3,622 pounds,

or 604 per horse, eighty-four more than the limit. In fact, it is within sixty-two pounds of the 3,684 fixed in the light artillery tactics as the weight permissible for a light field gun, and to which weight the old 3" rifle was only brought after adding 106 pounds for the seats for cannoniers, and not only increasing the weight of the shrapnel to 10.5 pounds, but increasing the number of rounds in the limber to the enormous sum of seventy-two, a number never heard of for a light field gun of the date, but of course quite practicable if a horse artillery gun has to be used as a light field gun. The same practice if followed in any European service would result in about doubling the present number of rounds carried in

the limber. To bring the above weight down to the proper limit of 3,120 pounds will necessitate removing every round from the limber. Two blank cartridges might be carried therein, serving as a very forcible illustration of the practical value of this gun for horse artillery purposes. That this weight, so greatly in excess of what has heretofore existed for our service, is permissible or can be tolerated, is simply absurd.

But this is not all. The caisson has also to be considered, and its weight will be found in the Report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1885, page 667:

Body, complete (no ammunition)	1,632 pounds.
Limber, complete, packed (30 rounds)	1,782 "
Total	3,414 pounds.

Here we already have reached the limit of 570 pounds per horse, without a single round in the caisson body. With nine caissons to carry 160 rounds per gun, will necessitate packing fifty nine (it is constructed to carry eighty, with which imagine the load) rounds in each caisson body, which would bring the weight up to 4,417 pounds, or 600 more than our heaviest caisson during the late war, and over 900 pounds more than that for the old 6 pounder or 3" rifle.

Verily was this gun not especially designed for horse artillery purposes.

Place these facts—and they will be found as cited—before General MERRITT or any other cavalry leader down to the last troop commander, and not one of them will have anything to do with such horse artillery. With such a gun—such measure of mobility—the artillery cannot hope to join services with the cavalry under any circumstances however favorable. Over good hard roads the gun might possibly, for a time, keep in sight of a cavalry column marched at the rate General MERRITT indicates, but the caisson could not possibly do so; while over poor roads or none at all, even the guns would have to be sent to the rear as utterly impracticable.

The conditions precedent are all well known and thoroughly understood, and the conclusions are obvious. So far from the conditions being widened in scope by the requirements of modern service, exactly the reverse obtains, and no more conclusive reasons for the members of this Association need be assigned than General MERRITT has given in his paper. It must appear quite evident that any horse battery commander who joins the General's command will find the condition absolute, that he maintain his place in the column of march, and at the same time the good condition of his horses while so doing. That this cannot be done with a measure of mobility less perfect than that heretofore obtaining in our service, or less perfect than that declared by the accepted rules from the conceded power of a good horse, requires no demonstration. The

horse batteries for infantry must be the same as those for cavalry, even if the conditions of their service should not practically reach the same end.

The reasons for these lamentably unsatisfactory results for the 3".2 gun are plainly to be seen. First of all it may be iterated that no gun for horse artillery will or can be expected to give such results, unless it be especially and carefully designed and constructed for this purpose alone. With an excessive charge of powder, caliber and length of bore, the new gun, fired with great pressure in the bore, gives an excessive recoil, to control which that most pernicious "novelty," the recoil brake was introduced and a 200 pound wheel resulted. The inertia of such a wheel, coupled with the fact that the brake almost instantly brings it to a dead-lock and adds the friction against the ground, of course bent any reasonable axle that could be made. Thus, instead of bringing into play the terrible strength of the metal and tying the ends of the axle to the trail as is the foreign and common sense practice, (thus securing the maximum strength with the minimum weight) just the reverse obtained and another "novelty" was introduced by spreading boiler-plate along the length of the axle to give it strength and rigidity. Such a practice no good mechanical engineer could endorse, and the proof of its viciousness lies in the fact that with the same track the carriage-body proper for the German 3".46 gun, which has to stand almost exactly the same strain as that for our gun, weighs 174 pounds, or 28 per cent. less than the carriage-body for the 3" 2 gun. In this connection it may be noted as a matter of no inconsiderable importance that this foreign gun fires 4.5 pounds greater weight of projectile from its light carriage than we do from our so much heavier one, and this foreign projectile also gets out to a range of 4,500 yards with 50 per cent. greater energy than our insignificant one does.

To sustain the assertion as to the recoil-brake it is only necessary to consider the subject of the wheel. The Archibald wheel is unquestionably far better in every way and especially stronger than the old one, and with the aid of aluminum bronze, or brass—three times as strong as the old—it can be greatly improved in these respects. But no reasonable wheel could stand the strain of this recoil-brake and the pressure in the bore which it tempted the use of.

With nine caissons of the old pattern there will be seventy-seven wheels in the battery, to each of which twenty pounds have been added, instead of a reduction—a reasonable expectation in view of the improved qualities of the new wheel. This involves the loss of 1,540 pounds outright for the battery. The new limber-body weighs 405 as against 335 pounds for the old one; loss 1050. The caisson-body equipped but without wheels 1,032, as against 961 for the old one; loss 639 pounds. The gun-carriage equipped but without wheels weighs 840, as against 598 for the old one; loss 1,452 pounds. To offset this enormous total we have

the reduction of thirty pounds in the weight of the gun; total 180, leaving a net loss of 4,501 pounds, equal to the weight of 265 rounds, or forty-four per gun. And this, be it remembered, in face of the fact that we are supposed to command not only the best material but the best wagon makers in the world. Comment is unnecessary, in fact no one could do justice to the subject.

It is generally an easy matter to criticise, but not always so easy to suggest proper remedies for defects. In this case, however, the remedies suggest themselves. First of all and as a matter of course, it is again repeated that as a horse artillery gun, far more than any other, must meet the requirements of a special service, restricted within very narrow though well-defined limits as to conditions, it must be especially and carefully designed and constructed to meet them.

In so doing the pernicious recoil-brake must be banished absolutely and beyond recall. Then natural conditions will have to obtain as with the man and his musket. If a high pressure and long bore must be resorted to for a given weight of gun, the caliber must be small and *vice versa*. From the nature of the action of this brake the wheel of necessity must be abnormally strong and heavy.

Within the whole problem of the construction of field artillery material there is no single item which at all begins to compare in importance with that of the wheel, and to make this clear to any mind it is only necessary to consider the number and weight of these in a battery. First as to the proper weight of a new wheel. The Archibald Wheel Co. maintain that their wheel is from twenty-five to fifty per cent. stronger than those of the old pattern, weight for weight. The use of aluminum bronze, or brass, will greatly increase the limit. But we can take the weight of the Russian wheel, 151 pounds, and assert that a fifty-five-inch 150 pound wheel of proper tread will meet our requirements. This at once saves to us fifty pounds each for seventy-seven wheels, or 3,800, which can go into the limber-chest in the shape of ammunition and not be trundled around in the shape of ponderous wheels to carry almost empty chests. Again, the experience of our war demonstrated the fact that six spare wheels were too many for a battery. In these days of shrapnel fire two will prove an ample supply when those carried with the ammunition train have been considered, and we gain 1,050 pounds for seven wheels discarded, and, say 455 for the discarded spare axles. In other words, this change in the weight and number of this single item saves to us the enormous total of 5,355 pounds for a battery, the equivalent of 315 rounds or fifty-two per gun, which is now hauled around in the shape of a useless and unnecessary weight of wheel, only made a necessity by the use of this vicious recoil-brake.

Unquestionably the objection will at once be raised that such a wheel will not hold the gun, neither could any semblance of a man short of a graven image withstand the shock of the present Springfield rifle fired with 120 grains of powder and its 500-grain bullet. Recoil-brakes could not be clapped upon the man, and the charge and pressure in the bore had to be regulated accordingly. Now that the magazine gun is recognized as a necessity and consequently the soldier must carry a greatly increased number of rounds to meet its increased expenditure of ammunition, not only must the weight of the individual round be reduced but some of the weight must come out of the musket and go into the cartridge-box in the shape of cartridges. At the same time, possibly, a much higher pressure in the bore must obtain, and this with a lighter gun, which means simply that the caliber must of necessity be reduced until, for the desired pressure, the work of recoil is reduced to the limit of the endurance of the soldier; precisely what must be done in the case of a suitable and necessary wheel or carriage-body. Such a wheel probably will not hold this 3".2 gun with 3.5 pounds of powder and 34,000 pounds pressure per square inch in the bore, and with the pernicious recoil-brake applied. That such a wheel is of paramount necessity is beyond question, and to secure its use requires that the present conditions be modified accordingly, just as in the case of the new rifle.

With the old "brutal powder" the maximum pressure in the bore of the 3" rifle is given in the Light Artillery Tactics as 50,000 pounds per square inch, with which the strain upon the carriage was 83 tons. Thanks to the powder maker—to whom, by the way, more than anyone else is due the great improvement in modern guns—we can regulate the pressure at will. With 34,000 pounds pressure the 3".2 gun gives a strain of 75 tons, due to the extreme calibre and length of the gun, and the preposterous weight of the carriage as compared with that of the gun. Why it requires a 1240 pound steel carriage to stand a less strain than a 958 pound iron and wooden one stood, is because of these conditions, and further because the wheels are locked down and the lighter gun is enabled to play the part of a hammer in knocking the almost immovable carriage to pieces. A 3" gun weighing 800 pounds mounted on a carriage similar to that for the old 3" rifle, but with 150 pound wheels and a suitable brake, with a pressure of 30,000, would give a strain upon the carriage of only 51 tons, or 32 less than the old carriage could withstand. When this 3" rifle was designed to replace the old 6 pounder, the weight of the carriage was left unchanged, and this notwithstanding the fact that the problem involved an enormously *increased* pressure in the bore, and greater length of the same, and further also that to insure a sufficient number of the much heavier elongated projectiles, the weight of the gun had to be diminished, which meant more unfavorable conditions for the

carriage, as the heavier the gun the greater its inertia and the less the strain transmitted to the carriage. To insure the safety of the latter the calibre of the gun had to be reduced from 3".67. The new conditions determined that the calibre required to insure safety to the carriage should be about 3".

We have very similar though much more favorable conditions for the conversion of the 3" rifle into a modern breech-loading horse artillery gun. First and most important of all we can reduce the maximum pressure in the bore to 30,000 or at most 32,000 pounds per square inch. Although increased length of bore is necessary, the less the better for the artilleryman, both as to general conditions of service and as to the recoil. Better material will enable a considerable reduction in the weight of the gun to go into the projectiles required, but the less of this reduction the better, as the 3" rifle is already lighter than the carriage, and well known principles of mechanics require that the gun should be at least as heavy as the carriage, or as much heavier as possible. By suitably regulating the tread of the wheel to secure proper traction upon soft ground—on the road there will be no trouble—its diameter can be reduced at least two inches, to fifty-five, and by the aid of aluminum bronze, or brass, three times as strong as the old metals, we can construct a wheel weighing 150 pounds or less, which will be stronger and better in every way than the old one. We can also slightly shorten the trail, and thus secure increased strength with less weight. The calibre remaining the same, three inches, with a much heavier charge, weight of projectile and length of bore, the recoil will be so much increased that it can no longer be neglected as was the case in the change from the six pounder to the 3" rifle, although, as has been seen, the strain upon the carriage will be reduced thirty-two tons. A brake of some kind becomes necessary—not the present recoil brake which is good for nothing else, save to increase the weight of material and render a good gun an impossibility—but an ordinary brake, suitable for instant and constant use upon the road or when the gun is in battery. Its application when the gun is fired will call upon the carriage for a certain amount of strength to meet this condition, but there are thirty-two tons excess of strength to its credit. This may be drawn upon for the purpose of limiting the recoil. But right here let it be perfectly understood that this credit is not to be overdrawn under any circumstance. To do this means increased weight, which is out of the question. If this credit be not sufficient to limit the recoil within proper bounds under the conditions suggested, then our man, our carriage, is being taxed beyond his strength and the conditions must be modified accordingly, until he makes no complaint. We can stand a somewhat greater recoil than that for the old 3" rifle, *provided always* that the weight of projectile, and its remaining velocity and energy are sufficient

to compensate for the increased evil, but we cannot afford to put 235 pounds additional weight into the carriage for the sake of a 13.5 pound projectile, and to limit the recoil to seven feet after the method used with the 3".2 gun.

The artilleryman does not expect to eat his cake and have it. A reduced charge, calibre, length of bore and an ordinary brake may not reduce the recoil to the limit secured with the 3".2 gun, but it will be brought within reason, and with that we will have to rest content, and will so do if the remaining velocities, weight, and energy of projectile, are satisfactory at battle ranges.

A round for the 3".2 gun weighs seventeen pounds, of which 3.5 is for powder, a deal too much in a field gun for the weight of projectile, or in a horse artillery gun under any condition. By taking 2.75 pounds as the charge, which is a reasonable one for a horse artillery gun, and the remaining 14.25 pounds for a projectile, good ballistic results are assured, or at least far better than for the preceding case. Allowing twenty per cent. for the loss of power by the absorption of heat by the gun, etc., a charge of 2.75 pounds will give to this projectile 1,482 f. s. I. V., and at 4,500 yards 746 f. s., with 55 f. t. of energy. The 3".2 gun with I. V. 1,670 f. s. and a 13.5 pound projectile gives at the same range 694 f. s. and 45 f. t. The shrapnel for the latter is to contain 157 bullets, thirty-two to the pound.

That for the former, with the reduced pressure to which it is to be subjected (and if as well made as the German and Italian shrapnel), will contain 5.6 pounds of bullets. With the increased velocity at the maximum range this could be reduced in size to about forty-four to the pound and still be as effective as the larger ones for the present gun, while the shrapnel would contain 246 bullets. Our shrapnel is simply the wire-cartridge or other form of concentration which the sportsman uses to secure at long ranges game of less dangerous character than the modern soldier. Like the sportsman we first determine the size of our bird, the bullet necessary to bag him; then regulate our "pattern" accordingly. If we take the size of a man in ranks at eight square feet and require say two hits to disable or kill him, then the pattern for the 3".2 gun must be regulated so as to cover at mean range a circle whose area is 628 square feet, with a diameter of twenty-eight, equal to fifteen files of infantry, which is the measure of the dangerous space along the front of a body of men, the crest of a parapet, etc. To this, of course, must be added the distance from the point of shell burst in the direction of fire, at which a bullet will inflict a dangerous wound. This latter is generally under modern conditions, of much less importance than the former. In the case of the other projectile the area of the pattern required at mean range will be 984 square feet and its diameter about thirty-five, equal to

twenty files. If our man takes to cover and gets behind a rifle pit or other like cover, as he is very apt to do, we can only get at him by increasing the angle of fall for our shrapnel, and must have recourse to high-angle fire with reduced charges.

The remaining velocity at 2,750 yards will give the same penetration at 100 yards to bullets say seventy to the pound, as that at 4,500 yards will give to those forty-four to the pound. Within this shorter range the smaller bullets will be effective, and the shrapnel will contain 392 bullets, *i. e.*, we shall stand an equal chance for bagging the smaller as the larger bird. This will give three kinds of projectiles, but our old time batteries carried four, and we can do the same if necessary. The projectiles should be regulated, not to a fixed weight of powder but to such quantity as will insure the standard initial velocity with a uniform service weight for all projectiles. Not a difficult matter, but without which we cannot obtain the maximum accuracy of fire, and more especially the maximum effectiveness with time fuzes, upon which so much of the usefulness of field artillery now depends.

A comparison of these two projectiles reveals the natural and apparently astonishing results which inevitably follow when a proper value for $\frac{d^2}{w}$ has been obtained. A suitable value for this factor will always insure, for any gun, the best ballistic results, and having all the conditions most favorable for the artilleryman, while a bad value will inevitably insure poor results, no matter what may be the conditions, and in the very nature of things they must be those most unfavorable to him.

It is not necessary to have an elevating screw of sufficient weight to raise a house, nor to have it fitted with a gear as complicated as that of a steam capstan. The weight of that for the 3".2 gun is out of all reasonable proportion to the work it ought properly be called upon to do.

The propriety of selecting the *French*, instead of the *wedge* fermeture for a field gun, and especially for a horse artillery gun, is a matter of grave doubt. By far the larger number of artillery officers favor the latter, and they are probably right.

A suitable brake which can be used at any moment upon the road or in firing the gun to check the recoil, is a *sine qua non*. Without one, any field gun should be condemned at once. The members of this Association have to deal with horses, and can fully appreciate the absolute necessity for the preservation of their good condition at all times. Not one of them, nor would any teamster or freighter in America, start upon a campaign with a wagon unprovided with this absolutely indispensable requisite. In fact it would be next to impossible to find such a wagon in this country. It is not the steep and difficult descents which have so much to do with the very serious evil of sore necks upon the artillery wheel horses, nor is it the weight normally thrown upon the pole straps, but the con-

stantly recurring little pitches along the road which do not call for—will not admit of the use of the lock-chain. These, far more than all other causes, produce this evil and the only prevention is a suitable and practicable brake, similar in its nature to that found upon any work wagon in this country. It may not comport with the "handsome and graceful appearance of the carriage," may require a slight additional weight, and it may be somewhat in the way of the gunners; but the gunners can be trusted to take care of themselves, and to get along as well as those of other nations; while the matter of weight will be made up from that of the recoil-brakes and the lock-chains, etc. For especially steep or difficult descents the prolonge is always at hand, and one or both wheels can readily and quickly be securely locked, should the brake prove to be insufficient in power. With a horse artillery gun the brake would have to be used by the wheel driver, in the same manner as with the freight teamster; the line to the brake lever would, however, have to be provided with a snap-hasp, to be detached and fastened to the chest-handle or other convenient place when the piece is unlimbered. For use upon the road the recoil brake is utterly impracticable. It will securely lock a wheel, but that wheel cannot possibly be unlocked without halting the team and running back the carriage in order to release the brake, and as we are here dealing with horse artillery, this necessitates the dismounting of some of the gunners. It is desirable to secure the opinion of General MERRITT, or any other cavalry commander as to the utility of a battery for rapid marching, (no matter how perfect it may be in every other respect) when handicapped by such a state of affairs as this recoil brake insures. It may be claimed that at least one man had to dismount to release the old lock-chain. A sufficient answer is that the carriage did not generally have to be halted even then; and that all old time freight wagons had to use the lock-chain, whereas all are now provided with the modern brake. It is here reiterated that there is nothing connected with the 3".2 gun carriage so pernicious as the recoil-brake; not even excepting the method of strengthening the axle by spreading a lot of boiler-plate along its length. So long as these twin evils are permitted to exist, we will never have a satisfactory field carriage, nor one at all to be compared with the best results obtained by foreign artillery engineers. Undoubtedly we shall have a "novelty," as this combination has been aptly designated, but this novelty will remain a mechanical absurdity as a means to an end where lightness of weight is undoubtedly the greatest factor. If any one doubt this fact, let him state the conditions and submit the designs of this carriage, together with one of KRUPP's, to any mechanical engineer in this country and secure his professional opinion. It is no plea in extenuation to claim that the tie-rods would be in the way of the gunner. This would not hold, even if the rods served only the single pur-

pose of supporting the axle; but they also serve another, of almost equal importance, by furnishing points of support for the brake, without which the matter of securing a suitable one would be, by no means, so simple.

The removal of the pintle from its old position near the axle to a considerable distance in rear of it is simply going back to the old evils our predecessors tried to mitigate or avoid. This change only provides a lever for whipping the pole around in every direction, and the further the removal the greater the evil, and *vice versa*. The pole can just as readily be balanced, either by properly placing or by packing the limber chest, as by the aid of the trail. The matter of limbering or unlimbering is one of no consequence. Once the cannoneers get their hands upon the limber they can quickly and readily do either with their eyes shut. The artillery during our late war had to campaign over some exceedingly rough country, encountering an unusual number of stumps and rocks, but it usually got there. An it would have done so just as readily had the diameter of its wheels been fifty five instead of fifty-seven inches. As to the "turning-angle" about which so much is said. Let anyone mark out upon a smooth drill ground with one of the old carriages, its turning-angle, then select the best drivers he can find and with a team of only four horses and no greater gait than a good square trot, see how near the carriage can be made to come to its turning-angle. There will be no doubt as to its sufficiency. For extraordinarily tight places the drill manual instructs that the carriage be unlimbered, when it can readily and quickly turn in any space in which the team can be doubled and the pole swung around. The new limber body weighs seventy pounds more than the old one, and there can be no possible reason for this increase save the change in the position of the pintle. This is equivalent to four rounds of ammunition for each limber, and as there are two and one-half per gun, the loss is ten rounds per gun. It is submitted that no possible virtue resulting from such a change, can compensate for such a loss as this.

The problem of the construction of a suitable field gun is in its nature similar to that of constructing a musket for a soldier. A given weight is available which must be divided between the gun and its ammunition and the means of carrying it. With the field gun the number and weight of the rounds being determined and the limber constructed to carry them, the remainder goes for the gun-carriage and the gun. A man has a limit of weight and strength—of endurance to resist the recoil of his gun, which, together with the conditions under which it is fired, must of necessity be made to conform thereto. Just so for a good substantial carriage. For a given track, etc., the weight and strength are limited, and it requires no argument to prove that, just as with the man, the gun and the conditions under which it is fired must in this case be made to conform to the conditions precedent. Had this been so with this 3".2 gun, we should

have had a good gun, but whether a horse or field gun it would have been a very different one from the present one. No better illustration can be cited than the one already alluded to, the change from the old 6 pounder to the 3" rifle. Here we have the fact that in this change the constructor not only had to face the difficulties of a longer bore but the vastly greater one of the enormous increase of 15,000 or 20,000 pounds per square inch pressure in the bore, and at the same time secure a greater weight of metal in the limber. He derived no such substantial advantage as now exists by the use of an Archibald wheel, with which greater strength, if necessary, is insured with a considerable reduction in weight. He could not gain forty-six pounds by a reduction in the weight of the implements and equipments, as can now be done. He had not the advantages now afforded by modern material and mechanical skill, whereby not only is greater strength insured but with a substantial reduction in weight also. Yet, notwithstanding all of these disadvantages, his gun, with forty rounds in the limber, weighed just twenty-five pounds more than the old one. This, with sixty pounds greater weight of metal in the limber, fifty per cent. greater weight of projectile, and the effective range more than doubled, to say nothing of greater accuracy. The weight of the carriage-body was not changed by a single pound, while the weight of the paulin, equipments, etc., was forty pounds greater than for the old gun. The recoil of the new gun was unquestionably greater than for the old one, and no effort was made to control it, but its virtues were so many and so great as to entirely overshadow the evil of recoil.

It is insisted, and it is believed, with justice, that in the conversion of the 3" rifle into a modern breech-loader for horse artillery, that this example of most successful conversion be followed. If a steel carriage cannot be constructed of the same weight, but greater strength, then the old one ought to be retained. A brake will require a weight of fifty-five pounds, but as an offset there is a reduction of forty-six pounds in the weight of implements no longer required, and about twenty more in the lock-chain, sponge-hooks, handspike rings, etc., leaving an actual net gain of eleven pounds for a new carriage. The diameter of the wheel can be reduced to fifty-five inches, as in the German and Russian (Austrian fifty-four, French fifty-six and one-half, and Italian fifty inches), and the weight reduced to 150 pounds or even less. The Russian wheel of the same diameter weighs 151 pounds, and serves for all field carriages, whether the 3".43 horse and field guns, or the 4".19 position gun, and for the caissons, weighing, without gunners 4,722 pounds. The Archibald Wheel Co., with the aid of aluminum bronze, or brass, can make a stronger and better wheel of this diameter and weight than any Russian ever saw, and one moreover that will be stronger than the old pattern wheel of 180 pounds which was used for the old horse artillery guns.

Such a wheel conceded, and it must be if we are to have what we want and ought to be given—we need go no further, though it is but reasonable to suppose that some further reduction in weight can be secured in the limber, and caisson bodies, chests, etc., and by discarding the foot-boards which are not required for horse artillery carriages, and in fact ought to be discarded if for no other reason than to prevent the men from making them harboring places for unauthorized weights. But without considering these, or changing the weight of the gun from that of the 3".2, and allowing seventeen pounds for the weight of a round as fixed for that gun, we should have:

Gun (caliber three inches)	800 pounds.
Carriage-body	540 "
Brake	55 "
Two wheels	300 "
Prolonge, implements, etc.....	21 "
	1716
Limber-body	335 "
Two wheels	300 "
Chest	185 "
Ammunition, packed (thirty rounds)	525 "
Equipments, water buckets, etc.....	28 "
Paulin	54 "
	1427—3143
Old 6 pounder, fifty rounds	3185 "
3" rifle, forty rounds.....	3203 "

Weight of metal in limber, 6 pounder, 300; 3" rifle, 360, and the above 427 pounds.

With nine of the old caissons but provided with brakes the above weight of wheel, two only carrying spare-wheel and axle and 160 rounds per gun, the weight of a caisson fully equipped for service will come within 3,420 pounds, or the limiting load of 570 per horse.

That such a gun and conditions, or others very similar, are entirely practicable, admits of no reasonable doubt. It would be especially designed for artillery service and would meet the conditions required therefor.

When the caliber of the 3".2 gun, its weight, etc., are compared with foreign guns, it is found to fall, not as the Ordnance Board asserted it was intended to, viz: between a horse artillery and position gun, but between a horse and a light field gun, and between these two stools it naturally falls to the ground, not good for either purpose.

A suitable value for $\frac{d^2}{w}$ would give a projectile weighing about fifteen pounds, with which this gun would be a very good one—of its kind. The projectiles for the best horse artillery guns weigh a little over twelve

pounds, and for the best light field about eighteen, the mean being about fifteen pounds. Thus the fact established by the calibre, would be emphasized by a proper projectile; the 3".2 is simply a "mean" gun between horse and light field, as compared with those in use by the military nations of the world. That it was not especially designed for horse artillery purposes, and can never under any circumstances be made to meet the conditions required for such a gun, is a fact so obvious as to be beyond question or doubt.

"SHERIDAN'S EXPEDITION AROUND RICHMOND MAY 9-25, 1864."

BY MAJOR LOUIS H. CARPENTER,
5TH CAVALRY, BREVET COLONEL U. S. A.

THE crossing of the Rapidan May 4th, commenced the campaign of 1864 in Virginia. The battles of the Wilderness followed on May 5th and 6th, and on the night of May 7th, the army marched around the right flank of LEE's line and pushed for Spottsylvania Court House, only to find that the Confederates had beaten in the race and were in possession, necessitating a desperate contest in that vicinity. During these movements our cavalry had encountered the mounted force of the enemy in severe conflicts: on the 5th, at Todd's Tavern and the Furnaces; on the 6th, at the Furnaces and on the 7th, at Todd's Tavern, a second time.

On the 8th of May General SHERIDAN received instructions to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the enemy's flank, attack his cavalry and line of communications, and, if necessary, go to the James River and obtain supplies from General BUTLER, who was then at Bermuda Hundred.

As a preliminary measure the cavalry was concentrated near the plank road to Fredericksburg at SILVERS' and ALDRICH's plantations on the evening of the 8th.

The Corps consisted of three Divisions, aggregating about 9,300 effective men, and was organized as follows:

First Division.—Brigadier General WESLEY MERRITT, three brigades.

First Br'gade.—Brigadier General GEORGE A. CUSTER.

Second Brigade.—Colonel THOMAS C. DEVIN.

Third Brigade.—Colonel ALFRED GIBBS. (This brigade consisted of the 1st, 2d and 5th Regular Cavalry, the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry and the 1st New York Dragoons, and was known as "The Reserve Brigade").

NOTE.—General SHERIDAN was assigned to the command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac early in April, 1864.

Shortly after this event his staff was fully organized with Lieut. Colonel JAMES W. FORSYTH (now Colonel 7th Cavalry) as Chief of Staff, and I was detailed as one of the additional Aides-de-Camp.

Second Division.—Brigadier General D. McM. GREGG, two brigades,

First Brigade.—Brigadier General H. E. DAVIES.

Second Brigade.—Colonel J. IRWIN GREGG.

Third Division.—Brigadier General JAMES H. WILSON, two brigades.

First Brigade.—Colonel GEORGE H. CHAPMAN.

Second Brigade.—Colonel JOHN B. MCINTOSH.

The 6th U. S. Cavalry was detailed as escort for General SHERIDAN, as the regiment was much reduced in numbers, having lost heavily in the Gettysburg campaign.

Several regiments of cavalry were left behind to perform escort service and to guard trains and prisoners. Three troops of the 5th Regular Cavalry were at General GRANT's headquarters. The 3d Pennsylvania was at headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. The 4th New York and 5th New York were guarding trains and prisoners.

The Brigade of Horse Artillery.—Captain JAMES M. ROBERTSON, 2d U. S. Artillery, Chief of Artillery.

New York Light, 6th Battery.—Captain JOSEPH W. MARTIN.

2d United States Batteries B and L.—Lieutenant EDWARD HEATON.

2d United States Battery D.—Lieutenant E. D. WILLISTON.

2d United States Battery M.—Lieutenant A. C. M. PENNINGTON.

4th United States Battery A.—Lieutenant RUFUS KING, JR.

4th United States Batteries C and E.—Lieutenant CHARLES L. FITZHUGH.

The batteries were assigned to divisions as follows: WILLISTON and HEATON to the first, MARTIN and KING to the second, PENNINGTON and FITZHUGH to the third.

The cavalry was well equipped, and armed with the sabre and Colt's revolver, and the principal portion with the Sharp's carbine, a breech-loading weapon, using a paper cartridge with a cap or the Maynard primer. CUSTER's Michigan brigade was supplied with the Spencer carbine, having a magazine carrying seven cartridges. The workmanship of this gun was indifferent, but it did, notwithstanding, excellent service and gave an immense advantage to the troops armed with it. The brigade could throw in a tremendous fire when necessary, with great effect upon the enemy, who was naturally very often deceived in his estimate of the force opposed to him, judging from the unintermitting, incessant rattle along the line that he was contending with at least a division.

The regiments of the Corps were as a rule drilled in the double rank formation, in accordance with the authorized tactics adopted in 1841, which was taken principally from the French system then in vogue. Three years of service in the field had made the men fearless riders, and had habituated them to the use of the revolver and sabre, in which they did not lack instruction.

As no campaigning could be attempted in Virginia during the winter season, the cavalry were at that time assiduously drilled in camp, except-

ing when engaged on picket duty, and as the regiments were filled with a very intelligent class of men anxious to learn, they improved rapidly and proved their efficiency afterwards in many encounters.

The country, in this section, being heavily wooded in many places, often much broken and intersected by streams with steep banks, afforded strong positions for defence to the enemy, which he was quick to take advantage of. When the Confederate cavalry were prepared to receive us under such favoring circumstances, it was found impossible to contend mounted with them with the least chance of success, and as a matter of necessity the Union troopers were compelled to resort to dismounting from their horses and fighting on foot. It must be admitted that we followed the lead of the Southerners in this respect, as they were the first to adopt dismounted fighting to any extent, and we were obliged to meet them in the same manner.

Numbers 1, 2 and 3 of each set of fours, both front and rear rank, dismounting, linked their horses, similar to the present method, No. 3 handing his reins to No. 4, who remained mounted, and three-fourths of the command became available for the work in hand. The men then formed quickly into line, and were deployed in extended order upon the center skirmisher or the right or left skirmisher, by each man obliquing at once to gain the interval. This was simple and worked well, and enabled the line to come into action and commence firing in a very short time. In less than half a minute a troop could dismount and deploy as skirmishers. Sometimes the line would be reinforced to about one man to the yard, but never heavier, and this answered all purposes. It is surprising when we consider how much was accomplished by this long, thin, apparently weak line of carbineers. How steadily it could advance under heavy fire, or deliberately retire, flexible, bending, but rarely breaking, keeping up its continuity, and showing a wonderful power of resistance. The formation seemed equal to any exigency that was presented to us during the war. The soldier becoming accustomed to losing the touch of his comrade, became more self-reliant and dependent on his own resources, taking advantage of all the cover and shelter possible, and more difficult to be persuaded that he was whipped. Here was developed the true spirit of the principle of fighting in extended and open order now introduced in foreign armies and following the adoption of the breech-loading fire-arms. Positions were attacked and defended in accordance with this method of our cavalry long before the system was followed by the infantry elsewhere. Reserves and supports were provided for, and kept in hand to render timely aid and be sent in when necessary.

Positions were occasionally held against infantry, as was done at Cold Harbor in 1864, where our dismounted men threw up hasty intrenchments and maintained their ground until the Union army came up, and again

later in the same year at Deep Bottom, on the James River nearly opposite Petersburg, when Generals MERRITT and GREGG with their cavalry defeated an attack of KERSHAW's division of LONGSTREET's corps, made upon lines held only by these dragoons on foot behind temporary cover. When the cavalry was dismounted, the horses were sent to the rear to take advantage of the nearest shelter from the enemy's fire, No. 4 having no difficulty in managing the three horses intrusted to him, or in moving them from place to place at any gait. In case a retreat became necessary, portions of the dismounted men would fall back alternately, taking new positions in rear, assisted by artillery, until it was possible to mount and retire without interference; or, in other cases, some of the line would be withdrawn and mounted, and then deployed as skirmishers to cover the retreat of the remainder, with mounted charges made occasionally on the flanks or front. In these movements the horse artillery was of the greatest assistance, being very efficient and in splendid condition. In action it was pushed far to the front, often with the most advanced line, and frequently with but little support. Remaining to the last minute, then galloping to a new position, harassing the enemy with excellent practice, checking his advance and discouraging his efforts, its services in the retreat were invaluable, as it was under many other circumstances. The guns used were the well-known 3-inch rifled field pieces of the Ordnance Department, equal at that time to any in the world, and six were the complement of each battery. According to VON VERDY DU VERNOIS, two batteries of horse artillery should be attached to each division of cavalry consisting of six regiments as organized in the German army, and we were within this allowance. We had more regiments in our divisions but they were generally weak and by no means up to the full strength. Afterwards the number of guns taken by us on long expeditions was considerably reduced. In raids made by FORREST, he usually had with him about two to a brigade.

With the exception of a battery of the New York Volunteers, commanded by Captain MARTIN, all of the horse batteries in the Army of the Potomac belonged to the regular artillery.

The cavalry consisted of volunteers, excepting three regiments in the Reserve Brigade, and the 6th Cavalry at headquarters, who represented the permanent establishment. As has been remarked before, the volunteers were a splendid body of men, well officered, and at this time had a great share of "the self-reliant, all-sufficing energy" which Sir HENRY HAVELOCK ascribed to the Northern horsemen that served under SHERIDAN.

The horses were in poor condition consequent upon the arduous picket duty required of the cavalry during the previous winter, which had been continued so long into the spring, that no opportunity had been given to allow the animals to recuperate. The command was supplied with one

day's forage and three days' rations, the latter being carried in the haversacks of the men, and there was reason to believe that no grain would be found in the country to the north of the North Anna. A small train of wagons accompanied the corps chiefly for the purpose of carrying extra ammunition, the baggage and material being left with the army.

We marched on the morning of the 9th, and soon turned upon a telegraph road from Fredericksburg, General MERRITT taking the advance with the First Division. It was customary in marches for the divisions to alternate, one taking the lead the first day, another the next and so on. The same rule was carried out with the brigades in each division, and the regiments in each brigade. The gait was the walk, any other being the exception.

The three divisions were marched on one road, making a column eight or nine miles in length, and it was obviously difficult at times to know the condition of affairs in the rear when the Commanding General and his staff were riding with the leading troops.

This order of march was adopted, notwithstanding the objections that present themselves, because the roads in the country did not admit of a satisfactory management of parallel columns, and it was not considered expedient or safe to be uncertain about the locality or whereabouts of a portion of the troops at any time. The plans of General SHERIDAN are thus given in his report: "There was but little space for a large cavalry force to operate on the left of our army from Spottsylvania to the Rappahannock, and we were liable to be shut in, I therefore concluded to march around the right of LEE's army and put the command before fighting south of the North Anna, where we expected to procure grain, and where I was confident that, while engaging the enemy's cavalry, no timely assistance from his infantry could be procured, and whence, if not successful, I could proceed west and rejoin the army, swinging around towards Gordonsville and Orange Court House." Continuing our march down the Telegraph road we stopped for a time at a place known by the euphonious title of "Mud Tavern," and then passed the Massaponax creek and swamp, a very deep valley skirted with high hills, and crossed in succession the Ny, Po and Ta rivers without opposition, in which we were favored by fortune, as they afforded many advantageous positions where the enemy could have given us trouble. The commanding ground was generally on the south bank of these streams, and the country near them was thickly wooded. The head of the column finally reached Chilesburg and halted here for a short time. Resuming the march we pushed on to the North Anna, and MERRITT with his division crossed at once at Anderson's Ford, the divisions of GREGG and WILSON encamping on the north side without crossing. We were thus far successful in turning the flank of LEE's army, avoiding the enemy's infantry and en-

countering in our advance only a few outlying pickets. The latter must, however, have soon informed the Confederates of the movement that was going on, as about 4 in the afternoon the rear guard, consisting of DAVIES' brigade of GREGG's division, was attacked by WICKHAM's brigade after the passage of the Ta, near Tarrald's Mills, and in the conflict that ensued the enemy was eventually repulsed. The 6th Ohio Cavalry, 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry and 1st New Jersey Cavalry were all engaged in the affair at times during its progress and several handsome charges were made on both sides. Captain ABELL, of the 6th Ohio was killed, two officers wounded and seventy-three men of the Union troops were killed, wounded and missing. These attacks were kept up until after dark, LOMAX's brigade assisting WICKHAM later in the afternoon. Immediately after MERRITR's division had crossed the North Anna, CUSTER's brigade was detached and ordered to proceed to the Beaver Dam station on the Virginia Central Railroad, a short distance beyond in the direction that the column had been traveling. Major BREWER, of the 1st Michigan Cavalry, with a battalion of his regiment, having the advance, captured a train of ambulances soon after leaving the river, and then moved on to the station, the remainder of the brigade following in support. A considerable force of the enemy was encountered and defeated, a number captured and 375 Union prisoners taken from them. Of the latter, one was a colonel, two were lieutenant colonels and many were officers of lower rank, belonging to regiments of infantry that had participated in the battles of the Wilderness. The poor fellows were overjoyed at their unlooked for good fortune and expressed their gratitude in unmeasured terms. As there was no other way of disposing of them they had to accompany us on our journey and share our fortune, getting mounted in every imaginable manner and style or traveling with the train. The station was destroyed two locomotives, three trains, consisting of 100 cars, ninety wagons, several hundred stands of arms, a large number of hospital tents, 200,000 pounds of bacon, flour, meal, sugar and molasses, making about 1,500,000 rations, and a great portion of the medical supplies for LEE's army. In addition, eight or ten miles of railroad track was thoroughly broken up and the culverts destroyed. This station was directly in rear of LEE's army at Spottsylvania, and between that place and Richmond, and on his line of communications. The loss must have been a serious blow to the Confederates as it was estimated at \$10,000,000.00 by the Richmond *Dispatch*, in a copy which afterwards fell into our possession. Forage was found and the animals were well fed, and we prepared as far as possible for the fighting that we knew was in store for us. The enemy's cavalry was gathering and troops were collecting in front to protect the Confederate Capital. About daybreak on the 10th,

the enemy commenced a brisk cannonading as a reveille, and our camps on the south side were shelled from the opposite banks of the river.

This was followed by an attack on WILSON and GREGG, who were still on the north side of the stream, the Confederates being however repulsed, and the crossing made without much loss.

The General sent me down to the ford to keep the troops moving and expedite matters, and I remained there until the rear had passed. The ford was then obstructed by felling large trees across it from our side. The 5th Regular Cavalry and a squadron of the 1st New York Dragoons were sent early in the morning a short distance up the North Anna to the Davenport bridge, with instructions to remain there until the rear of the command had passed on the main road, to protect the flank of the column from attack. While occupying this position a superior force of the enemy crossed the river by blind fords known to them, between Davenport bridge and Anderson's ford, and interposed between our detachment and the Union column. In withdrawing, the Confederates were encountered, but without hesitation the 5th Cavalry, with Captain ARNOLD at its head, drew sabres and all made a gallant charge, cutting their way through the enemy and rejoining the corps, but losing sixty-two men in killed, wounded and missing or captured. Some fighting occurred near Beaver Dam station, the Confederates commencing to harass our rear again. In making these energetic assaults, they evidently expected that we would be compelled to halt and assist the rear guard, and be delayed in our advance. If this was the case their tactics failed utterly, as General SHERIDAN moved steadily on, acting upon the opinion that the division in rear was fully able to provide for all exigencies. Near this place, however, STUART, taking FITZHUGH LEE's division with him, left us, making a forced march by way of Hanover Court House, and then on a parallel road, in order to throw these troops between our column and Richmond, leaving GORDON's brigade of W. H. F. LEE's division to continue the attack upon our rear. About 1:30 P. M. the command arrived at Negrofoot, a plantation belonging to Mr. HANCOCK, taking the road from that place to Richmond. At 4:50 P. M. we crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel bridge and encamped on the south side in that vicinity, obtaining some forage.

On the evening of the 10th, General DAVIES was sent out with his brigade to Ashland station, on the Fredericksburg railroad, where he destroyed six miles of track with a number of culverts, one engine and a train of cars. In an encounter with the enemy he lost seventeen killed and wounded, including among the former Lieutenant HOPKINS of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry, who fell in a conflict with a portion of the 2d Virginia Cavalry in the town of Ashland.

The morning of May 11th was inaugurated with an artillery fire upon

some of the Confederate cavalry who made their appearance on the north side of the South Anna, and some skirmishing was commenced with the rear guard on our departure. Having burned the bridge on the South Anna we advanced on the large road leading from Louisa Court House to Richmond. This road, sometimes known as "the old mountain road," was used a great deal by the Confederates for large trains hauling supplies to LEE's army. One of these trains passed shortly before our arrival, and the teamsters were probably not sorry to miss making our acquaintance. Arriving at the Glen Allen station on the Fredericksburg railroad, the track was destroyed for some distance. While our troops were engaged in this work, the enemy's cavalry was discovered in the direction of Richmond, and it was found that they had concentrated at "Yellow Tavern," near the intersection of the Telegraph road and the Brook turnpike, six miles from the city.

The 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, meeting the enemy in force, was reinforced by the Reserve Brigade, who rapidly dismounted, sent their horses to the rear, and were soon engaged near the junction of these roads. The 2d Brigade of the 1st Division was dismounted, placed on the right, and the whole line attacking the enemy in the most gallant manner soon gave to MERRITT the possession of the Brook road leading directly to Richmond. The enemy occupied a strong position on hills or bluffs, partly wooded and partly open, the line crossing the Telegraph road, following it for some distance and facing nearly west, being supported by artillery, and threatening SHERIDAN's flank if an advance was continued. The Confederates were dismounted behind temporary breast works, excepting the 1st Virginia Cavalry, which was held mounted as a reserve, LOMAX's brigade being on the left and WICKHAM's on the right. CUSTER with the 1st Brigade was sent mounted towards the left of our line of battle.

In the attack made by the Reserve and 2d Brigades, the enemy fought with desperation, and it is claimed by Colonel DEVIN that the 9th New York, serving on the left of the 2d Brigade, was principally opposed to the 5th Virginia Cavalry which was defeated after a hard contest, the 9th New York capturing eight commissioned officers and eighty-four men for whom they obtained receipts. Only three officers of the 5th Virginia Cavalry came out unhurt, and among the killed was the gallant Colonel H. CLAY PATE, whose body was left in our lines.

Not being able to drive the enemy from his position, the 2d Brigade held their ground, and were warmly engaged along the whole line. On the arrival of CUSTER upon the left of the Reserve Brigade, a survey of the enemy from this place showed him that the Confederates were strongly posted on a bluff in the rear of a thin piece of woods, their battery being concealed from our view by the timber, while they had obtained a very accurate range upon our troops. The edge of the woods nearest our front

was held by the enemy's dismounted men who poured a heavy fire into our lines until the 5th and 6th Michigan were ordered to dismount and drive the enemy from his position, which they did in the most gallant manner, led by Colonel ALGER of the 5th and Major KIDD of the 6th. These troops were then ordered to hold this position until further instructions were given. In this assault the regiments were assisted by HEATON's battery, which accompanied them and rendered valuable service. After making a careful examination, General CUSTER became convinced that the enemy's battery could be taken by a mounted charge, keeping well to the right. The 1st Michigan Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel STAGG, was formed for the attack, supported by the 1st Vermont Cavalry which had been furnished from CHAPMAN's brigade of WILSON's division, CHAPMAN himself leading the regiment. The 7th Michigan Cavalry was placed in reserve.

As soon as these troops moved forward, mounted, from the cover of the woods, the enemy opened an artillery fire with shell and cannister. Several fences had to be torn down on ground swept by the Confederate battery. When within 200 yards the command charged sabre in hand with the greatest dash, led by their intrepid commander, capturing two guns, the gunners and other prisoners, driving the enemy in confusion from that flank. CUSTER states: "After the enemy were driven across a deep ravine about a quarter of a mile beyond the position held by his battery he rallied and reformed his forces and resisted successfully the further advance of the 1st Michigan and 1st Vermont. The 7th Michigan was ordered forward and when near the enemy's position charged with drawn sabres. Major GRANGER, like a true soldier, placed himself at the head of his men and led them bravely up to the very muzzles of the enemy's guns, but notwithstanding the efforts of this gallant officer, the enemy held their position and the 7th Michigan was compelled to retire, but not until the chivalric GRANGER had fallen, pierced through the head by the bullets of the enemy." In this conflict the Confederate dismounted troops were assisted by a mounted charge of the 1st Virginia Cavalry.

The 1st Michigan Cavalry lost forty-eight men; the 7th Michigan thirty-five, and the 1st Vermont ten. During the mounted charge General STUART, commanding the Confederate cavalry, received a mortal wound while endeavoring to rally his broken command, and was taken in an ambulance to Richmond, where he died the next day.

His loss was a grievous blow to the cause that he fought for, and few cavalry officers have gained a more distinguished place in history. The entire dismounted line was now advanced, carrying everything before it, part of the enemy's forces retreating towards Ashland and part towards Richmond.

During the engagement, the 6th New York Cavalry advanced on the Brook road as far as the Brook bridge, and held it.

WILLISTON's battery was posted with one section at the cross-roads, and the other commanding the Richmond road, and made some good practice, dismounting one of the enemy's guns and destroying one of their caissons. GORDON's Confederate brigade of cavalry attacked the rear of the column held by GREGG, just as it was leaving Ground Squirrel bridge, and kept up a constant conflict during the entire day, and during the time that the fight at Yellow Tavern was going on, until finally defeated and compelled to retire, thus forming part of the general engagement. In this part of the action the Confederate brigade lost its commander, General JAMES B. GORDON, of Georgia, who was killed in front of GREGG's lines.

General SHERIDAN states in his report: "The enemy made an error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to throw all of the strength on that which opposed my front, and fight the other with a small rear guard." The Confederate losses in this engagement are admitted to have been severe, but it is impossible to determine the number with accuracy. The Union casualties on May 11th were 242 officers and men killed, wounded and missing. From the trustworthy account of a Southern writer it appears that FITZHUGH LEE's division of cavalry composed all of the force that opposed us on the front at Yellow Tavern and that GORDON's brigade of W. H. F. LEE's division engaged the rear, and that this force amounted to between 4,000 and 5,000 men. This leaves over 4,000 of the Confederate cavalry to be accounted for, as the returns of the Army of Northern Virginia, April 20, 1864, just before the campaign commenced, show 9,700 men as the strength present of the cavalry corps commanded by STUART, with an aggregate of over 16,000 present and absent. In a recent letter to the writer, General HAMPTON states that he was at this time on the left flank of LEE's army with ROSSER's brigade and some other cavalry (perhaps including CHAMBLISS' brigade of W. H. F. LEE's division).

BUTLER and his brigade had not returned from South Carolina, to which place he had gone expecting to return with his old regiments replaced by others of greater strength. At all events it is unquestionable that the division of FITZHUGH LEE occupied a strong position in this affair, protected and made stronger by temporary shelter hastily thrown up.

MERRITT's division was opposed to them, assisted by a brigade of WILSON's, and in this brigade the 1st Vermont alone was engaged to amount to anything, as the "return of casualties" shows only one man wounded in the 3d Indiana. McINTOSH's brigade did not fire a shot, nor were either of GREGG's brigades engaged on the front. With men and

officers of the reputation and fighting qualities of FITZHUGH LEE and his division, serving under the direction of STUART, and with the advantage of selecting the ground for a defence, no less number than those opposed to them in this affair could possibly have driven them from their position, and General MERRITT and his troops are entitled to great credit for their success.

After dark a reconnoissance was made in the direction of Richmond on the Brook road. Colonel DEVIN, with the 2d Brigade of the 1st Division, advancing crossed Brook creek and went forward through the outer defences of the city to the Emmanuel church, where he halted and received orders to remain in this position.

After caring for the wounded as far as practicable, and making arrangements concerning the prisoners, about midnight the whole command proceeded up the Brook road. Just beyond the church a road leads to the left between the inner and outer defences of Richmond, and General SHERIDAN determined to follow this around, and thence across the Mechanicsville turnpike south of the Chickahominy to Fair Oaks station, where he intended to encamp the next night, and then support BUTLER, if the report was true that he had crossed the James and was advancing toward the Confederate capital. Some have thought it strange that SHERIDAN did not make an attempt to take Richmond at this time, but I do not think that he ever seriously contemplated undertaking it with his cavalry alone. In later years he stated that the city could possibly have been taken, but it would have cost the loss of several hundred men, and if occupied it could not have been held for any length of time.

It is claimed in a speech made by Governor FITZHUGH LEE, of Virginia, at the recent unveiling of the statue of General STUART on the ground where he fell, that "the safety of Richmond was undoubtedly secured by the fight at Yellow Tavern, where a delay of some five hours to SHERIDAN made it possible for the works upon that side of the city to be manned by troops sufficient to hold them." This delay may have made the undertaking more difficult, but the returns show that there were troops enough in Richmond at any time on May 11th to have made a desperate defence behind strong works.

The city was thoroughly alarmed and its soldiers were on the alert. In the tri monthly return for the Department of Richmond, dated May 10, 1864, appears the following:

SHERIDAN'S EXPEDITION AROUND RICHMOND. 311

EFFECTIVE PRESENT.

Infantry:	
Richmond defences.....	1,628
Hunton's Brigade.....	1,608
Barton's Brigade.....	1,608
Gracie's Brigade	1,578
2d Maryland Infantry.....	286
Garrison Chapin's Bluff.....	435
Garrison Drewry's Bluff.....	395

7,538

Cavalry:	
Holcomb's South Carolina Legion.....	201
Battery Virginia Cavalry.....	216
1st Maryland.....	279

696

Artillery:	
Total	733

It is noted on the return that GRACIE'S Brigade had just arrived.

Deduct from the infantry the garrisons of Chapin's Bluff and Drewry's Bluff—830 men, and we have present effective the day before the battle at Yellow Tavern :

Infantry	6,708
Cavalry	696
Artillery	733

This, added to the cavalry we had been fighting, was certainly much more than the strength of the Union force. It will be seen that a considerable portion of this infantry made their appearance on the 12th at Meadow Bridge.

Major McCLELLAN states in "The Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," that he was sent to Richmond by STUART about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th, and had an interview with General BRAGG who was in the city, and who told him that there were troops to the number of 4,000, and three brigades were hourly expected from the army at Petersburg. By the returns, these brigades seem to have arrived, including GRACIE'S.

After passing Emmanuel church the column took the road to the left, WILSON being in front with the 3d Division, MERRITT and GREGG in rear. Several torpedoes exploded in the Brook road under the column, but did not do much damage.

The advance crossed the Virginia Central railroad and reached the Mechanicsville road, driving in a small picket.

The city seemed very near, and there was evidence of a great stir. The gaslights could be seen, bells were ringing and locomotives whistling loudly. Just before daybreak WILSON halted near the Mechanicsville turnpike, and not being certain about the route, concluded to wait for a guide and began massing his division. Directly after the enemy com-

menced a fire of musketry from their inner works, and then a battery of heavy guns opened at a few hundred yards distant. WILSON states in his report: "Colonel CHAPMAN hastily dismounted his brigade and sent the horses back. Colonel McINTOSH brought up his brigade and dismounted. The batteries were put in position and opened upon the enemy's works. By this time it was daylight. I soon learned that it would be exceedingly difficult to push on in the direction of Fair Oaks, and notified General SHERIDAN of the same. The defences of Richmond on the Mechanicsville pike, approach so near to the Chickahominy as to enable the rebel guns to sweep all the ground above the river bottom."

General SHERIDAN, on hearing of this state of affairs, massed MERRITT's division near the rear at the Meadow Bridge and as it was impossible to proceed farther in the direction of Fair Oaks, it became necessary to take measures to cross the Chickahominy and an examination was made into the condition of the bridge, resulting in finding that it was partially destroyed and the flooring gone. FITZHUGH LEE's division having proceeded here from Yellow Tavern during the night, had taken up a strong position, protected by breastworks, on a hill some distance from the river on the opposite side, with artillery posted so as to sweep the bridge, and a strong line of skirmishers thrown forward. MERRITT was ordered to take his division, repair the bridge as soon as possible and drive the enemy from the front. He lost no time and commenced the execution of a difficult duty with characteristic energy and judgment.

Details were sent to tear down some barns to get the necessary lumber and to protect the fatigue parties ordered to work on the bridge, the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments, dismounted, finally succeeded in crossing upon the Virginia Central Railroad bridge a little farther down the river. The advanced skirmishers of the enemy were then compelled to retreat, and our troops, using a thick wood for shelter, were able to keep the Confederates at a safe distance. Our men now worked rapidly and under the supervision of the officers every effort was made to make the crossing practicable with the least possible delay.

WILSON had formed his line to protect the right and GREGG the rear. CHAPMAN moved his line further back from the position occupied early in the morning and formed along the Virginia Central railroad on the left and McINTOSH connected with his right. A strong line of infantry advanced from the defences of Richmond against GREGG and WILSON and a force of cavalry at the same time attacked the right of GREGG's division. The engagement became general, the batteries on both sides opened fire and the rattle of musketry and roar of artillery was heard on all sides. The situation was undoubtedly a serious one. We had an impassable river on our left, the intrenchments and fortifications of Richmond on our right, and infantry and cavalry on our right and rear.

Anxious looks were cast in the direction of the bridge, but MERRITT's men worked hard, no doubt appreciating the condition of affairs, and after a few hours the crossing was made practicable and measures were at once taken against the enemy on the opposite side of the river. A force passed over the bridge and the 1st and 2d Cavalry (regulars) were formed dismounted to the right of the road, the 9th New York Cavalry, the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry and one regiment of the 1st Brigade on the left of the road, and four regiments, mounted, in reserve upon the road. The arrangements being completed the position held by the enemy was immediately attacked, and after a hard contest, in which we suffered severely, the Confederates were driven from their rifle-pits, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands, and the pursuit was kept up for about two miles. The road was now open to the north side of the Chickahominy and the column began moving across the bridge. A renewed attack was made by the infantry upon WILSON, and MCINTOSH's men were compelled to give way and fall back before the advancing Confederates. The retreat continued until our troops had passed a little knoll upon which FITZHUGH's battery was posted. The infantry had pressed forward until it was not more than five or ten yards from Meadow Ridge, and the hostile bullets were heard whistling over the only available road. Some confusion being noticed, two other staff officers were sent down to the bridge to preserve order and prevent anything like a panic, but the necessity for this did not last for any length of time. As soon as MCINTOSH's line had fallen back to the knob alluded to, FITZHUGH's battery opened with cannister, checking the advance of the enemy, and an attack being made by DAVIES' brigade on the right and a flank fire from some troops on the left, finally caused the Confederates to give up the fight and retreat behind the works. About the same time they were decisively repulsed on GREGG's front, after a warm engagement. When the 1st Division was detained at the bridge, the 2d Division (GREGG's) was in the rear, near the Brook road, and in front of the inner line of the enemy's defences. In his report GREGG says: "In this position the 2d Brigade on the right was attacked by a large force of cavalry in the direction of the Brook road. On the left of the 2d Brigade, and in front of the 1st Brigade formed on the left, the enemy attacked with infantry. Not doubting the success of their attack the enemy moved boldly against our lines despite the well directed fire of two of our batteries (MARTIN's and KING's). * * The contest was, however, of short duration and terminated in the enemy being routed along the whole line."

General FITZHUGH LEE did all in his power to detain the Union cavalry at the Meadow bridge, so as to give the infantry in Richmond a chance to inflict a disastrous blow on SHERIDAN's corps. The plan was well devised but failed in consequence of the excellent dispositions made

by SHERIDAN, supported by the good judgment of his generals and the gallantry of the officers and men. There is evidence that there were over 7,000 effective troops in array near Richmond on the 12th of May, 1864, not counting the clerks and employes who were enrolled and organized for emergencies, and if the Confederate authorities in the city did not take advantage of our situation and send all of their available troops against us, they committed a serious mistake, in regard to their own interests. We cannot determine how many were in the forces opposed to us, but we do know that a considerable body of infantry attacked our lines. General GRANT, in his memoirs, says in describing the situation of General SHERIDAN and his troops in this affair that he was in a perilous position, from which few generals could have extricated themselves.

Although many have been inspired with the gravity of the situation, still General SHERIDAN at the time appeared perfectly confident throughout and did not show any anxiety concerning the result. He was, however, too prudent an officer not to provide for such a possible contingency as the failure to carry the bridge, as he states: "The enemy considered us completely cornered but such was not the case, for while we were engaged, scouting parties were sent along the Chickahominy and several fords were found by them."

After the repulse on WILSON's and GREGG's lines we were not molested farther by the enemy from Richmond, and the Confederate cavalry withdrew from the vicinity. MERRITT's division moved to Mechanicsville and there halted. The wounded and dead were provided for and the whole command marched to Gaines' Mills and encamped for the night.

On the road from Mechanicsville to Gaines' Mills the Reserve Brigade of the 1st Division was sharply attacked by a force of cavalry on the left flank, but they were repulsed without difficulty and the enemy disappeared. On our arrival at Gaines' Mills we had an opportunity to enjoy a much needed rest, which was thoroughly appreciated by both men and horses. With the exception of a few hours on the previous night we had been fighting since a little after noon of May 11th, when the engagement at Yellow Tavern commenced. We have no record of the Confederate losses on the 12th. On the Union side Lieutenants THOMAS R. EDIC, 6th Michigan; RICHARD S. TAYLOR, 8th New York, and JOSEPH S. SCHULTZ, 17th Pennsylvania, were killed, and Major A. M. CORRIGAN, 9th New York Cavalry, was mortally wounded, and 167 men were killed, wounded or missing. The heaviest regimental loss was in the 2d Pennsylvania Cavalry in GREGG's division, where thirty men were killed and wounded.

On the 13th we proceeded leisurely down the Chickahominy to Bottom's bridge and, after making a short march, went into camp near the place. The next day the Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge and marched south through White Oak swamp to Malvern Hill,

passing over ground celebrated in connection with McCLELLAN's seven days fighting while making his change of base. From Malvern we soon reached the James river between Haxall's Landing and Shirley's. Several gunboats were lying in the river near by and looking from Haxall's down the stream we could see quite a fleet of vessels, about two miles distant, marking the position of Bermuda Hundred, where General BUTLER and his command were located. On making our appearance on the banks of the river some excitement was caused among the gunboats, with hostile preparations, but this was soon changed to a friendly greeting from the officers and men of the crews when the character of the command was discovered. We were covered and begrimed with dust and dirt, so that a close inspection was necessary to tell the color of the uniform, and in addition to bearing the marks of travel over the hot and dusty roads of Virginia, the men and horses were hungry and half famished. The three days' rations that we had started with had been made to last six, and the horses had eaten very little but grass since the morning of the 11th. Rations and supplies were soon obtained and the men were refreshed by bathing in the waters of the James. A party, consisting of an officer of one of the horse batteries, Captain P. LACY GODDARD, of General SHERIDAN's staff, and the writer, went on board of one of the gunboats and made the acquaintance of Mr. CUSHING, the Paymaster, who treated us very kindly and hospitably.

We found that this naval craft had formerly served as a ferry-boat, running between Brooklyn and New York, having been altered by the Government to suit her present requirements, and provided with a formidable battery. Every day a boat was sent up the river with hooks and drags to look out for torpedoes, which the Confederates were constantly sending down the current in the hope of blowing up some of our vessels. In some cases their presence was indicated by small floats, but oftener they were attached to pieces of boards and trees. A day or two previous they had discovered one charged with about 276 pounds of powder. Before taking our leave we purchased from the Paymaster some underclothing and full naval rigs, with wide collars, wide trousers and all, and after taking a bath in the river we consigned our old clothing to the deep and arrayed ourselves in the new attire, presenting an appearance that must have been "recherche" for cavalrymen. We had been separated from our baggage wagons since crossing the Rapidan, and had been so constantly engaged for ten days in fighting and marching that it had been impossible to get a change of clothes, or even a chance to wash properly. On the morning of the 16th we heard heavy cannonading, continuing without intermission for several hours, in the direction of General BUTLER's lines.

In the evening some of his officers crossed the river and informed us that the enemy had attacked our forces, and at first gained some advantage, but that finally they were repulsed, leaving the Union troops in possession of nearly the same ground that they held before the fight. Our wounded that we had been able to carry with us were cared for in General BUTLER's command, and our prisoners, amounting to over 200, were conveyed down the river in transports. Here, also, we bade adieu to the officers and men that we had released from captivity at Beaver Dam station, and we were relieved from all impediments possible. Nothing was done from the 14th to the 17th except to send a few scouting parties in the direction of Richmond. MERRITT's division was kept in the neighborhood of Malvern Hill, and a rest was taken, rendered necessary by the weak condition of the animals. On the evening of the 17th I rode twice to Malvern Hill to carry some directions to General MERRITT, one of which was an order that he should get his division in readiness to march that evening.

A little after General SHERIDAN sent me to see that a portion of the road was properly repaired by a party of pioneers at work upon it, and at 8 o'clock in the evening the whole corps broke camp and moved on the road to Jones' bridge, on the Chickahominy, by way of St. Mary's Church. We marched all night and, after many delays, arrived in the morning at Jones' bridge. This was destroyed, but a good ford having been discovered to the right, the command passed safely across the Chickahominy, wagons, artillery and horses. Very formidable earth works had been constructed to command the passage of the river at this point, but we found no enemy to oppose us. After halting for two hours we pushed on, but rather slowly on account of bad roads, the rain having commenced early in the morning and continuing very hard for several hours, made the traveling difficult, but towards evening we arrived at Baltimore Cross Roads where we encamped, the place being said to be twenty-four miles from Richmond. A house belonging to Dr. TYLER, and a building known as the "Old Baltimore Store," constituted the attractions of this place. Both were deserted, and apparently had not been inhabited for some time. The male inhabitants generally left their homes as we approached, but the country was infested with small parties of mounted men, whom we regarded as guerillas.

The question now came up as to the whereabouts of the army, and the proper course to be taken, and upon this point, General SHERIDAN says: "The uncertainty of what had happened to the Army of the Potomac during our absence, made the problem of how to get back and where to find it somewhat difficult, particularly so, as I knew that reinforcements had come up from the South to Richmond. I therefore determined to cross the Pamunkey river at the White House, and sent to Fortress Mon-

rope for a pontoon bridge to be used for that purpose. While waiting I ordered CUSTER, with his brigade, to proceed to Hanover Court House, and if possible, destroy the railrod bridges over the South Anna. GREGG and WILSON were sent at the same time to Cold Harbor to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond as far as Mechanicsville, so as to cover CUSTER's movement. MERRITT, with the remaining brigades of his division, held fast at Baltimore Cross Roads. In carrying out the details of this plan, Colonel HOWARD, the Chief Quartermaster of the corps, was sent on the morning of the 19th with a small escort to Fortress Monroe to obtain a pontoon bridge and have it and supplies, including forage, shipped by transports to the White House on the Pamunkey. On the 20th GREGG and WILSON proceeded to Cold Harbor and sent scouts towards Mechanicsville, to which place, we had information, that the Confederates had sent infantry from Richmond. On the evening of the 20th, CUSTER, with his brigade, arrived at Hanover Court House, having received instructions to destroy the Richmond & Fredericksburg and Virginia Central railroads when they crossed the South Anna. Two trestle bridges over Hanover creek were burned, the railroad destroyed for some distance, and a quantity of commissary stores were captured at the station. The brigade then retired towards Hanovertown and encamped for the night. Returning the next morning it was ascertained that a large force of Confederate artillery, cavalry and infantry were at the railroad bridge over the South Anna, evidently "en route" as reinforcements for LEE. Having satisfactorily demonstrated their presence by a reconnaissance, CUSTER withdrew with his brigade and rejoined the corps at the White House on the 22d. After the departure of these troops, General SHERIDAN caused the railroad bridge over the Pamunkey to be carefully examined, and concluded that it was possible to repair it. MERRITT was at once directed to take charge of this work, and accordingly moved his two brigades, accompanied by Headquarters, to the White House on the 21st.

Several spans of the bridge, many stringers and the flooring had been destroyed by fire and the lumber to replace this had to be searched for in the surrounding country and brought with difficulty from a distance. General MERRITT's report states: "This was all done in about fifteen hours with poor facilities and no tools save those ordinarily carried by pioneer parties" He gives also great credit to Lieutenant MARTIN, of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, who superintended the work.

Captain CLAFLIN with a detachment of the 6th Cavalry, who had been sent to West Point, returned with the intelligence that two gunboats and three transports had arrived at that place with supplies, but were afraid to come up the river any further, as they feared torpedoes. Colonel SMITH, of the staff, went down, however, and induced the commanding officer to bring the vessels up, and the supplies were issued to the troops.

When GREGG was at Cold Harbor a number of dispatches were taken to him by the aides during the time that we remained at Baltimore Cross Roads and the White House. This was a dangerous mission, as the country in the vicinity was patrolled by small parties of mounted men who were armed and apparently without regular uniform.

On one occasion I left with an escort of about three men from General SHERIDAN's headquarters to carry an order to GREGG at Cold Harbor, the distance being near fourteen miles. When six or seven miles had been traveled, I noticed a party of mounted men, about fifteen in number, riding rapidly down a road which joined that on which we were traveling, some distance to the front. I did not like their appearance, being perfectly sure they were hostile, and hesitated for a moment whether to turn back or not, but on measuring with the eye our relative distances from the junction of the road, I concluded that mine was the nearest and resolved to push forward, which I did, taking a faster gait. As soon as this occurred the men on the other road urged their horses to a run. We did likewise, and the escort and myself being well mounted reached the junction ahead of our competitors, and went on down the main road towards Cold Harbor as fast as we could, saluted by a volley of curses and pistol shots. The race continued for a distance but the enemy soon gave it up and my dispatches were delivered safely to General GREGG.

On our return later on the same day we did not see anything of our quondam acquaintances of the morning, and arrived at headquarters without further adventure. During the 21st and 22d our headquarters were at the old Custis mansion. In times past the place must have been a delightful residence with its old shade trees, situated on the banks of a beautiful stream and its distinguished and charming society, but when we were there it was uninhabited and in sad want of repair. The bridge having been placed in condition to bear artillery and wagons, the 1st Division crossed on the evening of the 22d, and on the morning of the 23d the 2d and 3d Divisions and the wagon train. The structure was about 200 yards long and twenty-five feet high, made of trestle planked over, without railing on either side, and was rather a terrifying looking place to our horses and mules, and we had great trouble in getting some of them over. Two mules fell from the bridge into the river, and being fastened together and entangled in harness, were drowned. While the command was passing over, a small boat came down the river with two or three ladies on board. One of them was energetically waving a white handkerchief fastened to a stick, and as the boat approached seemed more and more desirous of assuring us in regard to the character of the craft. An officer was sent to find the business of this novel flag of truce, and ascertained that an old lady, who seemed to be *in command*, had come to find the whereabouts of a son, placed under guard by us the day before.

for prudential reasons, and to beseech that we would not hurt him. Colonel SMITH, the Provost Marshal, satisfied her in regard to these points, and she returned, the white flag still waving away at the bow.

Having crossed the Pamunkey the command marched through Laineville to King William Court House. This place is about ten miles from White House, and consists of eight or ten houses. A few women were to be seen, but no men. Leaving this village we passed through a beautiful country well watered and timbered, and in eight miles farther arrived at Aylett's Mills. The factories or mills that were formerly in operation here had been destroyed. We then proceeded two miles to Dunkirk on the Mattapony river, with the intention of crossing the river. A bridge was built over it with the aid of two or three old ferry-boats that were lying on the side of the stream. The corps was encamped for the night in the vicinity of Aylett's Mills, and a reconnaissance was sent out to ascertain if possible the correct situation of the army. Heavy cannonading had been heard all day, and during the afternoon I went to a high hill in order to find out the direction of the firing. It was N. 70° W., and, referring to a map, I concluded that this was probably on the North Anna near Chesterfield ford. In the evening a Confederate mail was captured, consisting chiefly of letters written by soldiers to people living in Matthews county. One writer thought their loss had been enormous, but the general tone was sanguine.

Information was received by the morning of the 24th that the army was at Chesterfield station, and the General therefore concluded not to cross the Mattapony, but moved west in the direction of Hanover Court House as far as Mangotrech Church, about ten miles. Here we turned northward and encamped in the vicinity of Reedy Swamp, some of the troops having come by a more direct road. Cannonading was heard during the day, and we had no doubt that serious fighting was going on near the North Anna. Early on the morning of the 25th we continued our march, crossed the railroad at Chesterfield station, meeting large bodies of infantry, and soon arrived at Polecat creek. The corps was placed in camp in the vicinity and the trains came up during the day. We had rejoined the army and the expedition was terminated.

In this is demonstrated very clearly the self-reliance of the cavalry in the war of 1861-65, and this spirit characterized its career on both sides. Here a large mounted force, accompanied by horse artillery, moved without extraordinary haste to the line of communications of LEE's army, destroyed railroads and millions of dollars worth of property, and for a time occupied a position from which, if serious defeat had happened to the Confederate army, they could have operated on the rear with great effect, prepared to fight either mounted or dismounted, and supported by an efficient artillery.

Then, proceeding to the vicinity of Richmond with moderate marches, not exceeding twenty miles a day, paying little attention to the repeated assaults of the enemy on the rear of the column, defeating all of the cavalry that the Confederates could concentrate in the front, and in addition a considerable force of infantry. Fighting dismounted, when necessary, and making mounted charges when practicable, and the ground favorable, and filling the enemy with terror lest he should lose his capital by a "coup de main" and showing a coolness and audacity throughout, that could only be evinced in a command confident in its ability to take care of itself and to meet successfully any effort that the enemy was likely to make. General STEPHEN D. LEE says in a letter quoted in "*Dennison's History of Cavalry*": "A large body of cavalry as now armed is a match for almost any emergency; it is an army in motion and on a flank its blow is terrible, and against communications, magazines, etc., its damage is disastrous."

There is considerable difference to be observed between expeditions of this character and the dashes by cavalry into the enemy's country constituting the "raids" proper. In TRENCH'S "*Cavalry in Modern War*" is found the following: "It is obvious that cavalry bodies of such strength could now be used with the suddenness, secrecy and rapidity which are the essential characteristics of a cavalry raid."

In enterprises belonging to the latter class a comparatively small body of horsemen would travel at great speed, avoiding any encounter with the enemy in force, deceiving him and eluding him by feints and doing all the damage possible to railroads or other property.

Then retreating as rapidly, dexterously evading pursuit, scarcely permitting any rest for men or horses until they were safe behind the shelter of their lines. The great object was to effect all of this without a collision, as a fight with a respectable body of the enemy would have ended in destruction.

The actions near the Wilderness and this expedition were the first experiences of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac under their new leader. He had been thus far successful and all were favorably impressed with the magnetism of his manners and with his untiring energy, physical endurance and ability as a soldier, which had been shown clearly and made manifest in every emergency.

A mutual confidence was inaugurated between General SHERIDAN and his officers and men, which continued, never to be broken, gaining strength and depth through future trials until the end.

Our casualties amounted to an aggregate of 625 killed, wounded and missing. It has been impossible to find among the Confederate archives any official reports submitted by the generals concerned, of the part taken by them in this affair, or of their losses, and there are but few data

bearing upon the subject. The country was made to supply the forage needed, and as a very insufficient quantity was found the animals had to travel a considerable portion of the time with very little to eat but grass. They were in miserable condition when we started and some of the weakest gave out as was to be expected, and not being able to keep up with the column, were shot in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Confederates. The loss in this respect was not large.

In preparing this paper I have been assisted by the records in the office of the Union and Confederate Archives under Colonel LAZELLE, by my diary kept during the war, McCLELLAN's "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry" and by letters from Generals HAMPTON, FITZHUGH LEE and W. H. F. LEE.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES IN THE UNION FORCES DURING THE EXPEDITION
UNDER GENERAL SHERIDAN, MAY 9-25, 1864. COMPILED FROM THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION.

JERRALD'S MILLS, MAY 9, 1864.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or Missing.		Aggregate
	Officers	Enlisted Men.	Officers	Enlisted Men.	Officers	Enlisted Men.	
1st Massachusetts.....	2	1	2	21	26	
1st New Jersey.....	2	2	3	7
6th Ohio.....	1	19	10	30
1st Pennsylvania.....	13	13
Total	1	2	2	35	2	34	76

BEAVER DAM STATION, NORTH ANNA, DAVENPORT BRIDGE, MAY 9-10, 1864.

1st Maine.....	1	1	2	4
1st Michigan	2	2	4	8
19th New York (1st Dragoons).....	1	7	8
6th Pennsylvania.....	1	6	7
18th Pennsylvania.....	1	1
5th United States.....	2	1	2	49	54
1st Vermont.....	2	1	3
Total.....	5	1	10	2	67	85

GROUND SQUIRREL BRIDGE, ASHLAND AND YELLOW TAVERN, MAY 11, 1864.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or Missing.		Aggregate
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
FIRST DIVISION.							
1st Michigan.....		11	1	33	3	48
5th Michigan.....		4	2	12	3	21
6th Michigan.....		2		6	1	9
7th Michigan.....	1	3		13	2	16	35
6th New York.....				1		1
9th New York.....		2	2	8		12
1st New York Dragoons.....		2		3	1	6
6th Pennsylvania.....				4		4
17th Pennsylvania.....					1	1
1st United States.....					6	6
2d United States.....				2		2
5th United States.....		1				1
Total 1st Division.....	1	25	5	82	2	31	146
SECOND DIVISION.							
1st Maine.....		2	1	24	1	26	54
1st Massachusetts.....	1	5	1	7	2	10	26
10th New York.....				5	7	12
2d Pennsylvania.....				3		3
4th Pennsylvania.....		1				1
8th Pennsylvania.....				6		6
Total 2d Division.....	1	8	2	45	3	43	102
THIRD DIVISION.							
3d Indiana.....				1		1
1st Vermont.....			2	5	3	10
Total 3d Division.....			2	6	3	11
Total Cavalry Corps.....	2	33	9	133	5	77	259

MEADOW BRIDGES, AND MECHANICSVILLE.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
FIRST DIVISION.							
1st Michigan.....						2	2
5th Michigan				1			1
6th Michigan	1			2			3
6th New York.....				3			3
9th New York		1	1	7			9
1st New York Dragoons				1			1
6th Pennsylvania		1		9			10
17th Pennsylvania.....	1	2		7			10
1st United States.....				7		5	12
6th United States.....						3	3
Total 1st Division.....	2	4	1	37		10	54
SECOND DIVISION.							
1st Maine.....		1	1	4			6
1st New Jersey.....				1		1	2
10th New York.....		1		8			9
6th Ohio.....				3			3
2d Pennsylvania.....		2	1	27			30
4th Pennsylvania.....				3			3
8th Pennsylvania.....		1	1	5		2	9
16th Pennsylvania.....				3			3
Total 2d Division		5	3	54		3	65
THIRD DIVISION.							
1st Connecticut.....		1		4		3	8
3d Indiana.....				7			7
8th New York.....	1	1		7	1	6	16
18th Pennsylvania.....				3			3
1st Vermont.....				8		4	12
Total 3d Division.....	1	2		29	1	13	46
4th U. S. Artillery, Bat. C & D,		1		4			5
Total Cavalry Corps	3	12	4	124	1	26	170

324 SHERIDAN'S EXPEDITION AROUND RICHMOND.

MINOR SKIRMISHES, ETC., EN ROUTE, MAY 9-25, 1864.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
1st Maine.....	1	1	2
1st Massachusetts.....	1	1	1
1st Michigan.....	1	1	2
5th Michigan.....	5	5
9th New York.....	2	2
1st Pennsylvania.....	3	2	1	6
4th Pennsylvania.....	1	1
6th Pennsylvania.....	1	1
8th Pennsylvania.....	1	1
15th Pennsylvania.....	1	6	2	9
2d United States.....	1	1	2	4
5th United States.....	1	1
Grand Total Cavalry Corps..	7	57	16	321	10	214	625

THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.*

BY CAPTAIN GEORGE B. DAVIS.

5TH CAVALRY.

IT shall be my purpose in this paper to trace, as briefly as may be, the operations of the cavalry of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia in the campaign of Gettysburg. Those operations have peculiar interest and significance on account of their magnitude and novelty. The cavalry of both armies had been reorganized during the preceding winter, and it was employed in accordance with principles which are now familiar, but which were then in process of deduction, or were, for the first time, subjected to the test of practical experience. I shall treat the subject somewhat broadly, from the point of view of the *strategic* use of the arm. I shall not go into the details of the several cavalry engagements, interesting and instructive as I know them to be, but shall leave them to be made the subject of separate tactical studies.

On the morning of June 1, 1863, the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia still confronted each other, in the lines which they had reoccupied at the close of the Chancellorsville campaign. That campaign had terminated so decisively in favor of the Confederates that an early movement, in the nature of an offensive, might have been and was daily expected by Generals HALLECK and HOOKER. It was also, if not known, at least shrewdly suspected by the latter that the Confederate movement would, in many respects, resemble the invasion that had terminated unsuccessfully, in the defeat at Antietam in September of the preceding year. The Federal commander, however, was not long kept in doubt as

*The maps used in the preparation of this article were those contained in McCLELLAN'S "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," BATES' "Battle of Gettysburg" and those accompanying General H. J. HUNT'S concise and valuable history of the campaign in Numbers 19, 20 and 21 of the Century Company's "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." The movements can also be followed on the "Map of Portions of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania," issued by the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. For fuller details the reader is referred to Vol. III of the COMTE DE PARIS "Civil War in America," BATES' "Battle of Gettysburg," McCLELLAN'S "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," SWINTON'S "Army of the Potomac" and Nos. 19, 20 and 21 of the "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War."

to the intentions of his antagonist, for before any movement of the Army of the Potomac had been fully determined upon, LEE himself assumed the initiative by putting his army in motion towards the Valley of Virginia. Such advantage, whether political or military as goes with the offensive having been gained by his adversary, the more difficult task remained to HOOKER of ascertaining the movements of his enemy, and of so regulating his own as to keep his force, at any cost, between that enemy and the city of Washington.

The country lying in the triangle between the Potomac, Rappahannock and Shenandoah rivers was to be the immediate theatre of operations of the contending armies. The area thus included was, in some respects, favorable and in others decidedly unfavorable to military operations. Across its western border run two ranges of mountains: the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run or Catoctin range. They lie about fifteen miles apart; their general course is from northeast to southwest, and they are pierced by a number of gaps or passes, which were destined to play an important part in the ensuing campaign. Between the mountains and the Potomac the surface is diversified by hills and valleys, terminating in the bluffs that mark the western bank of the Potomac and the north bank of the Rappahannock rivers. The country is generally wooded, with timber of second growth standing so closely as to constitute—nearly always an obstacle to the movement of the troops—and at times, to preclude their passage. The principal roads of the region follow the tributaries of the Potomac in a general southeasterly course; the roads or cross roads connecting these, and running north and south are narrow and tortuous; difficult to use at all times, and after rains almost impracticable. It is important to remember this, for it was chiefly upon these narrow roads that the Army of the Potomac was required to move.

The organization of both armies had been subject to important modifications. The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was organized into seven army corps: the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 11th and 12th; having a strength "present for duty" on June 30, 1863, of 77,208 men. Each of these corps contained three divisions of infantry and a brigade of artillery. The artillery was composed of sixty-five batteries (370 guns). Of these, thirty-five batteries (212 guns) were attached, in brigades of five batteries each, to the infantry corps. Nine horse batteries, (fifty guns), were attached to the cavalry corps, and twenty-one batteries, (108 guns), were in the General Artillery Reserve. The personnel of the artillery consisted of 7,183 officers and men. The cavalry was organized into a corps of three divisions. Its strength at any particular moment is very difficult to determine, owing to the great loss of horses during the campaign. The aggregate present "mounted" on June 1, 1863, was less than 8,000 men. It was increased, late in June, by the absorption of General STAHEL'S

command, but was never able to muster, at any time, more than 9,000 mounted men.

The infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia was organized into three corps, commanded by Generals EWELL, LONGSTREET and A. P. HILL. Its effective total on May 31, 1863, was 54,356 men. The Confederate artillery was composed of fifteen battalions, of four batteries each, aggregating 257 guns and 4,460 men; and of one battalion of horse artillery, (six batteries of thirty guns), which was attached to the cavalry. The cavalry retained its division organization, and was composed of five brigades, aggregating, on May 31st, 9,536 men. The strength of the cavalry division, like that of the Federal cavalry corps, was subject to constant fluctuation, due to the same cause—loss of horses in campaign.*

On June 3, 1863, the three corps of infantry composing the Army of Northern Virginia were encamped along the south bank of the Rappahannock, on a line extending from the fortified position of Fredericksburg, to the east and southeast as far as Hamilton's crossing. From that point, the fords of the upper Rappahannock were observed and held by STUART's cavalry, the main part of which was bivouacked in the open air between Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station. The Federal infantry still occupied its cantonments at Falmouth. To the right and somewhat to the rear, the cavalry corps, under General PLEASANTON, was massed at Warrenton Junction, charged with the duty of maintaining a line of outposts, extending from a point on the north bank of the Rappahannock, a few miles west of Falmouth, to the west and northwest as far as Warrenton. From time to time, small bodies of the Federal cavalry were pushed into the country between the Orange & Alexandria railway and the upper Rapidan, to check the operations of partisan corps, and to give timely information of any movements of the enemy in that quarter.

LEE's first objective was Culpeper Court House, a center from which two systems of road diverge—one to the northeast, leading to Manassas, Fairfax and Alexandria; the other to the north and northwest, leading to the Shenandoah Valley. Leaving HILL's corps to occupy the lines at Fredericksburg, the corps of EWELL and LONGSTREET were put in motion towards Culpeper, which was reached by LONGSTREET's advance on the evening of June 7th. By nightfall of the 8th, LONGSTREET was joined by EWELL. The movement to that point was to be covered by STUART's cavalry, and was to be *discovered*, if possible, by the Federal cavalry under PLEASANTON. LEE's intentions were accurately suspected by HOOKER, who, on June 6th, directed PLEASANTON to make a recon-

*The above account of the organization and strength of the two armies is taken from General HUNT's thoroughly digested article upon "The Opposing Forces at Gettysburg," in No. 21 of "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," page 434.

noissance in force in the direction of Culpeper, to ascertain whether any Confederate infantry had yet arrived in that vicinity. To increase PLEASANTON's force, the mistake was made of attaching two brigades of infantry to his command. Just how these infantry brigades were to assist General PLEASANTON, who was engaged in an undertaking in which celerity of movement, rather than force, was essential to success, does not appear.

The problem before General PLEASANTON was to ascertain whether the Confederate army or any considerable portion of it was moving upon the road between Fredericksburg and Culpeper. If such a manoeuvre was in progress he was to ascertain something as to its state of forwardness. Had one corps or more reached Culpeper? Was any force in motion to the west of that town, and if so, in what direction? He knew that STUART's command was bivouacked somewhere in the vicinity of Brandy Station, and this knowledge would be of avail in determining the strength and composition of his reconnoitering columns.

At some point on the north bank of the Rappahannock PLEASANTON divided his command into three columns. One, which he accompanied, composed of BUFORD's division and AMES' brigade of infantry, was to cross at Beverly ford and move, by St. James church and Gee's house, to Brandy Station. The second, composed of GREGG's and DUFFIE's divisions and RUSSELL's brigade of infantry, was to cross at Kelly's ford, and move, by Shackleford's, to the crossing of Mountain Run, near Stone's house. At that point GREGG's command was to separate, his own division moving by the direct road past Mount Dumpling to Brandy Station, while DUFFIE's division was to take the left hand road by C. DOGETT'S, MADDEN and DOGETT'S houses to Stevensburg and beyond. Each of the three columns encountered the enemy, attacking him successfully, in point of time from right to left, the right column under BUFORD being the first to engage, followed at short intervals by GREGG and DUFFIE. I shall not enter into the details of this remarkable engagement which is worthy of being made the subject of a separate tactical study, for it is with the operations of these columns as gatherers of information as to LEE's movements that I propose to deal. After a battle lasting nearly all day, in which the fortune of war rested first with one and then with another of the contestants, the Federal cavalry returned unmolested to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and there was an opportunity to ascertain what had been gained during the day in the way of information as to the enemy's movements.

BUFORD and GREGG had encountered the cavalry of the enemy, which had been supported and relieved by his infantry towards the close of the day. To what extent or in what force that infantry had appeared on the field was not accurately known. It was fair, therefore, to infer from

these operations that there was an infantry force of the enemy in the vicinity of Culpeper. DUFFIÉ, who must have crossed and recrossed the road by which the corps of LONGSTREET and EWELL had entered Culpeper, did not examine the road to ascertain that fact, or if he did, made no report of the result of his examination. It is claimed in behalf of General PLEASANTON that a part of STUART's headquarter baggage was captured early in the day, in which certain papers were found, disclosing the purpose of the Confederate movement, and proving beyond doubt that LEE's army was on its way to the Shenandoah Valley. This claim, though accepted by the COMPTÉ DE PARIS, is stoutly denied by STUART'S friends. It would have been certainly a remarkable circumstance if so prudent a man as General LEE had formulated his intentions at so early a period of the campaign; it is still more remarkable that he should have entrusted them in writing to even a trusted subordinate.* If such despatches or memoranda were found and transmitted to General HOOKER, they certainly did not clear his mind of doubt as to LEE's purposes, since he admits that there was great uncertainty as to the enemy's intention on the 12th, and even so late as the 21st of June.

It must be admitted therefore that the movement of the Federal cavalry on Brandy Station had not been fruitful of results in the shape of authentic information as to the movements of the enemy. It had shown, however, that such information was to be obtained by a bold, well-directed and energetic quest. It was an object lesson, however, in a new strategical employment of the arm, which the leaders of the Federal cavalry were not slow in learning.

The battle of Brandy Station illustrates two methods of employing cavalry, which have been slowly making their way into general recognition in modern war: 1st Its separate employment against the cavalry of the enemy. 2d. Its employment, in sufficient force to be self-sustaining, for the purpose: (*a*) of obtaining information of the enemy's movement; (*b*) of preventing the enemy's cavalry from obtaining similar information. Of the Federal cavalry, this engagement may be said to have been a successful illustration of the former use, but an unsuccessful example of the latter. In so far as the Confederate cavalry was concerned, it is a matter of surprise—as the attacks upon it were timed—that it escaped destruction; for, under the circumstances, to have escaped destruction, was, in itself, a brilliant success. It is also not a little remarkable that so able and wary a general as STUART was—a very master of the art of outpost duty—should have been so taken by surprise as he was on this occasion. Had the Federal commander used his opportunities

*General LEE, in a letter to Secretary SEDDON, dated June 8, 1863, formally requested authority to undertake the invasion. Secretary SEDDON's reply, approving the project, bears date June 10, 1863. No. 19, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," pp. 265, 266.

with the vigor and skill that STUART displayed in the conduct of an obstinate and desperate defense, the Confederate cavalry would have been dealt a blow from which it would hardly have recovered. "One result of incalculable importance certainly did follow this battle—it made the Federal cavalry. Up to this time confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves and their commanders which enabled them to contest so fiercely the subsequent battle-fields of June, July and October."*

We have seen that the corps of EWELL and LONGSTREET had succeeded in reaching Culpeper on June 8th and 9th. HILL's corps, which had been left in the lines at Fredericksburg, to mask this movement, was withdrawn on June 14th and reached Culpeper on the following day. HOOKER, in order to conform to the movements of his adversary, on June 11th established the 3d Corps on the north bank of the Rappahannock, between Beverly Ford and Rappahannock Station. On the following day the 1st and 11th Corps were ordered, the former to Bealeton, and the latter to Catlett's Station on the Orange & Alexandria railway. These three corps constituted the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, and General REYNOLDS was assigned to command the whole. These movements were made with the double purpose of confronting LEE in his new position, and of covering Washington from a repetition of JACKSON's manœuvre of the preceding year.

The initiative in the next movement rested with General LEE. His first objective had been Culpeper, his second was to be the fords of the upper Potomac. A reference to the map will show two ranges of mountains, crossing the theater of operations from north to south, and distant from each other upon an average fifteen miles. Between these ranges lies the Loudon Valley; to the west of the Blue Ridge lies the valley of the Shenandoah. The eastern range crosses the Potomac at the Point of Rocks—the western at Harper's Ferry. Below the Point of Rocks the Potomac is rarely fordable; above Harper's Ferry the fords are numerous and practicable, especially in the summer. Both ranges are pierced by frequent gaps or passes, most of which, though practicable for troops of all arms, are easily defended and are thus susceptible of being converted into efficient military obstacles. The north and south roads in the Shenandoah Valley are very good, especially in summer; those of the Loudon Valley are less good, while those in the area between the Bull Run—Catoctin mountains and the Potomac are extremely bad. For these reasons, LEE determined to pass the larger part of his infantry and artillery through the valley of the Shenandoah. The ranges of mountains on the right of his column would thus constitute a screen, concealing his movements from the observation of the enemy. But the

* McCLELLAN'S "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," page 294.

mountain ranges alone, however well they may have been situated for that purpose, were not to be his sole reliance in screening his march, for, as we shall presently see, the Loudon Valley and the passes connecting it with the region to the east, were to be watched and held by STUART, supported, if need be, by LONGSTREET's corps of Confederate infantry. From his left flank, in his northward march, LEE had little to fear. He therefore disposed his marching columns in the following order:

On the morning of June 10th EWELL'S corps was put in motion for the Shenandoah, *via* Springville, Gaines cross-roads and Flint hill, HILL and LONGSTREET were to follow later; the latter by the Loudon Valley, partly, as I have said, to support STUART, and partly to lead the enemy to believe that Manassas and Centreville were the real objectives. On the 12th the head of EWELL'S column passed through Chester Gap and reached the Shenandoah at Cedarville. JENKINS' brigade of cavalry had accompanied EWELL and IMBODEN's brigade had joined him in the valley; the former covering the advance and the latter the left flank of the advancing column. After passing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap RODES' division, preceded by JENKINS' cavalry, was detached to attack and destroy McREYNOLDS' brigade of Federal infantry, which was posted at Berryville, about twelve miles east of Winchester. The rest of EWELL'S corps continued, *via* Stevensburg and Kernstown, to Winchester.

The military district of which Winchester is the centre was commanded by General MILROY. His command was independent of that of General HOOKER, and he was not informed by either HOOKER, HALLECK or his own cavalry, of the rapid advance of EWELL'S column, and it was not until late on the 11th that he was made aware of his danger. The result need hardly be stated. A commander who expects the Commanding General of the Army to do his out-post work for him, is not likely to find that personage a sufficient substitute for a vigilant and enterprising cavalry—indeed, it may perhaps be questioned, whether HALLECK, in his office in Washington, was able to render MILROY as efficient service in this respect as he might have gotten from some of his raw levies of West Virginia Horse, who wore plug hats and called their officers by their Christian names

LEE's columns were now stretched out to a dangerous length, inviting irretrievable disaster had he been opposed by a general less hampered with instructions from Washington than was HOOKER. On June 14th EWELL, having inflicted a crushing defeat upon MILROY—whom he had compelled to abandon his artillery and trains and to retire in great confusion upon HANCOCK and Harper's Ferry—resumed his route, with JENKINS' and IMBODEN's cavalry in front and flank, toward Williams-

port, the place appointed by the Confederate commander for the crossing of the Potomac.

While General LEE had no intention of entering the region between Warrenton and Fairfax, in which he had operated so successfully the previous summer, he was not unwilling to lead HOOKER to believe that an invasion of that territory was among the possibilities of the near future. To that end LONGSTREET was moved from Culpeper on June 15th, with orders to enter the Loudon Valley and appear to threaten Leesburg, returning when that purpose had been accomplished, by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. As this manœuvre would bring him within easy striking distance of the Federal advance under REYNOLDS, STUART was directed with the brigades of FITZ LEE, ROBERTSON and W. H. F. LEE, to mask the movement of LONGSTREET by moving his cavalry in front and on the right flank of the infantry column. To perform this task effectively it was necessary to occupy and hold Aldie and Thoroughfare Gaps. These are the two central passes through the Bull Run mountains; through the former runs the main road from Winchester to Alexandria; by the latter the Manassas Gap Railway gains an entrance into the Loudon Valley.

STUART, on June 15th, pushed forward to occupy Thoroughfare and Aldie Gaps, assigning to CHAMBLISS, temporarily commanding the brigade of W. H. F. LEE, the task of occupying the former, and to Colonel MUNFORD, who at the moment commanded the brigade of FITZHUGH LEE, that of occupying the latter. ROBERTSON's brigade was directed to Rectorstown, a point in the Loudon Valley, from which he could reinforce either CHAMBLISS or MUNFORD should occasion arise. The brigades of JONES and HAMPTON were left to guard the fords of the Rappahannock and cover the march of HILL from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah.

MUNFORD, moving by Salem, Piedmont and Upperville, reached Middleburg on June 17th, and halted between that town and Aldie, pushing his pickets, however, through the pass to the eastern slope of the mountain. As there seemed to be no prospect of a Federal advance, by way of Warrenton and the upper courses of the Rapidan, ROBERTSON was moved, on the 17th, from Rectorstown to Middleburg. On the same day CHAMBLISS was withdrawn from Thoroughfare Gap, and, on the 18th, he, too, arrived at Middleburg.

We have seen that the three corps constituting the advance of the Army of the Potomac, under REYNOLDS, were moved, on June 13th, to Bealeton and Catlett's Station. On the same day the cavalry was massed at Warrenton Junction.

EWELL's attack on MILROY, at Winchester, proved that a very considerable force of Confederate infantry was on its way to Pennsylvania,

and it now became necessary for HOOKER to dispose his force to conform to the probable intentions of the enemy. So, between June 14th and 17th, the several corps were moved to their right and rear, and arranged in two lines: the first, composed of the 1st, 11th, 3d and 5th, occupying the line between Herndon's Station, on the Loudon & Hampshire railway, and Manassas Junction; the second, composed of the 12th, 6th and 2d corps, occupying a line extending from Fairfax Court House due south to the Occoquan. This movement of the Federal infantry was covered by PLEASANTON, and it had hardly been completed, when HOOKER determined to employ his cavalry in a bold attempt to push through to the Shenandoah, if need be, to obtain some definite information as to the strength and purposes of the enemy.

On the 17th PLEASANTON was directed to the vicinity of Aldie, with orders to pass the gap and ascertain what the enemy was doing in the Loudon Valley and beyond. He was supported in this undertaking by BARNES' division of the 5th Corps. He took with him BUFORD's and GREGG's divisions of the Cavalry Corps—detaching DUFFIÉ, with a single regiment, to make a *detour*, by Thoroughfare Gap and the western slope of the Bull Run mountains, to Middleburg, a movement which will be described a little farther on. It was PLEASANTON's purpose to force his way, across the Loudon Valley, to Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge; for it was only by reaching that point that he could obtain any reliable information of the Confederate forces in the valley of the Shenandoah.

The disposition of STUART's force, on the morning of June 17th, has already been described. MUNFORD was at Dover Mills, a short distance to the west of Aldie, with outposts, on the road to the gap to the east of the town. CHAMBLISS was between Thoroughfare Gap and Middleburg; ROBERTSON between Rectortown and Middleburg; both converging upon that point, which they reached, the latter on the evening of the 17th, the former on the morning of the 18th of June.

In advancing upon Aldie, GREGG's division was placed at the head of the Federal column, and, at about 2 p. m., MUNFORD's outposts were encountered and driven back through the town. In the engagement that ensued, in which there was much brilliant fighting on both sides—both mounted and on foot—the advantage remained with General GREGG, who held the field at the close of the day. MUNFORD's brigade withdrew from the field at about dark, in obedience to orders to that effect from General STUART. Its retirement was effected in good order and without molestation from the enemy. With a view to ascertain whether any considerable force of the enemy was moving in the upper Loudon Valley, Colonel DUFFIÉ, with the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, was directed by General PLEASANTON to pass through Thoroughfare Gap and examine the coun-

try as far to the north as Middleburg. There it was expected that he would rejoin the main body after it had passed Aldie Gap, and specific orders were given him to that effect. DUFFIÉ passed Thoroughfare Gap at 9:30 A. M. on the 17th; at 4 P. M. he encountered the outposts of STUART's headquarter guard in the outskirts of the town of Middleburg. These were quickly driven in, but disclosed the fact that the place was held by the enemy. DUFFIÉ's orders, most unwisely, required him to encamp at Middleburg on the night of the 17th. I say unwisely, for PLEASANTON was not then in possession of the town, nor was he certain of his ability to occupy it even by nightfall of the 17th. DUFFIÉ's reconnaissance was for the purpose of obtaining information; when that information was obtained, his orders should have required or permitted him to bring it to the lines of his own army, wherever they were. To fix the termination of a day's march, in the face of the enemy at a point within that enemy's lines, is not sound strategy. In this case it resulted in defeat, and converted what might have been a successful reconnaissance into a complete disaster.

When poor DUFFIÉ encountered STUART's outposts he was at first strangely successful. The vedettes were driven in, and so precipitately that STUART himself, who was in the vicinity at the moment, narrowly escaped capture. The size of DUFFIÉ's command, however, was soon made known; MUNFORD was recalled from Aldie, and ROBERTSON and CHAMBLISS, who were at that moment marching upon Middleburg, were hurried forward with a view to surround and capture DUFFIÉ's entire command. At seven o'clock in the morning he was attacked by ROBERTSON's brigade. His men fought bravely and repelled more than one charge before they were driven from the town; retiring by the same road by which they had advanced. Unfortunately for DUFFIÉ, this route was now closed by CHAMBLISS' brigade, which surrounded him during the night and captured early the next morning the greater part of those who had escaped from ROBERTSON on the previous evening. Colonel DUFFIÉ himself escaped capture al! reached Centreville early in the afternoon with four of his officers and twenty seven men.*

On June 18th no important movements were undertaken on either side. The day was passed by both PLEASANTON and STUART in preparing for a renewal of the contest on the following day.

Early in the morning of June 19th PLEASANTON (GREGG's division being still in advance) moved out in the direction of Middleburg and encountered STUART about a mile to the east of the town. From this position the Confederates were dislodged by a successful dismounted attack on their right flank, and obliged to take up a position about half a

* McCLELLAN'S "Stuart," pp. 304, 305.

mile to their rear. On the evening of this day STUART was reinforced by the arrival of JONES' brigade, which was posted at Union. On the morning of the 20th HAMPTON arrived and was stationed on the Upperville road, replacing CHAMBLISS, who was moved over to the left of the line, in front of Union. STUART now had with him five brigades of cavalry and occupied a line extending from Middleburg, due north, to Union. Opposed to him were the six brigades composing the divisions of BUFORD and GREGG, supported by BARNES' division of Federal infantry.

On the 21st the initiative was again taken by PLEASANTON. At 8 A. M. BUFORD advanced on the Union road, with instructions to turn the left flank of the Confederate cavalry. GREGG advanced, simultaneously with BUFORD, with orders to engage the attention of the enemy's right. As is often the case in war, the parts to be played by GREGG and BUFORD were reversed, GREGG's feint becoming the principal attack. STUART was steadily pushed back, through Upperville, toward the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge. He retired slowly, stubbornly contesting every inch of ground, and at nightfall formed line of battle across the Upperville pike about two miles west of the town. Here, after fighting for the day had entirely ceased, he was reinforced by a brigade of LONGSTREET'S infantry. On the morning of June 22d PLEASANTON retired and rejoined the Army of the Potomac; on the same day STUART established his headquarters at Rector's cross roads, on the Aldie and Winchester pike, between Upperville and Middleburg.

PLEASANTON'S success in the engagements at Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville had been most encouraging; the more as they were calculated to inspire both officers and men of his command with confidence in their capacity to cope, on equal terms, with their redoubtable adversary. In a series of encounters covering a period of five days—between June 17th and 21st—he had succeeded in reaching the base of the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap. Partly from the observations of his scouts and partly from the stubborn character of STUART'S resistance, he had ascertained the general fact that the mass of LEE'S infantry was moving northward through the Shenandoah Valley. He does not seem to have learned, however, that LONGSTREET'S corps had entered the Loudon Valley, or that it had passed through Ashby's and Snickers' Gaps into the valley of Virginia. General LEE had now fully committed his army to the scheme of invading Pennsylvania; General HOOKER was sufficiently well informed of the plans of his adversary to enable him to conform his movements to those of the enemy. Both generals, for the next few days, stood less in need of their cavalry than at any time since the campaign began. The cavalry, which had been employed almost without intermission for more than two weeks in the performance of arduous and unfamiliar duties, stood much in need of rest. But this it was not to have. The

Army of Northern Virginia completed its crossing of the Potomac on June 26th; STUART, two days earlier, had set out on his famous *detour* to reach the Confederate right, between York and Harrisburg, in Pennsylvania. The last troops of the Army of the Potomac passed into Maryland on the same day—June 26th—that LEE's rear guard crossed into the Cumberland Valley.

It will perhaps be well at this point to trace the march of the Confederate infantry to the extreme point reached in its invasion of Pennsylvania. EWELL, on June 15th, the day following his decisive encounter with MILROY, reached and crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown; JENKINS' cavalry brigade covering the advance until the river was passed, when it was directed to Chambersburg to gain information and collect supplies. EWELL with the main body of his infantry moved by Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, where he divided his command, and directed RODE's and JOHNSON's divisions to Carlisle, *via* Chambersburg, and EARLY to York, *via* Gettysburg. Carlisle was occupied on June 27th and York on June 28th. On the 29th LEE, becoming satisfied that HOOKER was following him, recalled EWELL, directing him to concentrate at Cashtown, about ten miles northwest of Gettysburg on the Chambersburg road. LONGSTREET, after his *detour* through the Loudon Valley, turned to the west and entered the valley of the Shenandoah through Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. He crossed the Potomac at Williamsport on June 25th and 26th and passed through Chambersburg to Fayetteville, where he arrived on June 27th. On the following day he was directed to Cash-town, which was reached by his advance on June 29th. HILL, leaving Culpeper on the 18th, reached Shepherdstown on June 23d; there he crossed into Maryland and marched, by Boonesborough, to Fayetteville, which he reached on June 27th.

In the general movement of the Confederate army down the Shenandoah Valley, and across the Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania, it was LEE's intention that STUART should maintain his position on the right flank of the infantry. In the performance of this duty STUART, through his orders under LONGSTREET's command, was left a wide discretion. It was necessary that this should be so, for the task to which he was about to address himself was altogether new and untried; it was also beset with peculiar difficulty and danger. To understand this difficulty it will be necessary to consider for a moment the theatre of operations. STUART's orders required him to keep to the right of the Confederate infantry. That infantry was marching in a long column, the head of which was in Pennsylvania, the rear in the lower courses of the Shenandoah. East of the Blue Ridge, Catoctin range, and separated from LEE by the narrow Loudon and Catoctin Valleys, the country was occupied by the Army of the Potomac. The fords of the Potomac, from Harper's

Ferry to the west, were reserved for the passage of the artillery and infantry; from the Point of Rocks to the south they were controlled by the enemy. Between Harper's Ferry and the Point of Rocks the mountain ranges cross the river; there are few practicable fords; the roads are narrow and difficult and the general surface of the country is broken, irregular and full of obstacles. There were then but two courses open to STUART: to cross at Shepherdstown, keeping to the right and rear of LONGSTREET, or to cross the Potomac below HOOKER and join the right of the Confederate advance, under EWELL, in Pennsylvania. The latter course was the one which he favored and advocated, in at least three communications to General LEE. A glance at the map will show that this route to York or Harrisburg was at least as short as that taken by EWELL, LONGSTREET and HILL. The Maryland roads were certainly better than those used by the infantry, and the moral effect upon the authorities in Washington could be confidently reckoned upon. There was no time during the progress of the war when the approach of even an insignificant partisan force to the vicinity of the defenses of the Capital did not fully engage the attention and excite the alarm of the distinguished lawyer who then commanded the Armies of the United States. If such an effect followed the incursion of a partisan force of less than a hundred men, why might not STUART count upon a correspondingly increased effect to follow the news that he had interposed the greater part of his command between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. In this he was not mistaken, and General LEE so far concurred with him as to twice give him a written order to carry the scheme into effect. The sound military objections to the project were either not apparent to General STUART, or were outweighed, in his mind, by the apparent brilliancy of the undertaking. To the success of his endeavor, time and the utmost celerity of movement were absolutely necessary, but these were the uncertain elements in the problem before him. He would have to pass through or evade the columns of Federal infantry which were then converging on Frederick, and his recent experiences with the Federal cavalry had not warranted the belief that it was less enterprising or less ably commanded or handled than his own. As the event proved these elements entered as causes of delay, preventing that junction with LEE at Gettysburg, which the latter so ardently desired, and the failure of which he so bitterly regretted.

In the execution of this movement, STUART selected to accompany him the brigades of FITZ LEE, HAMPTON and CHAMBLISS, leaving those of ROBERTSON and JONES to replace him on the right and rear of the infantry corps. Salem was selected as the point of departure of the expeditionary column, and the three brigades were assembled there on the night of June 24th. At 1 A.M. of the 25th the command moved *via* Glass-

cock's gap to Haymarket, where HANCOCK's corps of Federal infantry was encountered. This caused a delay of nearly twenty-four hours, as it required a longer *detour* to be made, *via* Buckland Mills and Wolf Run Shoals. On the 26th, he passed Fairfax Court House, and on the 27th reached Dranesville. During the night of the 27th, he accomplished the difficult passage of the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, and massed his command, at daylight, on the Maryland shore. After a short rest on the morning of the 28th, the column pushed forward (HAMPTON's brigade taking the road *via* Darnstwon), to Rockville, on the main road from Washington to Frederick City. Here the telegraph wires were cut and the first, and only important, capture was made, of a train of 125 wagons, laden with supplies for the Federal army.

STUART, now believing that he had gained sufficient ground to the east, to pass well to the right of the Army of the Potomac, turned to the north at a point about six miles east of Rockville, and, by a rapid night march, reached the Baltimore & Ohio railway, at Hood's mill, soon after daybreak on the morning of the 29th. The railway and telegraph lines were destroyed, and the railroad bridge at Sykesville was burned. STUART then pressed on, reaching Westminster at 5 P. M. of the same day, and here he determined to give to his tired men and horses the rest of which they stood so greatly in need.

Meantime the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had not been idle. PLEASANTON, on retiring from the Loudon Valley, on June 22d, though actually employed on outpost service, was enabled, in the few days that elapsed before he crossed into Maryland, to supply his command with both rations and forage. HOOKER, still uncertain as to LEE's precise intention, had, on June 17th, established his corps in two lines extending from Manassas Junction to Dranesville. By the 24th, he had shifted them still farther to his right, the 12th, 5th and 2d occupying the line from Leesburg to Haymarket, the 11th at Edwards Ferry and the 1st, 3d and 6th in reserve, upon a line extending from Farmwell, through Gum Springs, to Centreville. It becoming apparent to HOOKER that the greater part of LEE's army was now north of the Potomac, and that all danger of a direct attack, by way of Centreville and Fairfax, had disappeared, he passed his army across the Potomac, at Edwards Ferry, on June 25th and 26th. On the 27th, the advance under REYNOLDS occupied Middletown. The divisions of BUFORD and GREGG crossed, in the rear of the infantry, on the 27th. At about this time, the strength of the cavalry corps was increased by attaching to it the regiments of cavalry that had composed the command of General STAHEL, and which had been stationed in front of Washington, on outpost duty, during the preceding winter and spring. The command of the new division was given to Gen-

eral KILPATRICK. On June 28th General HOOKER was relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac by General MEADE.

On the night of the day that General MEADE succeeded to the command, the Confederate invasion, unknown to him had spent its force, and General LEE signalized the beginning of his retrograde movement, by ordering a concentration of his three corps at Cashtown. MEADE, still unaware of LEE's position, on the 28th determined upon Frederick as his first objective. His line of march to that point ran in a northeasterly direction, and the cavalry divisions were placed, BUFORD on the left, KILPATRICK in advance and GREGG on the right of the advancing army. KILPATRICK was detached from the column on the 28th and turned to the east with a view of intercepting STUART. This task should properly have fallen to General GREGG, and such would have been the case had that officer not been delayed from pursuing—or even from starting in pursuit—by an unfortunate encounter with a column of infantry, which blocked his way for some hours on the morning of the 28th. It therefore fell to KILPATRICK, who pushed forward to the vicinity of Littlestown, seven miles from Hanover, where he encamped on the night of the 29th. STUART, as we have seen, had halted that night at Westminster, ten miles from Hanover.

STUART seems to have been aware of KILPATRICK's presence, but KILPATRICK does not seem to have been so well informed as to his adversary's movements; for, early on the morning of the 30th, he pushed on through Hanover, where his rear was attacked by STUART's advance as it entered the town. KILPATRICK thus failed to take advantage of an opportunity that is rarely offered to a general in war—to strike an opponent at a decided and demonstrable disadvantage. STUART's command, worn out with six days and nights of hard work, was stretched out in a long column, endeavoring to protect a train of captured wagons over a mile in length. It cannot be said, in KILPATRICK's defense, that he was not aware of the near proximity of the enemy, for it was his first duty to know, before he encamped on the night of the 29th, whether STUART had yet passed the point on the Hanover-Westminster road, which his own line of march would intersect. Had he known his enemy's position, any attack, however deficient in energy, would have compelled STUART to abandon his captured wagons—a well directed attack upon STUART's long line would have resulted in his disastrous defeat, from which he could only have escaped with the loss of a considerable portion of his command. I regret to say that neither course commended itself to General KILPATRICK.

His adversary, however, was more enterprising. He was aware, as we have seen, of KILPATRICK's presence, and he made his dispositions accordingly. His first endeavor was to escape annihilation; should he be

so fortunate as to succeed in that, his desire was to save a portion, at least, of his captured wagons. On the morning of the 30th, STUART put his brigades in march in the following order: CHAMBLISS took the advance, followed by the wagon train, which in turn was followed by HAMPTON, as rear guard. FITZ LEE's brigade marched on the left flank of the column — the side from which KILPATRICK was expected to appear. Had such an attack been made, this disposition would have been a good one, as it would have placed Lee in an advanced line, with the other brigades in echelon, to his right and left. But this was not to be. KILPATRICK at daybreak, pressed on through Hanover, where his rear was attacked by CHAMBLISS. For this particular encounter — which was the last that would have been predicted as likely to occur — the Confederate disposition was not a good one. It required too long a time to deploy on the advanced brigade, and enabled FARNSWORTH, who commanded KILPATRICK's rear guard, to repulse the attack. This he did, though with considerable difficulty.

KILPATRICK formed his brigades into line of battle, a little to the south of Hanover, but did not assume the offensive. STUART confronted him until dark, when he withdrew, by his right, and resumed his march, via Jefferson toward York, where he expected some tidings of EWELL. From Jefferson he pushed on, via Spring Forge, to Dover, whence, after a short halt on the evening of July 1st, he pressed on toward Carlisle. He found the place in the secure possession of the Federals, and, hearing that the Confederate army was retiring in the direction of Gettysburg, he turned back, and by a night march, reached Hunterstown on the morning of July 2d. KILPATRICK, who had lost touch of the enemy on the night of the 30th, marched on an interior line, via Abbottstown and Berlin, to Heidlersburg, where he turned to the southwest in the general direction of Gettysburg. At Hunterstown he encountered the rear of STUART's retiring column under HAMPTON. After a combat lasting all day, both parties bivouacked upon the lines which they occupied at nightfall. At dawn on July 3d, HAMPTON withdrew and joined the main body. STUART, with the brigades of LEE and CHAMBLISS, reached Gettysburg on the evening of July 2d, and took post in the rear of the Confederate left.

This bold ride of STUART's has been much discussed. In the opinion of military men it has always been regarded as a useless and unwarrantable, though brilliantly executed undertaking. He eluded successfully the numerous detachments that were set in motion to intercept him; he created such consternation in the minds of the authorities in Washington as to cause the telegraph wires to fairly burn with the orders and appeals that were sent in every direction, to fall upon him or drive him out of Maryland. He captured a number of wagons and a quantity of supplies, the loss of which was not felt in the Federal army. But he exhausted

the strength of his men and animals in a long, tedious and useless march ; he gained no information of any practical value to General LEE, and he was absent from the army at a time when his skill, enterprise and ability would have enabled him to render most important services to the Confederate cause, services which I need hardly say no other commander was capable of rendering.

With a word as to the cavalry that remained with the Confederate infantry I will bring this portion of the narrative to a close. The brigades of ROBERTSON and JONES were left behind by STUART, and accompanied the Confederate army across the Potomac. Their orders were from STUART, and were given to ROBERTSON in writing by that officer before his departure. They were so explicit, and define the duty of a body of cavalry, situated as was ROBERTSON, so clearly and accurately, as to be worth citing in full.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
June 24th, 1863.

Brigadier General B. H. Robertson, Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL:—Your own and General JONES' brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in command.

Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to our designs, and to harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.

After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.

As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. LEE, Lieutenant-General LONGSTREET, or myself, hold the gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.

If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the valley clear of what pertains to the army and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.

You will instruct General JONES from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General LONGSTREET, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.

I send instructions for General JONES, which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses and to marching off of the turnpikes.

In case of an advance of the enemy you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions, and if possible you will prevent him from gaining possession of the gaps. In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.

You will have with the two brigades, two batteries of horse artillery.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,
Major General Commanding.

Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning unless compelled to do so.*

*Century War Papers, part 19, p. 253.

These orders fixed ROBERTSON's responsibility, subject only to the superior orders of LEE or LONGSTREET. They imposed upon General ROBERTSON a most important duty, which it is necessary to understand, in order to appreciate his responsibility. When STUART left on his *detour* of the Army of the Potomac, HOOKER's forces were massed at Edwards Ferry for the purpose of crossing the river at that point. The main body of the Confederate army was on the north bank of the Potomac, on its way to Pennsylvania. It was still possible, however, for HOOKER to pass quickly to the west, enter the Shenandoah Valley, and place himself across LEE's line of retreat. To prevent this by giving timely notification of any such movement on HOOKER's part, STUART directed ROBERTSON to establish a line of outposts, facing south and east, extending from Winchester, via Charleston, to the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. This order contemplated a line of vedettes nearly thirty miles in length. A strict observance of this order would have, and probably did, carry ROBERTSON out of touch with the main body of LEE's army. If General LEE desired ROBERTSON to pursue any other course of duty, or to operate elsewhere, he should have given orders accordingly. Failing to do this, the responsibility for the failure to make proper use of these two brigades rests, not with General ROBERTSON, but with General LEE.

We will now return to the divisions of BUFORD and GREGG, which we left, the former covering the left, and the latter the right, of the advancing Army of the Potomac. The line of march of this army after crossing the river, was at first in a northeasterly direction. After passing Frederick its course was changed to one more nearly due north. This change of direction, and the detachment of KILPATRICK, changed, somewhat, the positions and duties of BUFORD, and GREGG, bringing the former to the front, and the latter to the right rear, of the advancing columns. MEADE vaguely knew that the Confederate infantry was in Pennsylvania, to the north, and in Maryland to the northwest, but whether the main body of the enemy was in Pennsylvania or to the west, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, he did not know; and it was necessary to ascertain this fact in order to enable him to effect a concentration.

On June 28th the several corps of the Army of the Potomac were stationed as follows: the 12th at Berlin, on the Potomac; the 1st and 11th at Middletown; the 2d, 3d and 5th at Frederick. BUFORD was in the Catoctin Valley, beyond Middleton, on the Frederick and Hagerstown road; GREGG on the Little Monocacy, to the east of the Point of Rocks, and KILPATRICK on the main Monocacy, a few miles north of Frederick. It was MEADE's purpose on the 29th to push forward his infantry to the line of Pipe Creek, but to do this, it was necessary, as we have seen, that he should know whether the Cumberland Valley, below Hagerstown, was occupied by the enemy. This duty was entrusted to BUFORD.

On the morning of June 29th that officer detached the Reserve Brigade, under MERRITT, to occupy Mechanicstown and protect the division trains. BUFORD himself, with the brigades of GAMBLE and DEVIN, then passed rapidly through Turner's Gap into the Cumberland Valley. Turning to the north he skirted the western base of the Blue Ridge and passing Cavetown and Ringold, encamped at Fountain Dale. At dawn on the 30th he pushed on through Fairfield and approached Gettysburg at about 10 A. M. HILL, who had bivouacked near Fairfield on the night of the 29th on his way to the point of concentration at Cashtown, detached PETTIGREW's brigade of HETH's division to occupy the town of Gettysburg, but PETTIGREW withdrew at the approach of the Federal cavalry. BUFORD, whose duty it was to observe rather than to engage the enemy's infantry, withdrew in the direction of Emmitsburg and reported the presence of a force of Confederate infantry to General REYNOLDS. At Emmitsburg he was directed by General PLEASANTON to advance and occupy Gettysburg. This he did on the afternoon of June 30th. Appreciating at once the importance of the position and the necessity of securing it, he advanced about a mile and a half beyond the town and deployed his division: placing GAMBLE's brigade on the left, across the Chambersburg road, and DEVIN's on the right, to cover those leading to Mummasburg and Carlisle. "GAMBLE threw out his scouting parties towards Cashtown and DEVIN towards Hunterstown, which scouted the country, capturing stragglers from the enemy, from whom important information was obtained. BUFORD now became satisfied that the mass of the rebel army was converging towards Gettysburg and that heavy columns were in close proximity."*

The honor of being the first to discover the strategic advantages that combined to determine the vicinity of Gettysburg, as the site of an important battle has rested first with one and then with another of the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac. Neither MEADE nor LEE seem to have had anything approaching an exact knowledge of its great strategic value, and it is altogether probable that on the morning of the 1st of July neither general knew more than that it was a place from which ten roads diverged, and that it was for that reason an important point to occupy. Each general was conducting his operations with but little accurate information as to the movements of the others. LEE had determined upon Cashtown as a point of concentration, and MEADE seems to have looked upon the line of Pipe Creek as a position having many claims to consideration. In the light of what is now known it seems to me that there can be no escape from the conclusion that General BUFORD is fully, completely, and beyond all manner of doubt, entitled to the credit of the selection. It is fortunate that we have an expression of his

* BAKER'S "Battle of Gettysburg," p. 55.

own opinion upon the subject. It will be found at page 55 of BATES' "Battle of Gettysburg," and is so pertinent and important as to be worthy of citation. "A lieutenant who was signal officer of BUFORD's division, reports the conversation of the chiefs on the occasion. On the night of the 30th he says General BUFORD spent some hours with Colonel TOM DEVIN, and while commenting upon the information brought in by DEVIN's scouts remarked 'that the battle would be fought at that point,' and that 'he was afraid that it would be commenced in the morning before the infantry would get up.' These are his own words. DEVIN did not believe in so early an advance of the enemy and remarked that he would take care of all that would attack his front during the ensuing twenty-four hours. BUFORD answered 'No, you won't; they will attack you in the morning and they will come *booming*—skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold we will do well.' Upon his return, he ordered me, then first lieutenant and signal officer of his division, to seek out the most prominent points and watch everything; to be careful to look out for camp-fires, and in the morning for dust.

And BUFORD was not mistaken. From 8 until 10 A. M. his two small brigades, with CALEF's battery of the 2d Artillery, held their ground against the most energetic and well directed attacks of HETH's division of Confederate infantry. At 10, General REYNOLDS arrived with the advance of the 1st Corps, but it was not until nightfall that it was deemed safe to permit the command of BUFORD to be withdrawn from the line of battle. On the following morning, the division was posted, for a time, at the Round Top, to the left and rear of the Union line. A little later in the day it was withdrawn and directed to Westminster, thus uncovering the left of the Army of the Potomac.

This movement, which seems to have been a mistaken one, deprived the left of MEADE's line of its cavalry. To remedy the error, KILPATRICK, FARNSWORTH's brigade of his division,* and the Reserve Brigade under MERRITT, moved up, on the morning of the 3d, and took post at Little Round Top, connecting with the left of the 2d Corps. Here both MERRITT and FARNSWORTH were heavily engaged on the afternoon of the last day of the battle. After the repulse of PICKETT's charge, General KILPATRICK ordered FARNSWORTH to attack an angle of the Confederate line, near its extreme right. The ground in KILPATRICK's immediate front was broken and irregular, covered with boulders and intersected by walls and fences to such a degree as to make it extremely unfavorable to the mounted employment of the arm, but FARNSWORTH, having drawn

*CUSTER's brigade was stationed on the Bonaughtover road and so fell under GREGG's command on the following day.

the attention of his superior to that fact, in a manly and dignified protest against a rash and ill-considered order, placed himself at the head of his command and rode gallantly to his death.

We have seen that BUFORD, when he started on his *detour* through the Cumberland Valley on June 29th, had left the Reserve Brigade, under MERRITT, at Mechanicstown. Here the brigade remained from June 29th to July 1st, protecting the division trains and maintaining a line of outposts along the road from Hagerstown to the eastern slopes of the Catoctin mountains. This was done with the view of preventing a turning movement, and of giving timely warning of any attempt, on the part of General LEE, to withdraw by his right flank. This duty precisely resembled that imposed on ROBERTSON, by STUART, in his order of June 23d. On July 2d, MERRITT's line of outposts was moved up to the Emmitsburg-Waynesboro road, and on the 3d he was called in and established on KILPATRICK's left, at Little Round Top.

It will be remembered that GREGG's division was assigned the task of covering the right of the Army of the Potomac in the advance on Gettysburg. The presence of STUART in Maryland, and the delays caused by the occupations of the roads by columns of infantry, having the right of way, had kept this division farther to the rear than had been anticipated or intended. On the night of June 27th, GREGG entered Frederick and learned that STUART had crossed the Potomac. On the 28th McINTOSH's brigade was sent east on the Baltimore Pike, and smaller commands were pushed out on the country roads, to the north and northeast, to prevent STUART from obtaining information, and to keep him as far to the east as possible, in the hope of delaying him until KILPATRICK could place himself across his line of march. At noon of the 29th, STUART was reported at Hood's mill. At 4 p. m. GREGG assembled his division at Mount Airy, and at 5 p. m. he set out in pursuit. After a difficult night march, his advance entered Westminster at daylight on the 30th, and reached Manchester at 10 a. m. After a short halt, GREGG pushed on to Hanover, which was reached at 9 a. m. of July 1st. Here he found orders directing him to proceed in the direction of Baltimore, but, before leaving, new orders reached him to send HUKE's brigade to Manchester, and proceed with the rest of his division, by the most direct route, to Gettysburg. At noon of the 2d the division reached the intersection of the Salem Church and Hanover roads, at a point about three miles east of Gettysburg. GREGG's prompt and intelligent obedience of orders had thus brought him, none to soon, into a position from which, on the morrow, he was to render the Federal infantry a service, hardly less important than that rendered by BUFORD on the first day of the battle.

We have seen that STUART, on returning to the main body on the evening of July 2d, had been posted on the York road, to the right and

rear of the extreme left of the Confederate infantry. In arranging the general assault, of which PICKETT's attack was to be the central feature, General LEE proposed with EWELL's corps and STUART's cavalry, to create a diversion in PICKETT's favor, by a simultaneous advance upon the extreme right of the Union line. General GREGG's fortunate presence, however, prevented the execution of this manœuvre, for STUART in moving to the place from which on the afternoon of July 3d he was to deliver his attack, encountered GREGG, and, after an obstinately contested engagement lasting from 2 p. m. until dark, was obliged to retire to the position which he had occupied in the morning before the battle began. "This was no mere reconnoissance to develop the position or movement of the enemy. STUART had with him the main strength and the flower of the Confederate cavalry, led by their most distinguished commanders. His force comprised four brigades with twenty regiments and battalions and four batteries. His avowed object was to strike the rear of the Federal army in co-operation with PICKETT's grand attack upon the centre."*

With GREEG's successful encounter on the right, the three days of fighting at Gettysburg came to an end. I shall not, at this time, follow the operations of the cavalry during the retreat and pursuit of the Confederate army across the Potomac into the valley of Virginia; the campaign ending where it began, in the dense, impenetrable forest growths on the south banks of the Rappahannock and Rappidan.

I will say a word in closing as to the lessons taught by this campaign. In the first place, what may be called the "science of outposts," was developed as it had not been before in the history of war. Up to this time the practice had been to maintain a chain of infantry outposts along the front and flanks of an army in the vicinity of the enemy. Cavalry had been neither freely nor boldly used, and outpost duty had, as a rule, been timidly and inefficiently performed. Within the lines all was believed safe; beyond the outposts, not only was it "enemy's territory," but the country was presumed and believed to be actually filled with the troops of the enemy. In the two great wars just preceding our own, in the Crimea and in Italy, this state of the case was true to a remarkable degree. This was largely due to the fact that the cavalry had been fractioned up and distributed among the larger units of infantry. The same thing was attempted in the Army of the Potomac, but after a year's experience the attempt was abandoned; the cavalry was withdrawn from the infantry corps and concentrated first in a division, then a corps of three divisions, acting under the orders of the commanding general. In a word the same principle was applied in its organization and employment that General HUNT labored so successfully to introduce into the organization of the artillery. In the Army of Northern Virginia, the cavalry had been iso-

* No 21, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," p 406.

lated from the first, and was trained in outpost work—sometimes to the neglect of its proper cavalry instruction. This course was perhaps necessary, but it impaired the efficiency of the Confederate cavalry whenever it was called upon to meet the Federal cavalry *mounted*. The result was that the latter steadily improved, while the former remained stationary, if, indeed, it did not decrease in effectiveness towards the close of the war.

In this campaign we have the first example of the outpost work of an army being done "by wholesale" by the arm best fitted for the task. The cavalry of one army was employed to locate the main body of the enemy, and incidentally to examine the country between the contending armies. The cavalry of the other army endeavored to prevent this information from being obtained, by interposing itself as a screen between its own main body and that of the enemy. In the performance of these duties we have seen that there were frequent collisions. If the tactical details of these encounters be carefully and thoroughly studied, I think the fact will appear, that while there was much fighting on foot, it was not so generally successful as has been supposed. I think the fact will also appear that that command was most frequently and uniformly successful which was most skillfully handled *as a mounted force*—dismounting only to accomplish a temporary purpose, or, as in BUFORD's case at Gettysburg, when it was necessary to oppose infantry, or to hold a point of great strategic importance until the infantry could arrive.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED PLEASANTON, COMMANDER.

First Division.—Brigadier General JOHN BUFORD.

<i>1st Brigade.</i>	<i>2d Brigade.</i>	<i>Reserve Brigade.</i>
Colonel WILLIAM GAMBLE.	Colonel T. C. DEVIN.	Brig. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT.
8th Ill. Cavalry,	6th N. Y. Cavalry,	1st U. S. Cavalry,
12th Ill. " (4 Cos.),	9th N. Y. "	2d U. S. "
3d Ind. " (6 Cos.),	17th Pa. "	5th U. S. "
8th N. Y. "	3d W. Va. " (2 Cos.).	6th U. S. "
		6th Pa. "

Second Division.—Brigadier General D. McM. GREGG.

<i>First Brigade.</i>	<i>Second Brigade.</i>	<i>Third Brigade.</i>
Colonel J. B. MCINTOSH.	Colonel PENNOCK HUEY.	Colonel J. I. GREGG.
1st Mo. Cavalry,	2d N. Y. Cavalry,	1st Maine Cavalry,
1st Mass. "	4th N. Y. "	10th N. Y. "
1st N. J. "	6th Ohio "	4th Pa. "
1st Pa. "	8th Pa. "	16th Pa. "
3d Pa. "		

Third Division.—Brigadier General J. KILPATRICK.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. E. J. FARNSWORTH.
5th N. Y. Cavalry,
18th Pa. "
1st W. Va. "
1st Va. "

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. GEO. A. CUSTER.
1st Michigan Cavalry.
5th Michigan "
6th Michigan "
7th Michigan "

Horse Artillery.

First Brigade.

Captain J. M. ROBERTSON,
9th Mich. Battery,
6th N. Y. "
B and L. 2d U. S. Artillery,
M, 2d U. S. Artillery.

Second Brigade.

Captain J. C. TIDBALL.
E and G, 1st U. S. Artillery,
K, 1st U. S. Artillery,
A, 2d " "
C, 2d " "

ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION OF THE ARMY
OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

MAJOR GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, COMMANDER.

Brig. Gen. FITZHUGH LEE'S Brigade.	Brig. Gen. WADE HAMPTON'S Brigade.	Brig. Gen. W. H. F. LEE'S Brigade.
1st Md. Batt. Cavalry,	1st N. C. Cavalry,	2d N. C. Cavalry,
1st Va. Cavalry,	1st S. C. " <td>9th Va. "</td>	9th Va. "
2d Va. " <td>2d S. C. "<td>10th Va. "</td></td>	2d S. C. " <td>10th Va. "</td>	10th Va. "
3d Va. " <td>Cobb's Legion (Ga.),</td> <td>13th Va. "</td>	Cobb's Legion (Ga.),	13th Va. "
4th Va. " <td>Jeff Davis' Legion,</td> <td></td>	Jeff Davis' Legion,	
5th Va. " <td>Phellips Legion (Ga.),</td> <td></td>	Phellips Legion (Ga.),	
Brig. Gen. A. G. JENKINS' Brigade.	Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON'S Brigade.	Brig. Gen. W. E. JONES' Brigade.
14th Va. Cavalry,	4th N. C. Cavalry,	6th Va. Cavalry,
16th Va. " <td>5th N. C. "<td>7th Va. "</td></td>	5th N. C. " <td>7th Va. "</td>	7th Va. "
17th Va. " <td></td> <td>11th Va. "</td>		11th Va. "
34th Va. (Batt.),		35th Va. (Batt.).
Jackson's Va. Battery.		

Horse Artillery Battalion.—Major R. F. BECKHAM.

Brethed's Va. Battery,	Hart's S. C. Battery,
Chew's Va. " <td>McGregor's Va. Battery,</td>	McGregor's Va. Battery,
Griffin's Md. " <td>Moorman's Va. "</td>	Moorman's Va. "

Imboden's Command.—Brigadier General J. D. IMBODEN.

18th Va. Cavalry (?),	Va. Partisan Rangers,
62d Va. (Mtd. Inf.),	Va. Battery.

TRANSLATIONS.

LETTERS ON CAVALRY, BY PRINCE KRAFT ZU HOHEN- LOHE-INGELFINGEN.

BY COLONEL R. P. HUGHES,
INSPECTOR GENERAL U. S. A.

FIRST LETTER.—GENERALITIES.

I FIND myself a good deal embarrassed by your question concerning the value of cavalry, upon which military writers have given such different opinions since our last war. I feel that being an artillerist I shall not be acknowledged by either the cavalry or infantry as a competent judge. You think, and I must acknowledge that your opinion has some foundation, that as an artillerist I will be able to express an unbiased opinion, and that I have seen so much of cavalry in peace and war, (having commanded a division for seven years with cavalry in my command which I had to inspect and criticise in detail) that my experience must have given me a thorough knowledge of its character. I have a good deal of hesitation in giving written expression to my views, and will consider the question from a birdseye perspective as it presents itself to a division commander who has all arms under him, and I will enter into cavalry details only so far as may be absolutely necessary.

I must first remark that I regret from the bottom of my heart the intemperate contention which has existed at times upon this subject; because, such hostility between comrades of the same army, who are called upon to help and strengthen one another when it concerns the attaining the great purpose, the defending of the fatherland, cannot lead to profitable results. In war times the infantryman feels himself comfortably secure when he knows his cavalry is four or five miles in front, and will bring him timely and reliable information; he knows that he can sleep quietly that night under shelter because the enemy is so distant that a

nocturnal attack is not possible. On the other hand in war the cavalryman utters a sigh of relief when he sees his infantry in possession of a defile towards which he is being driven by a numerically superior enemy, because he will find protection and safety behind it. Such experiences call forth a friendship and comradeship which not unfrequently lead to an intimate brotherhood between the different arms of the service. Who is not familiar with the story of the Heurichs in the war for freedom? Who does not know that the Hussars and Jägers of the Guard in Potsdam call each other "Couleur," although their coats are of different colors? This feeling of unity continues for some time after the close of hostilities. At last the pen assumes the mastery of events, and founds statements upon intelligence and reports which are often defective, and sometimes untrue, and at best are never reproductive of the complete and exact picture of the personal impressions. (The most objective historian can only represent that which really happened, not how it appeared to the actors at the time of the act.) Assertions and claims which occasionally go to the length of the annihilation of one of the arms, soon destroy all feeling of good fellowship between the different arms, to the great detriment of the army as a whole.

It is necessary, therefore, to consider things in their greatest objectivity, and carefully to avoid extreme statements which may occasionally make their appearance. Many have gone so far as to deny the cavalry their *raison d'être*. We have also seen that a writer was ready to establish the fact that a cavalryman costs more than ten infantrymen, and that Prince FREDERICK CHARLES' army on the Loire, in 1870, would have conquered the army much sooner if he had had 200,000 infantry instead of the 20,000 cavalry which he did have. As though the army were the result of a financial transaction and was to be bought or hired "on change," as were the armies of the Italian Condottieri in the latter part of the fifteenth century. But without objecting to the foregoing calculation (which, however, is possibly correct), he who makes that assertion has not taken into consideration the fact that when an army is created by requiring service from all, and every serviceable man takes part in the war, it is not possible to obtain 200,000 infantry for the 20,000 cavalry, because the serviceable men are not to be had. The 20,000 cavalry could be transformed into 20,000 infantry and thereby leave some money in our pockets, of which the victorious enemy would soon relieve us, as his superiority in cavalry would enable him to keep himself much better informed of our movements than we of his, and thus give him a great strategic superiority which would result in the destruction of our army.

Other writers have defended themselves against attacks of this kind with much vigor, and, at times, have shown justifiable indignation, and we are not surprised that under great provocation they have occasionally

gone too far, and have represented the capabilities and worth of the cavalry in too bright colors. None of them have yet arrived at the conclusion (from the statement made by NAPOLEON III on the 2d of September, 1870, to our king, "Your cavalry and your artillery have alone secured this great result") that the infantry must be done away with, but they suggest, with a tone of sadness, that the cavalry should be organized separately from the infantry, and that then the most brilliant results might be expected from the raids and attacks of this independent cavalry.

At the beginning of a war these controversies between extremists as to the relations and duties of the different arms of the service are productive of baneful results. If our infantry commander accepts the claims and statements of the cavalry and fosters expectations of it which are not fulfilled when the time for action comes, he is disagreeably and sensibly surprised, and a commander who is surprised in a campaign is already half beaten. If he shares the unfavorable opinion of the capabilities of cavalry as represented by some writer whom he has read, who was inimical to that arm, then he will not apply it, is not in harmony with it, and unity of action is rendered impossible, and failure is the natural result.

Controversy can only cause mischief. The best results are only secured by both arms acting in entire harmony; they must become so thoroughly acquainted with one another on the drill field as to gain a clear understanding of how each can make application of its special and characteristic strength to re-enforce the characteristic weakness and compensate for the deficiencies of the sister arm.

The views upon the value of and the manner in which to apply the cavalry are much more at variance than they are upon the work and application of the other arms.

This is probably the result of suggestive comparisons between victories gained by the cavalry in earlier wars and the small number of attacks of cavalry masses in late wars. In the three Silesian Wars of the eighteenth century there was scarcely a battle in which the final and deciding thrust was not given by the cavalry, or, at least, *die tenne segte* (it swept the field). One very decisive battle (Rossbach) was fought almost entirely by cavalry on the side of the victors. The history of the war of 1870-71 gives account of more than twenty great decisive battles, and of a great number of actions and affairs in which the number of troops engaged was greater than in the great battles of the Seven Years' War, and in all these struggles of powerful masses, attacks of great masses of cavalry have only occurred on four occasions: On the part of the Prussians at Mars-La-Tour; on the part of the French at Woerth, Mars-La-Tour and Sedan, and excepting these instances there was but one attack (Loigny) which amounted to the strength of a full brigade. These facts have caused many writers to represent the cavalry as worthless as a rule, and the cav-

alry writers, in their longing for the glorious days of Hohenfriedberg, Rossbach, Leuthen, Haynon, Liebertwolkwitz and Laon, are disposed to attribute their failure in the late wars rather to faults in leading and applying their arm of the service than to grant that the date of glorious days for the cavalry is past. When I think of the feeling with which we looked upon the cavalry in those episodes in our late wars in which I participated, and from them infer what value we would have put upon the cavalry in the other actions, then I must reject the premises and conclusions of all such writers, of both arms, and most emphatically maintain that the cavalry was applied upon proper principles in our last great war, and had an equal share with the other arms in the result obtained by our army in the campaign of 1870-71. I am prepared to prove this assertion.

It is true that no single regiment returned from an attack with sixty-six captured colors as at Hohenfriedberg, because the cavalry is not now so infinitely superior to the other arms as it was at the time of FREDERICK THE GREAT. The improvements in fire arms has re-established the equilibrium, and has again confined the cavalry to its legitimate sphere, i. e., to those duties which require swiftness of movement in their accomplishment. It is true that the pursuit of the enemy by the cavalry after most great battles has failed in its results. The enemy found shelter behind fortress walls, and no one expects cavalry to take fortresses. When the whole army of the enemy capitulates there is no occasion for a cavalry pursuit. After other great battles which occurred during the winter season the chief element of the cavalry, velocity of movement, was destroyed by the ice, and this prevented it from making an effective pursuit. After other battles, however, an energetic pursuit was made and an abundant harvest reaped. I am far from maintaining that the application, leading and performances of the cavalry were at all times what they should have been. Nothing that man does is perfect. Our cavalry has no more sins of omission and commission to repent of in the part it took in the campaign of 1870-71 than have the infantry and artillery, and the excellent spirit that animated it is clearly seen in the readiness with which faults were acknowledged, and in the zeal with which they entered into a scientific and careful examination of themselves, after the campaign, in order to fix the seat of their past faults and to apply the necessary corrections.

It is not necessary that one who does not belong to the cavalry should enumerate their faults and expose them, and I will pass them over. Every one should sweep in front of his own door. In instruction and leading, the cavalry undoubtedly has much greater difficulties to overcome than the other arms, and these difficulties increase in the same ratio as the duties required of the cavalry increase in importance. *These duties*

have now reached such a height that cavalry officers must in time of peace make greater sacrifices in means and health, and do more studying than the officers of the other arms, if they will satisfactorily accomplish the work which now belongs to their arm of the service.

In earlier times it sufficed to have a strong arm, a good sword, a stout heart, to be a good rider, and to have a noble horse, to make a capable cavalryman. These are, in our day, elementary, self understood conditions. The improvements in fire arms have so increased the difficulties with which the cavalry has to contend in instruction and leading that it constantly demands increased exertion and talent to overcome them and to meet the requirements of the cavalry of the present day.

The tasks of the cavalry of the present day are the same as those of the past. A few of the most brilliant have fallen somewhat into the shade, while some of the less conspicuous but equally important duties, of which little mention is made, have come to the front. The manner of executing their tasks has become more difficult.

We know how zealously the cavalry have worked to fit themselves for these heightened requirements. The new cavalry tactics, the new instruction in equitation; the cavalry practice marches are proofs of it. I only mention these three things because they can be considered as the latest and most troublesome labors of the cavalry.

I would not be understood as acknowledging that the entire development of cavalry has been accomplished. I am of the opinion that much can yet be done in the way of training, instruction, leading, application, arrangement and method of exercises, with fewer demands upon the physical forces, which will more surely secure the results sought. In my opinion the possible modifications and improvements do not lie in the hands of the cavalry itself; they relate to the application of it, the plan and direction of the exercises, which, as a rule, are established and ordered by non-cavalryists.

I also doubt whether a complete organic separation of the cavalry from the infantry, and organizing it into permanent, independent divisions, (these divisions to be grouped into cavalry inspections, with an inspector general of cavalry at its head, which is so strongly recommended by some writers), would give salutary results. Besides, the duties which the cavalry has to perform result from the demands of the army as a whole, and the work is rendered easier when there is an intimate union of all arms. There would be greater danger that the cavalry would fall into the habit of taking a one-sided view of the situation if it should be entirely separated from the other arms. By itself, the cavalry cannot always secure satisfactory results. The time has passed when whole armies could be made up of mounted men. The cavalry, likewise the artillery, can only obtain the best results so long as they

remain constantly conscious that they are only auxiliaries to the infantry. The *infantry is the army and makes use of cavalry as well as artillery*. The cavalry must act for the infantry, and it can only appreciate the duties which the infantry requires of it by being thrown in constant contact with it, while on the other hand, it is only by constant union with the cavalry that the infantry is enabled to understand just what services can be demanded of it, and what it is capable of doing. With us the general inspector of cavalry is only sent to the great cavalry exercises for the purpose of inspecting them, and submits his report to the general headquarters, and, in my opinion, this is the wisest arrangement. Perhaps they might make a few cavalry inspectors who would be subject to his orders, and who, under his instructions, would superintend the instructions of the cavalry organizations, and who would become the commanders of cavalry divisions in case of war.

Without going to the extreme of wishing to abolish the cavalry it is not unusual to hear, or see it argued that the strength of this arm should be reduced because it has become less important than it was in earlier times. There has been much said and written as to the proportion which should exist between the cavalry and infantry. This numerical relation has been different at all times and in all armies. I hold the fixing of such a theoretical normal ratio as one of the most ancient of theories. When service is general and obligatory the only correct rule in organization is conditioned upon the being able to apply the whole strength of the nation with promptness at the right moment; and the ratio is determined by the condition of the fatherland. The duties of the cavalry are so comprehensive, and so specially important at the first moment of hostilities that one cannot have too much of it in readiness for action. Every serviceable horse as well as every serviceable man must be available for the defense of the fatherland, and the industry of horse breeding in some measure determines the number of cavalry in the army. An organization which would render it necessary for us to purchase abroad any appreciable number of horses could not be maintained for any considerable time.

THE PART THE CAVALRY HAD IN THE RESULTS
OF 1870-71.

SECOND LETTER.—RECONNOISSANCES.

IF it seems to you that the assertion in my last letter, that our cavalry had as great a share in the successes of our army in the campaign of 1870 and '71, as the other arms, is in need of any substantiation, I will try and provide you with the proofs.

I could confine myself to the quoting of a single sentence from the history published by the Great General STAFF, to-wit: "The numerous German cavalry upon whose clear and reliable reports the decisive resolutions of the army commanders were based." * * *

The results showed how securely these decisions were grounded.

But the information obtained by the cavalry constituted only a portion of their work and application on the front of the army. They inundated the enemy's territory for miles; yes, even several marches, in front of the main body of infantry. Everyone finds that quite natural now. Of course, that is what the cavalry is for, and yet in 1870, such an application of the great mass of cavalry was entirely new. Yet, after it has been once done, it is quite easy to copy. In earlier days the great mass of cavalry was held back as reserve cavalry for some special attack, and only the light cavalry was sent in advance. In those days the Prussian cavalry was not numerically superior to that of other armies. In the first two Silesian wars FREDERICK THE GREAT found himself surrounded everywhere by the enemy's hussars, who reconnoitered him and blindfolded him; and in the Seven Years' War the light cavalry of Austria was still, in minor affairs, superior to the hussars which the king had organized in the meantime.

In the wars at the beginning of this century even the great NAPOLEON never made such use of his cavalry as did our army commanders in the last war, and, notwithstanding the great experience of the French, we have often seen infantry carelessly marching at the head of their great armies. The surprise of HAYNAU is a good example of this experience. In our War For Freedom individual leaders made extensive use of light cavalry, as is shown by the acts and dispositions of VON KATZLER, but the great mass of the cavalry was left in the rear. The idea of keeping a heavy cavalry mass in reserve for the purpose of breaking the enemy's line at the opportune moment continued in force until after the close of the war of 1866, in which both sides are seen to have held a mass of cavalry in reserve, which, as has been well said, was intended to act as a sort of torpedo and give the decision at the last moment.

The expression "reserve cavalry" was a very unfortunate one. One would scarcely believe that a bare word could exercise such influence. And yet, it is so.

A command which is once designated as, and given the name of, "The Reserve," will seldom be sent to the front by the commander. What kind of a "reserve" would it be if applied at the opening of an action?

On the 18th of March, 1869, I made the suggestion, in an article read before the Military Society at Berlin, that our "reserve" artillery should be applied to preparation of the attack, and a French writer banteringly asked, "*Qu'est-ce que c'est que cette réserve qui n'est pas une réserve?*" Therefore the name Reserve Cavalry was done away with, and Cavalry Division substituted, just as the name Reserve Artillery was changed into Corps Artillery.

Upon the opening of hostilities in 1870 we do not see the cavalry employed in the first days of the campaign as it was a little later when all France was in a state of terror from the Prussian Uhlan. Although France declared war on the 19th day of July, yet upon our side only bold rides of single patrols were made until the first part of August. On the 5th of August the 4th Cavalry Division was sent forward on an extended reconnaissance toward Hagenau and Reichshofen, and it was through this division that the fact was established that the enemy had concentrated a strong force behind the Sauer. Nevertheless, during the battle of Woerth the 4th Cavalry Division was held at Schonenburg, about eight miles in rear of the line of battle, apparently in the sense of a cavalry reserve, because the arrangements made for the 6th of August were evidently based upon the supposition that there would be no battle on that day, but that our army would employ that day in closing up and changing front to the right. Granting that the line of the Sauer was strongly occupied by the enemy, this division of cavalry could not find employment in front of the enemy.

The victories of Woerth and Spicheren first gave the cavalry divisions the basis for their subsequent activity, and the idea suggested above, that the cavalry should be employed in front of the army, soon found general realization. Thus a new thought is like a spark of fire, small in its inception but of very rapid growth.

For example: We see on the 7th of August, as the Guard Corps marched from Homburg to Bliescastel-Assweiler, that as it neared the French border the cavalry division belonging to the corps was placed at the rear of column. The order of the day only permitted it to push its head of column as far as Webenheim, in front of which stood the entire Second Division of Infantry. The First Infantry of the Guard was in Assweiler. On this day an officer and four men of the Brunswick Hussars captured Saargemund, in which town two companies of the enemy's in-

fantry were found. The lieutenant threatened to bombard the town with his troops (four men), and by verbal agreement the mayor dismissed the companies from the town and then surrendered it. In this way that very important defile fell into our hands without firing a shot.

After we crossed the French border on the 8th of August the Guard Corps threw its cavalry to the front for the first time, but only from four to five miles (to Great Rederchingen-Achen, while the corps remained at Moranville). To be sure, our corps only succeeded in coming into the front line on the 7th; up to that time we had been moving to the front in long marches on the main road and in rear of another corps, and even on the 7th the Guard Cavalry Division could not be developed in front of the corps, because the field in front of the first and second armies was already completely occupied by the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions.*

From the 8th of August on, with the exception of such interruptions as were occasioned by our front having been entirely occupied by other cavalry divisions in their development, the distance at which our cavalry spread itself across the front of the guard increased from day to day.

The Guard Corps reached Oron on the 13th of August, but the dragoon brigade of the Guard was sent forward to Dieulouard, two marches further to the front, where it secured possession of the crossing of the river Moselle and of the railway Metz-Nancy, and forced a railway train to put back, which was coming up with infantry intended for the defense of the crossings of the Moselle.

Thus the communication between Metz and Nancy was interrupted at this point.

The 5th Cavalry Division crossed the Moselle on the same day and scouted the country still further to the front.

Up to this time I have not seen any military or other writer who has made it appear of what vital importance this celerity, by which our cavalry surprised and seized the crossings of the Moselle on the 13th of August, was in our operations. NAPOLEON was not wrong in using the language which he employed in sending a dispatch to Paris a short time previous, to-wit: "The unattackable positions of the Moselle into which he would withdraw the army." When we reached the Moselle from the east we saw a river valley almost two miles in width, which could only be crossed on long, open bridges, which were just wide enough to accommodate vehicles in single column (single track). Upon the opposite side the dominating heights rose fortress-like, and we involuntarily thought of the difficulties with which we should have to contend if the enemy awaited us in a well-chosen position on those heights with this wide depression on his front. But he had not succeeded in reaching these "un-

*The Guard Corps formed part of the second army.—R. P. H.

"attackable positions," for, notwithstanding the fact that he had entire control of a railway running through the Moselle Valley, our cavalry had forestalled him by making forced marches, which have never been exceeded in length and speed. We ask whether our results would have been so decisive on the 18th of August if our cavalry had let the enemy have time to destroy all the crossings of the Moselle between Metz and Nancy and to have opposed us with infantry and artillery at all points from the dominating heights on the left banks of that river? He had sufficient time up the 13th of August to have done so if he had determined upon such a course on the 7th, on which day it must have become evident to the army commanders how very significant the disasters of Woerth and Spicheran were. He would doubtless have decided upon doing so at once had he known what masses of German troops had been put in motion towards the crossings of the Moselle above Metz. But our cavalry surrounded him in all directions and prevented him from gaining any intelligence of the movements of our masses. BAZAINE and NAPOLEON have repeatedly stated that our thick veil of cavalry kept them in complete ignorance of the movements of our main armies. On the night from the 11th to the 12th of August our cavalry patrols cut the telegraphic connections between Metz and Nancy and had also reached Moselle at Pont à Mousson (as well as Nancy).

After the French commander had neglected until the 13th of August to destroy the crossings of the Moselle above mentioned, and, through vacillation in deciding whether to strike a blow on the east bank or to withdraw to Chalons, had deferred the occupation of those "unattackable positions," the credit is due to our cavalry that after the 13th it was no longer possible for him to occupy those positions, and, that the crossings of the Moselle were secured to us.

There are some critics who have charged our cavalry with a want of vigor and enterprise in the pursuit of the enemy after the battle of Woerth. Be it observed, that the twenty-six squadrons engaged in the direct pursuit brought in on the evening of the battle nineteen officers, 1,593 enlisted men, fourteen guns and one standard, while the 4th Cavalry Division was pushed to the front in the morning of the 7th of August and reached Nancy four days later, which, in air line, is seventy-five (75) miles from Woerth, and has to be reached through numerous defiles of the Vosges mountains.

When the enemy is totally defeated and routed, when he has no more troops in condition to offer effective resistance, then it is the duty of the cavalry, by energetic and direct pursuit, to collect the wreckage of the defeated enemy and thus destroy his army. If, however, the victory has been but partial, as was the case on the 6th of August, and whole armies that have not yet been engaged stand behind the beaten troops, as at

Spicheren, then a destructive pursuit of the enemy, by cavalry alone, is not possible. In such cases it is better that the cavalry break through the gaps made in the enemy's position and cause him anxiety for his flanks, because he no longer knows what is in rear of this advancing cavalry. This indirect pursuit, as HOPFNER calls it, was executed with noteworthy energy on this occasion, and by its work placed the commander of the armies in position to give directions to the great masses of the army, which had for their objective the entire destruction of the armies of the enemy.

If we would be impartial we must acknowledge that our cavalry from the 6th to the 13th of August, and at the opening of the campaign, displayed a decided and effective activity before the main bodies of the opposing armies had measured their strength, and that the cavalry assisted in no small degree in securing the victory to our colors *before* the day of battle.

The role of our cavalry became far grander, more imposing and decisive from the moment it crossed the Moselle. Although knowing that they must be in the immediate vicinity of the main body of the enemy's army, and although infantry detachments of the enemy had been discovered in the mountainous and wooded country on the left bank of the Moselle, two cavalry divisions (5th and Guard), making a force of sixty squadrons, crossed the river at Pont à Mousson and Dieulouard and pushed into the very heart of the enemy's base of operations, and there deployed, in order to secure definite and reliable information concerning the situation and condition of the main body of the enemy's forces.

On the 14th of August, while the battle of Colombey-Nouilly was going on on the east of the Moselle, a squadron of the dragoons of the Guard (Trotha), while pursuing some French chasseurs, had pushed forward to Toul and had, with assurance which is natural to the cavalry, demanded the surrender of that fortress. In the course of the 15th of August the Guard Corps received orders transferring, temporarily, the Dragoon Brigade to the 10th Corps, and on the 16th of August these troops took an active part in the battle of Mars-La-Tour. One could not well demand greater speed or greater ability of the cavalry, for Mars-La-Tour lies in an air line almost thirty-three miles from Toul.

The movements of the 5th Cavalry Division on the 15th of August were strategically decisive. It moved forward in a northerly direction and located the enemy at Mars-La-Tour. It deployed itself between Jarny and Rezonville, upon the direct line of retreat of the enemy's army, which was 200,000 strong, and boldly bivouacked at Suzemont, Purieux and Xonville, after a light skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, although they were at least nine miles in front of Thioncourt, to which

place an infantry division had been pushed forward as their support, but no other infantry had yet crossed the Moselle.

These movements of the cavalry division were strategically decisive, for it established the fact that a great part, if not the whole, of the enemy's army was still about Metz, and that there was a large force of the enemy bivouacked at Rezonville. Our commanders based their orders and dispositions of troops upon this information.

Can more be asked of the cavalry? It trotted in force around the enemy's army; threatened the line of retreat of an enemy, the greater part of whose forces had not yet been defeated, and, through surprises and sudden appearances, caused uneasiness in the ranks of the enemy, and uncertainty and indefiniteness in his plans; and camped over night in rear of an army of overwhelming strength, and so close to it that the bullets from the infantry rifles struck in their bivouacks. Many writers miss, in the movements of the German cavalry, the raids of the American type; and one of the most distinguished of our cavalrymen grants that our cavalry should have accomplished more in this way in 1870. In what way would such a raid have accomplished more than the 5th Cavalry division did upon the occasion of which we speak? A raid simply as such, and without an objective purpose, should not be permitted. Well may it cause the heart of many a cavalryman to swell with delight when he reads of the great cavalry masses of America, that, when set in motion, would ride for weeks at a time over wide expanses of country, over rugged mountains and blooming valleys, across deep rivers and dense forests; but in all movements there must be a purpose. If this purpose be to threaten the enemy's flanks and rear, to disturb his base and plan of operations, to give reliable information of his strength and position, and the cavalry succeeds in its object in a ride of two days, has it not completely *accomplished its task?* The work of the Guard Cavalry Division was of almost equal strategic importance on the 15th of August, although the results were of a purely negative character, viz: The determining that there was no force of the enemy between us and the Meuse. This enabled the Germans to direct, in their dispositions for the 16th, that all the corps on the Moselle should swing to the north against the enemy bivouacked at Rezonville, without running any risks of being attacked in the left flank. It could attack the enemy who wished to withdraw from Metz to Verdun, and, by engaging him, so delay his movements that dispositions could be made that would render escape impossible.

SERVICES RENDERED BY THE CAVALRY IN THE BATTLES BEFORE METZ.

THIRD LETTER.

MY last letter brought us up to the 16th of August, the day of the great cavalry contests in the last war.

The cavalry, on the side of the Germans which participated in the battles of that day, was as follows:

The 5th Cavalry Division.....	36 squadrons.
The 6th Cavalry Division.....	18 squadrons.
The Dragoon Brigade of the Guard.....	8 squadrons.
The Division Cavalry of the 3d and 10th Army Corps.....	16 squadrons.
Total.....	78 squadrons.

The deeds of this cavalry mass will fill any unpartisan and impartial reader with admiration, and much that is profitable can be learned therefrom.

First, twenty-four guns which accompanied thirty-seven squadrons startled the enemy in his supposed security and caused a partial panic, at least in the bivouacks of the cavalry.

They then advanced upon the infantry and made a threatening turning movement, supported by the eighteen squadrons and six guns of the 6th Cavalry Division, which had just arrived. The infantry stood to arms and formed up to defend themselves against this cavalry. Six and a half infantry divisions were employed in forcing it to withdraw upon the support of its own infantry. Thus, according to the strength reported on the field, a force of 8,250 cavalry held a force of 65,000 infantry in check, threatening their flank and line of retreat, until the advancing infantry could come up and take up the action. The course pursued by the cavalry on this occasion in avoiding any objectless attacks must be fully approved, for they obtained their object, the observation and detention of the enemy, without loss. In the days of Hohenfriedberg, Rossbach and Leuthen these fifty-five squadrons would have attacked and ridden down this infantry. It is due to the improvement and increased effect in firearms that the irresistible superiority of the cavalry over the other arms no longer exists, but has been reduced to a state of equality with them.

After our cavalry had been relieved of its unequal struggle with the enemy's main body, by the infantry, for the next two hours it formed the second line in support of the very thin line of our engaged infantry, which from 10 until 12 o'clock pushed the enemy by bold attacks, notwithstanding the fact that he outnumbered it more than two to one.

Here the 3d Army Corps, provisionally supported by the detachment, LYNKER, fought against three French *corps d'armée*. The advance of the Prussian infantry against such a superior force was so decided that BAZINE called upon his cavalry to check the advance of the Prussians, and General VON ALVENSLEBEN directed the 6th Cavalry Division to pursue the enemy and complete the victory. Then cavalry attacks of greater and lesser dimensions developed, which prescribed practically the limit of the capabilities of the cavalry against infantry. Attacks were made by both sides with great heroism, advancing infantry was brought to a standstill, yielding infantry was overridden, and guns were captured. But when cavalry came upon infantry intact, especially when it was somewhat covered by the accidents of the terrain, the cavalry could accomplish nothing. It had to fall back out of the range of the enemy's rifles.

During this struggle the French infantry had increased to such an overwhelming superiority that the line of the 3d Corps could think no more of making an offensive attack, but could only do their utmost to maintain their position until the arrival of the 10th Corps. The Prussians then withdrew a part of the cavalry in order to form a second line in support of the infantry, for the infantry was already engaged to the last man. The main portion of the Prussian cavalry was, however, sent forward to protect the left wing, to observe and occupy the attention of two French *corps d'armée* which had been deployed in that direction. At this moment Marshal CANROBERT led his corps to the decisive attack.

There was great danger that this attack, through superiority of numbers, would crush the 3d Corps, and there were no guns and no infantry in reserve, while the nearest support (20th Division) was still far to the rear. General v. ALVENSLEBEN ordered the Brigade Bredow to attack in order to relieve the pressure on the 6th Infantry Division. The brigade had six squadrons on the ground and attacked around the left wing from Vionville. The first line of the enemy was overridden, the artillery line was broken through, and men and horses cut down. These horsemen rode through the entire line of battle of the enemy and continued their course until confronted by a far superior force of the enemy's cavalry in close formation. Driven back by this, it again rode through the enemy's lines and assembled at about the same point from which it began its attack, but fearfully reduced in numbers.

This attack of BREDOV'S has been severely censured by many writers. It has been represented as useless, purposeless and resultless; as a purposeless destruction of a matériel that cost the country much money.

Let us consider for a moment the sacrifice made, and the result achieved, in the light of a financial transaction. The entire loss of both regiments, of which three squadrons of each were engaged in this attack, amounted to 409 horses during the course of the 16th of August. Calcu-

lating that this entire loss occurred in this one attack (which is not probable, for the brigade undoubtedly suffered some losses in previous attacks of the day), yet the brigade had saved a whole corps d'armée with a loss of 409 cavalry. With scarcely 800 cavalry it charged a whole corps d'armée of the enemy, rode down his first line of infantry and cut down the horses of the artillery. It thus crippled for the rest of the day this entire corps d'armée of the enemy, and this occurred between 2 and 3 P. M.; the movement of the 6th Corps was brought to a standstill and was finally abandoned; at least the French undertook no new attack from Rezonville on this day. Thus considered, the attack of these 800 cavalrymen upon 40,000 men appears not only to have been an act of heroism of the first order, which equals the most celebrated and glorious deeds of all ancient and modern wars, but it obtained a result of rare magnificence with comparatively small loss, and was not a purposeless death-ride which could be compared to CARDIGAN's attack at Balaclava, as many critics are pleased to do.

Again, the cavalry is reproached with having made the attack on this occasion without providing any support; and it is set forth that it would have been much more effective if the line of attack had been followed by a second and third line. That is perfectly true, but it does not justify any reproach being heaped upon the Brigade Bredow. The result would have been very much more substantial if the Brigade Bredow had been followed by 100 squadrons. But there was no more cavalry on hand. Time pressed, and something must be done immediately, and the commanding general availed himself of what he had in hand and on the spot. During the contest the Hussar Regiment, No. 11, came up just in time to give the necessary protection to permit the wreck of the Brigade Bredow to assemble. Methinks I hear the critic of the green table ask: "Where were the seventy-eight squadrons" of which mention has previously been made? We know that at about this time the 3d and 4th French Corps came into line near the 6th Army Corps and threatened the left flank of the 3d Prussian Corps. A part of this great mass of cavalry trotted forward, in order to observe the movements of the enemy and to delay his advance. Even the Brigade Bredow was compelled to detach two squadrons in that direction in order to secure their left flank. Besides, instead of holding the cavalry as a second line it was found necessary to distribute it in rear of the very thin fighting line of the 3d Corps, which extended from Vionville to the Bois de St Arnould, a distance of between three and four miles, and upon which it was necessary to be prepared at all points for similar critical moments. A critic will then sententiously announce that a good tactician must understand how to secure the superiority on the decisive point. As a general rule this is correct; but in special cases it is not possible; for instance, in a battle where you

struggle from early morning into the night against an enemy who has three men to your one. In such a case it requires much dexterity to unite sufficient force upon the decisive points to offer an effective resistance to the enemy, generally. The cavalry did not allow itself to fail in anything during this battle. It hastened from one threatened point to another and attacked the enemy whenever it became necessary.

The attack of the Brigade Bredow caused a pause in the course of the action. The French seemed to wait for the results of the turning movement of the 3d and 4th Corps. The Prussians collected and formed the thinned ranks of the infantry of the 3d Corps. The contest was temporarily continued by the artillery.

Meanwhile the 3d and 4th French Corps both pushed forward against the left flank of the 3d Prussian Corps. A few infantry battalions in the Tronville wood, assisted by the cavalry, succeeded in holding the enemy in check for a time, but towards 4 o'clock these troops were driven back across the chausseé, on which the artillery by great exertion was able to maintain itself. At this critical moment the 10th Corps arrived. The 20th Infantry Division wrenched the Tronville wood from the enemy, and half of the 19th Infantry Division debouched from Mars-La-Tour and attacked the enemy in position on the plateau to the southward of Bruville. This last named attack fell upon the line of battle of the 4th French Corps, and from the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and his being still further favored by the terrain, the result could not be other than a total failure. In a short time this brigade was driven back with heavy loss and was in great danger of being totally destroyed by the pursuing enemy. Then the 1st Regiment of Dragoon Guards threw themselves upon the pursuing enemy. The enemy's infantry collected about its eagles, drew off from our infantry and was repeatedly broken through and overridden; our depleted infantry was able to reform, our much endangered guns were saved and put in position along the chausseé, and the pursuers withdrew to their former position upon the plateau. By this attack the 1st Dragoon Guards saved the 38th Infantry Brigade exactly as the brigade of BREDOV had previously saved the 6th Infantry Division. I should only repeat myself if, I were to add any remarks. The losses were heavy, but in comparison with the results quite small. The half cavalry regiment was sacrificed (250 horses, in order to save a brigade). Colonel V. AUERSWALD, who had been mortally wounded, collected and formed the remains of his regiment and gave a "hoch" for the king and dropped from his horse, dead. That reminds us of the heroism related by the Greeks and Romans of their best men.

Meanwhile the great cavalry struggle developed itself northwest of Mars La Tour. Twenty-one squadrons of Prussian cavalry were here contending against the regiments of Generals MONTAIGU, LEGRAND and

DE FRANC. The cavalry was properly applied on both sides and rode into action with resolution. Echelon after echelon entered the contest and caused a hither and thither waving of the battle. After the most violent struggle with sabre and lance the French cavalry mass was driven back and sought shelter under the protection of the five regiments, twenty squadrons strong, of General CLERAMBAULT, but made no further offensive movements. The Prussian cavalry formed up on the contested plateau and then withdrew to the infantry line of battle which had been reformed at Tronville, and was now prepared to offer further resistance. At this point night and darkness fell upon the field.

Critics have spoken disapprovingly of this cavalry action and have designated it as a useless cavalry duel. But if both sides are in the habit of using their cavalry on such fields as are suitable to its nature and on which the configuration of the terrain admits of its employment, then cavalry duels are necessary preludes to the obtaining of the proposed results.

In the foregoing case it must be granted that the cavalry on both sides was opportunely and properly employed. Upon the Prussian right and the French left the terrain did not admit the employment of cavalry masses. Upon the other wing the Prussian infantry had suffered a check. It was quite reasonable that the French cavalry should then advance upon this wing in order to fall upon the flank of the yielding infantry and thus seize the momentary result to secure a complete victory. It was equally reasonable that the Prussians upon their part should employ all their disposable cavalry upon this wing, in order to protect the threatened flank. Thus developed a cavalry duel. It was far from resultless. The Prussian cavalry gained the advantage. Owing to the fine quality and numbers of the enemy's cavalry he suffered a striking defeat, but he was finally pushed back and the Prussians remained in possession of the battle field. The result was that they accomplished all that they had undertaken to do. Their own infantry was again in condition to re-enter the action. "The fight was again restored" when night came on without the enemy's venturing to make a further advance. If any reproach is allowable to this cavalry, it belongs to the five regiments of General CLERAMBAULT, which took no part in the attack. *It could have reversed the fortunes of the day and have turned the Prussian victory into defeat.*

When one of our great military authorities announces (*vide Militär-Wochenblatt*, 1881), that the services of our cavalry divisions would have been greater at Vionville if they had been held in hand as divisions, he certainly makes no reproach against the cavalry. From the General Staff history it appears that the divisions could not be held in hand as units on the field because it was necessary to distribute them along the very long and attenuated line of battle, in support of the struggling infantry, which was greatly outnumbered. It so happened that to the left

of Mars La Tour a collective cavalry division could not be assembled (possibly at one time the 5th with thirty-six squadrons might have been collected), but in that part of the field all the cavalry that was accidentally in that vicinity had to be collected in haste by squadrons, regiments and brigades.

Upon the other wing of the Prussian line the battle was also ended by a great cavalry attack. After the attack of the Brigade Bredow the action was carried on for a long time by the artillery, until the Prussian infantry was encouraged to attempt a new attack by the arrival of reinforcements which the 8th and 9th Corps put in on the right wing. There were various isolated thrusts undertaken and successfully executed on the extreme right. The coming up of powerful reserves of the enemy always forced them back into their old positions. After this devastating but honorable struggle had lasted for a long while, towards evening Prince FREDERICK CHARLES ordered a general advance of the whole line of battle of the 3d Corps d'armee and put all three arms in motion. The 6th Cavalry Division gave the final and decisive blow. It was reënforced by the Division Cavalry and formed with twenty-one squadrons. It was already growing dark as they rode to the attack. The Brigade Grüter fell upon an insurmountable position in which the enemy's infantry had ensconced themselves, and had to withdraw. The Brigade Schmidt rode through the skirmish line, scattered a few groups and finally returned again to our infantry, which, notwithstanding its numerical weakness, had accomplished the very glorious result of holding possession of the heights to the south of Rezonville, for the possession of which the contending forces had fought the whole day.

Many find fault with this attack of the 6th Cavalry Division, and declare that it was without result and condemn its having been permitted. As a general rule night attacks should not be undertaken without special reasons. The well-known cavalry "coup" of BLUCHER's at Gross-Gor-schen failed by coming upon a wide canal, which they had not seen in the darkness, and the confusion extended to the corps of MARMONT, but it is questionable whether the French would have continued the pursuit any earlier on the next day, even if this night attack had not been made, for they have never been inclined to very early starts. But the great night attack of the cavalry at Laon decided the battle. If one knows the ground exactly a night attack of cavalry is less objectionable to-day than it was formerly, because the darkness prevents the enemy from deriving the full benefit of the long range of modern fire-arms.

So far as the result of this cavalry attack at Vionville is concerned, it was quite important. It is true that but little infantry was overridden and broken up, but this night attack of all three arms seems to have had a very imposing effect upon the enemy, and his infantry would not face a

second attack. The enemy withdrew to Rezonville and abandoned the battle-field along the entire front of the 3d Corps, *i. e.*, the plateau to the south of the chaussee, Vionville, Rezonville, for which they had fought the entire day.

The enemy's commander could not explain such boldness except upon the theory that the Prussian troops had received important reënforcements, and he determined to withdraw under cover of the night. The undecided battle thus became a victory, and for this victory the army is indebted as much to the boldness and audacity of its cavalry as to the heroic endurance of the infantry and artillery. The infantry had fought all day against an odds of one to four, or one to three, and in their heroic but murderous attacks they had lost nearly all their leaders; they were broken up into small groups, and notwithstanding the reënforcements which came up in the evening they were still not half as strong as the enemy, and the latter still had at his disposal, that had not yet fired a shot, more troops than the whole of the shattered and weary Prussian 3d Corps numbered. The extent of the result of the battle was scarcely a victory for the Prussians. They had maintained possession of Vionville in their center, which they had taken at the opening of the action, and had won one mile of territory on the right wing, but they had lost an equal amount on the left. There had been a change of front pivoted upon Vionville so that the Prussian line, which at the beginning faced northeast, at the close faced to the north.

If BAZAINE had made a determined and heavy attack at daybreak on the morning of the 17th with the heavy reserves which he still held intact, the result of an attack by these intact reserves upon the numerically weaker and exhausted Prussian army can scarcely be doubted.

That he did not do so is due perhaps as much to the boldness and resolution of the Prussian cavalry as to the bravery with which the other arms continued the offensive over a wide front with a light line, so that he was deluded into believing that the entire German army was united on his front.

Think what the result would have been if BAZAINE had made this thrust with his reserves and had attacked the Prussian troops which had been engaged on the 16th at daybreak (4 A. M.) of the 17th, and had thrown them into the defiles upon the line Gorze Thiaucourt. It must be conceded that the shutting up of BAZAINE in Metz and the capture of his entire army later on would hardly have been possible.

What can be said of the losses suffered by the cavalry on this day, which were quite severe, in comparison with the part they took in bringing about such a result? The collective cavalry regiments which shared

in the last night's attack of the right wing lost in the course of the whole day 360 horses. Accepting that this whole loss occurred in the night attack, it must be granted that this loss is not worthy of mention, in view of the great results obtained.

Who can speak of it as a useless sacrifice?

* * *

PROTECTION TO THE INFANTRY.

FOURTH LETTER.

YOU reproach me with having been partial in my last letter and with having written a panegyric upon the cavalry. I have no interest to serve in taking up the cudgels for the cavalry. I only earnestly endeavor to give expression to the truth, or better said, to the feeling with which I became possessed for our cavalry during our last campaign. In reflecting upon the further course of the events of the war, I cannot help bringing forward additional proofs in support of the assertion which I made in my first letter, that the cavalry had had just as great a share in the collective results of the war as had the other arms.

On the 17th of August the Uhlan Brigade of the Guard Cavalry marched to St. Mihiel on the Meuse, and reconnoitred, or scouted, the country to the west of that place. All the German corps were enabled with great security to change their line of march from the west to the north and hasten to the assistance of the corps which had fought the battle of the 16th, since this cavalry had been pushed so far to the west that a threatening advance of the enemy from that direction would be known by our troops at least two days before he would be able to make an attack. In like manner the cavalry division of the 12th Corps* was pushed forward to the northwest and secured the army against Verdun and established the fact that only a small detachment of the French army, with the Emperor, had yet disappeared in the west, and that the French army was still encamped about Metz. The Saxon cavalry scouted the country as far as Etain and Verdun. The work of the cavalry just mentioned enabled the great headquarters to make in entire security definite dispositions of the whole fighting force, in order to unite it for a decisive action against the main force of the enemy and to cut off his retreat.

*The 12th Saxon Corp d'armée has a division of cavalry as one of its merits of organization.

On the 18th of August the gigantic struggle between the two armies took place. On this day the cavalry divisions, as such, did not make themselves very prominent in reconnoitering the enemy. Before the opening of the battle the two armies stood facing one another at such short distance that on the right wing it was not possible to employ great masses of cavalry in front. Therefore the cavalry divisions which were still with the army were placed in rear of the line of battle as reserves. Upon the left flank the Saxon Cavalry Division reconnoitered in the direction of Etain and Verdun and covered the rear of the army. Although the part taken by the cavalry division in this battle was less brilliant than on other occasions, yet it was none the less active and faithful in the performance of its duty. I can distinctly remember that the advancing hussars of Count GROBEN sent word to the Guard Corps, as it was forming at Doncourt, that an advance guard of the enemy, consisting of all arms and of about the strength of a brigade, was marching upon Ste. Marie aux Chenes from St. Privat-la-Montagne. This report established the incorrectness of the original supposition, that the enemy's right wing only extended to Amanvilliers and enabled the commander of the Guard Corps to set things right by sending his infantry by the shortest road over Habouville to St. Ail, in order to take possession of Ste. Marie.

Under the protection of these hussars and in the secure and well founded confidence that they would receive timely notice of any movements made by the enemy in their front, the Guard Corps moved up in close formation, which troops, as a rule, do not venture to do in close proximity to an enemy. It is true that, through habit, an advance guard of four battalions and a battery was formed, but the body of the corps followed so closely that the whole corps came up in one great column, having a front of three battalions formed in line of battalion masses, doubled on the centre, well closed up and the artillery in columns by batteries in the intervals. This imposing mass moved across the country along the ridge until it came into the danger zone of the enemy's shells, when it was found necessary to assume the fighting formation.

Equally clear in my memory is the moment when I had placed the artillery of the 1st Guard Division and the Corps Artillery on its left, the right resting on the Bois de la Cusse and the left on the village of St. Ail, for the purpose of opening the battle, and far in front of the infantry. The right wing was secured by troops of the 9th Corps, which occupied Bois de la Cusse; in front of my position the Hessian cavalry had reconnoitred the ground up to the enemy's position on the heights Amonvilles — St. Privat; and now unmasked my front by withdrawing through the intervals between my guns, but upon my left there did not seem to be any protection at hand. The enemy's skirmishers were pushing forward from Ste. Marie against St. Ail and gave me much anxiety for the left of my

artillery line. I hastened thither and to my great relief I saw the entire Guard Hussar Regiment halted in a depression of the ground and covering my left flank. I could remain comfortably in my position until the head of the infantry (Guard Fusileers) took possession of St. Ail and by driving back the enemy's skirmishers (and later through storming of Ste. Marie), dissipated all care concerning my left wing. The Division Cavalry did the reconnoitering in the limited space on our front, while the great masses of cavalry, the cavalry divisions, undertook the scouting and reconnoitering at greater distances in our rear. The Division Cavalry also shared readily and effectually in the battle through its movements in covering our flanks.

The 18th of August produced no attacks by masses of cavalry as did the 16th. Upon the right of the battle-field, the ravine between Gravelotte and Point du Jour which was covered by the enemy's fire, prevented our troops from coming promptly into position in their normal formation, and they were forced to break and reform on the other bank under a murderous fire from the French. Therefore, the attempt of the First Cavalry Division, strengthened by two hussar regiments, to advance on that part of the field was a complete failure. Upon the left flank the work in hand was the storming of St. Privat and Amanvilliers, and in such actions the cavalry is excluded from taking part. There remained nothing more for the cavalry to do but to hold itself in rear ready for any opportunity that the fluctuations of the battle might momentarily present for its special action.

Critics have missed the cavalry pursuit after the battle of St. Privat. Upon our right wing from the Point du Jour to Amanvillier all possibility of a pursuit was prevented by the enemy maintaining his main position. Our infantry succeeded in penetrating into Amonvilliers just as night came upon us, and after the taking of St. Privat there was nothing to pursue. Such of the enemy's infantry as had not withdrawn behind the protecting woods in rear before the storming of the place was destroyed in St. Privat: some of them killed and the balance captured. During the night the French army took up its position under the protection of their fortress walls, and pursuit by cavalry was impossible.

The battle had lasted until darkness with great violence and it was necessary to establish how the enemy stood at daybreak on the morning of the 19th. We see several cavalry squadrons trotting forward before the break of day and the complete evacuation of the position by the enemy was soon confirmed. That portion of the Saxon Cavalry Division which was still held at Auboué (while the main body was reconnoitering and scouting towards the Meuse) i. e., one brigade hastened to Moizieres in the Moselle valley and completed the blockade of the enemy close under the cannon of the fortress.

Let us cast a glance upon the activity of our cavalry between the battle of St. Privat and the catastrophe of Sedan.

After the somewhat disorganized condition of some of the troops, which had been caused by the loss of so many of their leaders of the higher grades, had been overcome, the army of the Meuse was withdrawn from the district of the Second Army and brought in line with the Third Army. After this was done, a day's rest was given to these sorely tried troops, and on the 23d of August these two armies began their forward movement towards Paris, and expected to meet the enemy in the vicinity of Chalons, where McMAHON, in the presence of the Emperor, was assembling a new army.

The base from which this march was begun was with the Third Army (which was still a little further to the front than the Army of the Meuse) the line Ménilly-Horgne-Treveray-Hundelaincourt-Gondrecourt and in an air line about seventy miles from Chalons. The cavalry pushed rapidly forward, and on the evening of the 24th our cavalry patrols had already discovered that the camp at Chalone had been quitted. These cavalry detachments must have ridden between ninety and one hundred miles in the two days, for they had to go hither and thither, and the roads are much longer than an air line. On the 25th the reports of this cavalry came in to confirm the supposition, grounded upon intelligence received from other sources, that McMAHON's army had moved northward in order to turn our right flank and extend a hand to Marshal BAZAINE, who was shut up in Metz. (While pushing these cavalry divisions to the front, they accomplished all that could be expected of great raids. They captured whole battalions of Mobile Guards in process of formation that had been armed, but were not yet uniformed. I saw one such battalion brought in on the evening of the 25th of August.) The reports referred to, reached the great headquarters on the nights of the 25th and 26th of August, and during the 26th of August we were stopped in our march towards the west and immediately turned towards the north.

In two cavalry divisions of the Army of the Meuse, the *Guard and Saxon Divisions, which, up to this time had been held well in hand, now undertook the reconnoitering and scouting on the new front. Unusual forced marches were demanded of both these divisions. The cavalry of the guard made a right turn upon our front and reached Richicourt, and the Saxon cavalry reached Dun on the Meuse, with its leading brigade on the same day, and established the fact that the enemy had not yet reached the main road leading from Reims to Metz.

While the 12th and Guard Corps were being pushed forward to the north by long marches, in order to obstruct the enemy's movement

* A division of cavalry is part of the Guard Corps organization.

towards Metz, the cavalry divisions pushed further forward in order to locate the enemy with certainty.

On the 27th of August, some of our daring cavalry officers turned the French camp and established that they were located at and about Vouziers. One of these officers (Lieut. V. ZIEGLER, of the 3d Regiment of Ulans of the Guard,) must have ridden about ninety miles on that day. The cavalry of the 12th corps advanced to Stenay and pushed patrols as far as Beaumont. There they found the enemy's cavalry.

On the 27th of August, the first meeting with the enemy's cavalry took place at Buzaney, in which the Saxons overthrew the enemy. On the 29th of August, our Ulans of the Guard captured a general staff officer of the enemy and an officer of the Intendance who was innocently and carelessly traveling from one corps to another in a carriage. The officers of the enemy were no longer safe against the bold attacks of our cavalry in the very midst of their own corps. This catch was one of great importance for us, for upon the general staff officer was found the order of march for the enemy's army for the following day. This confirmed the correctness of the conjectures of our commander over the movements of the enemy.

The first fruit of this was the victory of Beaumont, where the careless enemy was surprised in the clear light of day and two corps d'armée almost entirely dispersed. It would be necessary for one to be present and see, as I did on the day before the battle of Beaumont, the manner in which our cavalry surrounded the moving column of the enemy, as bees disturbed in their hive, in order to appreciate their work. I saw a corps d'armée, of which I estimated the number of battalions at about forty, constantly annoyed and delayed in its march by our troublesome Ulans. Occasionally whole companies would quit the column and deliver a volley upon a single patrol, which would immediately disappear in order to avoid loss. Unspeakable fatigue was the result of this kind of thing. They reached their destination extremely tired, and at nightfall and from weariness neglected taking the usual precautions for the protection of their inhospitable bivouacks; while our infantry, quite near them, but of which they were entirely ignorant, slept comfortably in the villages.

The pursuit of the two divisions of cavalry last mentioned on the day after the battle of Beaumont, did not produce any direct result in the way of capturing prisoners, etc., but had an indirect result in relation to the general situation; in operating on the right in such a way as to bar the route of the enemy as far as the Belgian border. The cavalry of the guard prevented a provision train moving from Carignon by breaking up some of the wagons with their artillery. This train furnished rations for the Guard Corps for eight days.

By the close of the 31st of August, these cavalry divisions had completed their work as reconnoitering and scouting cavalry against the army of Marshal McMAHON. The infantry of the two armies had entered the fighting zone. The net which the cavalry had heretofore thrown around the enemy was now strengthened by the other arms, and the time had come for these to reap the harvest which the cavalry had prepared.

In the battle of Sedan our cavalry did not take any conspicuous part. The annoying feeling of inactivity while the battle raged, drove some of the cavalry to take part in the struggle.

Yes, we see isolated attacks of small masses of cavalry, resulting from such restlessness, which probably had just as well been dispensed with entirely. There was no pursuit after the battle. But that was as it should have been. While the fire-arms are doing the rough work, the cavalry belongs in the reserve in rear, covering the flanks and rear by observation. In this case there was nothing to pursue, for the whole army capitulated.

The cavalry attached to the infantry divisions were constantly attacking by squadrons, reconnoitering and patrolling during the course of the battle, and if I were willing to run the risk of tiring my readers, I could relate many instances where, while the opposing lines of artillery were engaged, the cavalry moved about between the two lines of fire in order to bring information concerning the enemy and the terrain. In like manner the division cavalry took part in all the later actions at which I assisted. With great audacity the cavalry patrols would ride up to the villages which were to be attacked, and ascertain whether they were held by the enemy or not, and if so, in what force and manner. The services which the division cavalry rendered, was so important that during the long position-war about Paris, every company, when assigned to the execution of some duty, would beg for a few mounted men as messengers and patrols.

After the battle of Sedan, I received the order on the 5th of September, to make an attempt to bring about the surrender of the fortress of Montmedy by a bombardment with field artillery. I appeared before the fortress before daybreak, and the cavalry had already encircled and reconnoitered the place so carefully upon the previous evening, that I was enabled to make my dispositions at once. The collective information of the cavalry was subsequently established to be absolutely correct. A glance at the march of the troops from the battle field of Sedan to Paris demonstrates sufficiently, how, during this forward movement of our army, the cavalry divisions reconnoitered several days march in front.

The cavalry divisions arrived in front of Paris two days march ahead of the infantry (for example, before Gonesse and Etains on the 17th of

September), then crossed the Seine and undertook alone the blockading of the west side, covering themselves against the fortress and the west side until the blockade was completed by the arrival of the infantry two days later. On this occasion things were executed by our cavalry which are now considered as quite natural and have never been presented as being worthy of special mention. But the history published by the General Staff has given due credit for these actions. Our cavalry crossed rivers where the bridges had been destroyed, rode into cities, villages, and forests, in which the inhabitants and franc-tireurs offered resistance. They suffered frequent losses in such attacks and occasionally entire patrols were captured, but upon the other side we see weak cavalry detachments scattering whole companies of the enemy's national guards and carrying off their officers as prisoners. We see that where the infantry is disheartened or, as militia, has not yet gained the requisite confidence and cohesion, the old superiority of the cavalry again makes its appearance.

So soon as the blockading of Paris was completed, the cavalry undertook immediately, and almost alone, the covering of the rear. But one infantry corps was detached and that was sent to Orleans, and the cavalry, which was operating far to the rear of the besieging army, could get no additional support until our infantry could be reënforced from home by sufficient numbers to bring the combatant strength up to the normal, which, in some of our corps, had melted down to one-third by the time they arrived before Paris.

The cavalry advanced to Compeigne and Beauvais in the north; Etre-pagny and Les Andelys on the northwest; Dreux and Evreux on the west, about forty miles, and their patrols were pushed to the gates of Rouen Chartres, until they met such resistance that it could not be overcome without the assistance of the infantry. The cavalry attached to the command which had been sent to Orleans was pushed out to Sabris, about forty miles further south, and reconnoitered in the direction of Blois and Vendome. In view of such actions, one must read with great astonishment the assertion made in a late publication, that the great masses of cavalry which we had before Paris were inactive and useless. In fact we did not have one cavalryman too many, but could have made use of more if we had had them.

There are writers, and some of them cavalrymen, too, who have expressed the regret that at this period more extended raids were not made — raids reaching the very heart of the enemy. But to have done so would have required more cavalry than we had, or had we detached great cavalry corps for this purpose, we would not have had sufficient remaining to perform the security service and cover the rear of the besieging army. It must not be overlooked that we were in a civilized

country, thickly populated by bitter enemies, a country traversed by numerous railways, and that such raids reached their limit much sooner than in the extensive country of America, where a partial sympathy could be counted upon in a percentage of the inhabitants.

I might extend the itemized list of services performed by our cavalry, and I have only mentioned those actions in which I was brought in contact either directly, or indirectly, in the execution of my own work. I am convinced that upon all the other theatres of this eventful war the services of this arm have been equally important, and that any impartial witness who had been in the position, as I was, to see from the standpoint of a corps commander the duty performed by our cavalry, would have a similar opinion of the worth of this arm.

If single instances are mentioned to me in which a cavalry troop could have accomplished more, or in which a leader had not accomplished all that had been expected of him because he had not taken the right measures, this does not alter the opinion upon the cavalry as a whole. Everywhere, where anything is done, more or less faults occur. The bravest and most excellent warriors have committed faults; even NAPOLEON and our great king. The latter accuses himself frequently in his writing. It is neither my purpose nor design to expose such faults and to thus judge men, who, at another time, perhaps the same day, performed distinguished services.

DISCUSSION ON "LETTERS ON CAVALRY."

GENERAL MERRITT:—Before proceeding to the discussion of this first paper, I will read a note received from Colonel HUGHES, Inspector General's Department, who translated these papers, which shows so commendable a spirit that I would not have it lost to members of this Association. The note should be printed that it may be read by non-resident members of the Association, and generally by officers of the Army:

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 17, 1888.

MY DEAR GENERAL:—I transmit herewith the first installment of letters on cavalry, translated from the German of Prince HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN. The value of these letters would seem to lie in the hints or "directives" they contain. The discussion of these hints by the officers of your Association would certainly be both interesting and instructive. My original work on these letters was done on railways, at ranches, and at odd times, and is quite crude, but I cannot find the time to rewrite the letters. As the translation was made simply through good-will for the cavalry and with the hope of contributing thereby to the success of your Association, I trust that German idioms and crudities may be treated with leniency.

Very sincerely yours,

R. P. HUGHES.

General Wesley Merritt, Com'g Dept. of Mo., Fort Leavenworth.

It will be recalled that able suggestions for the improvement of the cavalry made by Colonel HUGHES in inspection notes were discussed here early in the organization of the Association, and I have personal knowledge of suggestions made by the same officer for the improvement of the infantry drill tactics, tried while I was in command as Superintendent at West Point.

Colonel HUGHES deserves the thanks of this Association and he and other officers of the army, who like him are devoting the time and talents which can be spared from the duties of their several stations, to the improvement and advancement of the three arms of the service, deserve the gratitude of the army and of the Government. It should be added that the note from Colonel HUGHES was written to me personally, with no thought of its publication.

It will appear from Prince HOHENLOHE's remarks in his first letter that our own is not the only service in which jealousies exist between the different arms. In fact, as compared with other services, I am inclined to the belief that such feelings in our service are confined to the limit which is useful in exciting a reasonable rivalry in the three arms, which results in improving each. I have never heard that anyone in the cavalry, artillery or infantry of this country has advocated the abolishment of any one of the other arms, as not being necessary to the army, or as being too expensive. It is true that during the early part of the Civil War complaint was made of the cavalry, and later, hints were heard that the artillery was not as effective as it might be: nor can our brethren of the infantry boast that they were entirely without criticism from others. But in the sequel all will agree, that if there was any result to these strictures it was for the good of the arm complained of, and in the end each was respected by the others. And I wish right here to correct an impression which is calculated to become permanent by iteration. It is an injustice to the cavalry, and its correction does no wrong to any man. We have heard it often, and it again occurs in the admirable paper on the late distinguished General of the Army, which was recently read before the Cavalry Association. While that is just and well deserved eulogy of a great leader in war, and is not in any way open to criticism, there is nothing improper in having it serve as a basis for the correction I contemplate—that is the refutation of the fling against the cavalry in the remark attributed to General HOOKER, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"

In the first place General HOOKER never made the remark. On the other hand, he and other general officers of experience in the line, recognized how much the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, under McCLELLAN, had been misused and neglected, and he at once, on coming n command of the Army of the Potomac, took measures to reorganize and strengthen the cavalry; and I think every cavalry officer of the army, who is conversant with the facts, will agree with me in saying that to General HOOKER, more than to any other one man, the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac owes its opportunities for reorganization, which made it fit for the victories it afterwards gained.

In the second place, the innuendo conveyed by the question has no foundation. General McCLELLAN had no conception of the management of cavalry. Nothing was further from his comprehension than the aggressive and independent tactics of this arm. The cavalry was to him a body from which to draw orderlies, guides, couriers and pickets (named in the order of their importance), and nothing more. The result was that the cavalry under McCLELLAN was distributed by regiment, squadron, troop and detachment among the Headquarters of the Army, corps, division and brigades, and thus stultified for its legitimate uses. On the other hand, in the Confederate army the cavalry was powerful in numbers and well organized from the first. It is not wonderful under these contrasted conditions that more failures than successes make up our cavalry record of the first two years of the war.

After its organization by HOOKER the cavalry never lowered its standard to any foe, nor took second place with friends. Commencing at Beverly Ford (though then not handled to the best advantage), it has nothing but victories to inscribe on its record. Beverly Ford, Aldie, Gettysburg and the nine days fighting thereafter in Maryland and Pennsylvania, all attest the success of the cavalry in 1863 until the end of the campaign, when SHERIDAN came, finding the cavalry ready to answer his call in any emergency. He made no changes in its organization, found none necessary in its preparation for campaign. It was then complete in every part and specially fitted for the work of a master mind. How could it be otherwise when such accomplished cavalry leaders as PHILIP ST. GEO. COOKE, BUFORD, STONEMAN and PLEASANTON had created and perfected it, and the experience of two years hard service, relieved it is true, by scarcely a single success, had inured it to the hardships of war?

Even under SHERIDAN it had nearly met the fate of another disintegration under the immediate army commander when GRANT intervened and saved it from this new peril.

This, in brief, is a glance at the history of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac.

No need to dwell on its after record. But let us have done with the flash phrases, such as the one referred to, which convey so much and have so little foundation in fact.

CAPTAIN RAFFERTY:—The letters on cavalry which the translations of Colonel HUGHES have afforded us an opportunity of reading, are full of interest to this Association. Written by a prominent actor in the events described and by one evidently anxious to improve the cavalry service of his country, the letters inculcate much that is indispensable to the well being of the cavalry of every nation.

Prince HOHENLOHE shows how undesirable it is that there should be any quarrel between the cavalry and the infantry; each having its proper duties which do not clash, and each at

times dependent upon the support of the other. Together, knowing what each can do, they should act in concert. His remarks on this subject are much to be commended.

When we consider the infinity of work and subjects that a cavalry officer should devote his time and attention to, all properly bearing upon his profession, it is not to be wondered at that Prince HOHENLOHE, familiar with all branches of the service in peace and war, should state that a greater sacrifice of time and health is demanded of the cavalry officer than that of any other arm.

A mere study of the cavalry, tactics and army regulations will be of little avail in the application of cavalry to the various purposes it may be put, and yet for a period after the war of the Rebellion, such were about the only professional books a cavalry officer on our remote frontier had access to. At that time, when foreign books were almost unobtainable, and our own officers of reputation and experience had written but little for publication, the Ordnance Department, I believe, did much good by publishing its notes, exciting an interest in professional matters and letting us know what was being done and written about in our own and foreign armies.

Prince HOHENLOHE describes what was accomplished during the Franco-German war by a cavalry properly organized, well drilled and carefully instructed, and practiced in all the duties required of modern cavalry. Colonel BONIE, in his pathetic narrative, describes the reverses, the lack of instruction in scouting and other duties of the French cavalry in the same war. The letters and narrative are the complements of each other, and together force us to the conclusion that in time of peace more is required of the cavalry to render it fit for war than is needed by the other arms. Mere theoretical instruction will not answer. An opportunity must be found of occasionally bringing together, for practice, as large bodies of cavalry as can conveniently be assembled.

Within a year or two a start has been made in this direction, although attended with many difficulties. The government should encourage such camps of instruction, and not hamper all efforts toward that end by not allowing anything extra for the transportation of troops, the purchase of forage, the rent of grounds, etc. It is only in such large assemblies of troops that many of the duties required of cavalry in modern war can be practiced. We may know by study what the books say in reference to the handling and management and attack of larger masses of cavalry, but that is not enough. The actual practice is much to be desired. HUME states that in time of war we must be satisfied if our army accomplishes what it has been taught in time of peace. Here again we are shown the great necessity of thorough instruction of the cavalry in all of its duties.

FIRST LIEUT. BLOCKSMON: — I think these letters are admirable in tone and fuller of instruction to the cavalryman of our army than any translations yet read before the Association. Without going into the sometimes dry statistics of foreign organization, they are comprehensive and expressive concerning the requirements and the place of modern cavalry, the relation of the three arms of the service to each other, and the feeling that should exist between them. The description of some of the principal operations of the Franco-Prussian war illustrated the fact that a preponderance of cavalry, if properly managed, may be made to win "victory before the day of battle," and that its role on the battle-field itself is but little inferior to that in former wars. The idea that the ratio of cavalry to the rest of the army during war should be regulated in a great measure by the resources of the country, is in accord with the opinion of many writers, that future campaigns will begin with a series of great cavalry battles.

The author, like other foreigners, does not do justice to the operations of our cavalry in the war of the Rebellion, claiming for the German cavalry the first application of principles which were practiced by our own.

CAPT. BABCOCK: — *Mr. President:* These letters contain a clear statement of the brilliant results obtained by the modern use of cavalry, on the part of the Prussians. This in a great war waged between two of the most formidable nations of the earth. The record here given may well make all cavalry soldiers proud of the part before them in the future, that of the irrepressible ubiquitous horsemen, ever in touch with the enemy. We may also feel a just pride in the gallant charges, death rides, undertaken with such blind devotion, notwithstanding our deep regret that so many brave riders should have fallen, especially on the French side, in the effort to carry out impossible orders. The letters before us present a vivid picture of the long columns of invading infantry, pressing forward in three great masses, steadily, surely, each huge monster feeling out in every direction with its antennae of restless horsemen, whose light

est touch of the enemy is instantly communicated to the center. We see changes of direction and intention of great armies, vital decisions and resolutions of army commanders, based upon the clear and reliable reports flashed along the cavalry feelers to the guiding brain of the masses. How it was done is well worthy of the critical study of cavalry soldiers. We find that the experiences of the war of 1866 were of great value to the Germans. We are told by our author that at the close of that war, the Prussians understood that the name reserve, applied to artillery or cavalry, was misleading.

The artillery was hereafter to be used well to the front and early in the action, that every advantage might be taken at once of its power to shake the infantry lines destined to receive the attack. So the heavy masses of cavalry formerly "kept in reserve to act as a sort of torpedo," on the infantry battle field, are hereafter to be spread out fan-like in advance of the infantry columns, an elastic, but impenetrable shield. With the Germans the discovery of a defect in their military organization is the signal to make diligent search for the remedy. We find them, therefore, four years after the time when great armies approached each other within five or six miles without discovery, as at Königgrätz, ready to flood the French territory with horsemen trained in the special duties of scouting and reconnaissance, and we have before us in these graphic letters, the record of their achievements. We also have within our reach, much that has been written by the German cavalry leaders themselves, on the subject of the new duties of their mounted forces; duties which, in the words of the author before us, "though less brilliant than the battle charges, are not the less important," and we may by a little careful study, unravel the net work, formed by groups of ever moving horsemen, which appeared to the harassed French soldiers, and frightened villagers, so mysterious and entangling. I commend the study of the German cavalry in '70 and '71 to all progressive cavalrymen.

But my object just now, is to point out that the great results accomplished by the invading horsemen were obtained under conditions not likely to be repeated in future wars, and for that reason a study of the operations of our own great cavalry leaders has more vital interest for us.

The proof is plain. On this side we find the enterprises of the blue or gray riders, met by equal skill and audacity on the part of their opponents; whereas, admitting the great gallantry of the French cavalry, their want of training in the methods of their adversaries put them out of the problem, and the operations of the German horsemen in reconnaissance were practically uninterrupted.

This assertion rests upon the authority of the French cavalry officers themselves. Our author says, "Every one should sweep in front of his own door," and I invite your attention to a collection of errors and fatal blunders, made by the opponents of the German cavalry, which a distinguished French colonel of that arm has swept together, so that they may be plainly seen by his countrymen and avoided in the future. "It was thought in France," he says, "that both the regulations and system of tactics for cavalry, approved in 1829, were perfect for 1869. In the midst of this indifference war suddenly broke out, and we were obliged to appear on the field of battle with all our old ideas and our old mistakes." "Our enemy carrying on his preparations with secrecy" (for the new use of cavalry) "burst upon us with the greater force and overwhelmed us."

He gives a pitiable picture of strong cavalry forces in retreat, after the first battles, moving in column on the roads, annoyed and harassed by advanced scouts of the enemy, which he says, were taken for the heads of strong columns.

Before these "fly-away" scouts the weary division of French cavalry pressed forward in retreat ceaselessly, wearing out horses and men; continually changing their route to avoid the heads of phantom cavalry columns, which appeared in every direction; short of rations (their trains could not follow their windings); soaked by the ceaseless rain, with little rest or sleep for many days; they played a part in this long retreat which, in the words of the French author, "was simply nil, as we neither obtained information or fought" but were * * * "left in unwieldy masses, which rendered no service, either by protecting our own army or in any other way."

But worse was in store for them; herded within the lines of the infantry by the blockade of Metz, our French colonel tells us that on the "9th of September the cavalry had to furnish one thousand horses to aid in feeding the troops." "By the 21st the forage has been so cut down that more horses died than the commissariat wanted. Those that remained ate each others manes and tails, dirt or leaves." Again, in the operations preceding the disaster at Sedan, our French colonel tells us, "The Prussians had pushed forward their cavalry and artillery to oblige us to halt. By this manoeuvre they gave the rest of the army time to concentrate for the great battle of the following day. One may well ask what was our cavalry doing all

this time; massed in divisions it marched each with its own infantry corps. Not a man was sent out to gain information of the enemy's strength and intentions."

"Tied to the apron strings," so to speak, of the protecting infantry, this fine cavalry, like their brothers at Metz, were included within the crushing grasp of the encircling Germans; their brilliant charges, made too late, were unable to liberate them. Our French author says: "The commands of our conqueror are received; all we have is to be given up. On the receipt of this intelligence we were filled with rage and the men were animated by the same feeling. The troops refused to give up their arms and set to work to break up everything. Pistols, swords, cuirasses, lances, all are dashed to pieces; the saddles are destroyed, the guidons are burnt. * * Deep in mud, without cloaks and with our clothes worn out we crowd together for warmth." "There were still 10,000 horses belonging to the cavalry. In order to avoid giving them up to the enemy, their picketing ropes had been cut and the horses, galloping in every direction, soon left no place where one was out of their reach; deprived of their usual food they commenced to fight and tore each other to pieces."

Such was the fate of the brilliant French cavalry, which scarcely a month before rode out "so confident in itself and careless of danger." Do we ask how this happened, the French answer is: "If, in place of leaving our cavalry idle, we had employed it in every direction to maintain our contact with the Prussians, the disaster of Sedan would never have occurred." The Marshal, warned in time, would have been able to make good his retreat.

It is evident from all this, I think, that the Prussian horsemen rode at ease and made their observations for the most part undisturbed, and it remains yet to be proved by the contact of equal foes, whether the immense spread of the German cavalry in 1870, radiating in decreasing subdivisions from a common center, can be maintained, to its full extent, in the presence of an equally active cavalry foe. It is more likely that to obtain the information which in '70 was brought in by small groups of horsemen, fearlessly riding over the country at great distances from their regiments, it will be found necessary to hold them somewhat more in hand and push forward on every avenue of approach to the enemy, a self-supporting body of cavalry of considerable size, trained to fight under all conditions. So it is that the careful study of the expeditions of cavalry against cavalry, so fruitful of good results, in 1855, 4 and 5, is of first importance to us as students of cavalry progress.

THE COMMAND OF ARMIES, FROM LA GUERRE MODERNE,
BY DERRÉCAGAIX.

BY LIEUT. COLONEL A. K. ARNOLD,
FIRST U. S. CAVALRY.

THE constitution of command is one of the first elements of the strength of armies. It reposes upon a fundamental principle—the *unity of the command*—or, according to a happy expression of the great NAPOLEON, “*the unity of the military thought*.”

This principle constitutes a rule without exception. It is absolute. In peace, as well as in war, it is the basis of all good army organizations. But it is especially in a campaign that its neglect can cause irreparable disaster. It has been many times proven that in multiplying the number of chiefs called to make a decision, a means is only offered to each one to elude the responsibility in difficult movements.

It is very rare then, that in the hour of danger the execution of a plan has not suffered from it. This truth is so clear that at first sight it would seem useless to prove it. In practice, however, it is not always so, and in many circumstances the command meets with difficulties which render the application of this principle very nearly impossible. History offers many examples in which its neglect became fatal.

In the spring of the year 1796, when BONAPARTE, scarcely twenty-seven years of age, had already conquered Lombardy, the Directory fearing his prestige, resolved to divide the army of Italy into two parts, and confide one of them to KELLERMAN.

BONAPARTE wrote to the Directory the following letter, which caused it to abandon its project. It contains upon the unity of command all the thought of this great soldier:

“HEADQUARTERS LODI, 25th FLOREAL, YEAR IV.

“I received at this instant the courier who left Paris on the 18th.

* * * * *

“I believe it to be very impolitic to divide the army of Italy in two parts. It is likewise contrary to the interests of the Republic to place two generals over it. The expedition to Leghorn, Rome and Naples is a very little thing; it should be made by divisions in echelon in a way that one could, by a retrograde march, find oneself in force against the Austrians, and threaten to envelope them at the least movement they might make.

“For this, it is necessary, not only a single general, but even that nothing hinder him in his march. I have made the campaign without consulting any one. I would have done nothing good if it had been necessary to adopt another's views. If you impose upon me all kinds of obstacles, if it is necessary for me to refer all my steps to the commissioners of the government, if they have the power to change my movements, to take away or send me troops, expect no longer any good results.

"If you enfeeble your means by dividing your forces, if you break the unity of the military thought, I tell you with sorrow, you will have lost the finest opportunity to impose laws upon Italy.

"In the situation of affairs of the Republic in Italy, it is indispensable that you have a general who has entirely your confidence.

"If I am not the one I will not complain; but I will employ myself in redoubled zeal to merit your esteem in the part you may confide to me. Each has his own way of making war. General KELLERMAN has more experience, and will do it better than I, but to unite us would ruin everything."

This letter was supplemented the same day by another which BONAPARTE addressed to CARNOT, and which is not less explicit:

"I wrote to the Directory relative to the idea of dividing the army. I swear to you that I have only considered in that the good of the country. Besides, you will always find me in the right way. I owe to the Republic the sacrifice of all my ideas. If any one seeks to prejudice you against me, my answer is in my heart and in my conscience. As it may be possible that the letter to the Directory might not be well interpreted, and as you have been friendly to me, I take the liberty of addressing this to you, praying you to make use of it in any way your prudence and attachment to me may suggest. KELLERMAN will command the army as well as I, for no one is more convinced than I am, that victories are due to the courage and audacity of the soldiers; but I believe that uniting KELLERMAN and myself in Italy would ruin everything. I cannot serve voluntarily with a man who believes himself the first general in Europe, and besides, I believe it is better to have one bad general than two good ones.

"War is like government, decided in a great degree by tact."

In 1812, however, NAPOLEON himself, forgetting the principles which he had so clearly enunciated, committed the fault of ordering the northern army of Spain, commanded by BESSIÈRES, to go and sustain that of Portugal, under the orders of MARMONT, without deciding which of the two marshals would command in Chief.

This situation of affairs created grave embarrassments and became an obstacle to the operation.

MARMONT thought it was his duty to protest in bitter terms to Major General BERTHIER, Chief of Staff to the Emperor:

"His Majesty supposes that in the case of an offensive movement by the English the Northern Army would sustain that of Portugal by two of its divisions, but can the Emperor be persuaded that in the actual order of things troops will arrive promptly and on time?

"The enemy takes the offensive. The one who should fight him prepares his means, the one who acts hypothetically, awaits quietly and allows precious time to be lost. The enemy marches upon me, I unite my troops in a methodical and precise manner. I know to a day, nearly the moment, when the greatest number at least will be in line, at what time the others will be in connection with me, and from this order of things I determine to act or temporize. But these calculations I can only make for troops

simply and purely under my orders. For those that are not, what slowness! What uncertainties! What time lost!

"I announce the march of the enemy and ask for aid. I am answered by observations; my letter came to hand very late, because the communications were difficult in the country. It will be the same with the answer and the answer back, and the enemy will be upon me. The consequence is that I am placed in a false position and I have no means of doing anything methodically and with due knowledge."

This situation was the result of the habit taken for sometime past by the Emperor to command all himself. He considered himself even at Paris as the veritable Chief of the armies in the Peninsula and sent his orders through his Chief of Staff, who also resided in Paris.

This example shows that not only the unity of command should always be maintained, but that it should be also exercised upon the theatre of operations.

One of the most serious obstacles to the unity of command is the *equality of grade*. When it exists between different chiefs in an army, it is only by the energy of his character that the Commander-in-Chief can enforce obedience. In order to avoid these difficulties, most civilized nations have created special grades for the commanders of corps d'armée and of armies. The Germans have thus four grades of generals. Major generals for brigades, lieutenant generals for divisions, generals for armies, or, more properly, corps commanders, and field marshals for the armies. Under the Consulate the French had also chiefs of brigade, generals of division, lieutenant generals and generals-in-Chief. The lieutenant generals disappeared with the first empire, and from that time the clashing between the commanders of corps or marshals was only emphasized. The presence of the Emperor was nearly always necessary to cause them to cease.

One of the most striking examples of these dissensions was that which Marshal NEY gave in Portugal, in 1811.

At this epoch when MASSÉNA was forced to abandon the investment of the lines of Torres-Vedras and retire into Spain, his army was in a most critical position. The privations and lack of provisions had much impaired its discipline. However, at the end of March—after a fine retreat, which had given his troops a certain vigor—MASSÉNA resolved to retake the offensive upon the Tagus. He gave immediate orders in consequence. The disapprobation of his lieutenants manifested itself then in a most unfortunate manner, and NEY, who was the only Marshal among them, forgot himself so far as to become the speaking trumpet for the general complaints.

On the 22d of March he wrote to his chief an insubordinate letter, which contained a formal refusal of obedience. MASSÉNA, in spite of his

energetic character, was kind-hearted and a little enfeebled by his long service. He did not reply. NEY wrote a second letter the same day at 6 p. m., in which he announced his resolution to set out the next day with his corps d' armée in another direction from that which had been prescribed to him.

MASSÉNA hesitated no longer; however, through a feeling of friendship for his old companion in arms, he informed him that if he persisted in his disobedience he would be forced to take measures to cause his authority to be respected. NEY had gone too far to recede. He believed besides that MASSÉNA was incapable of taking an energetic decision against him and hoped to associate the troops of the 6th Corps in his disobedience. He persisted in his refusal. MASSÉNA took the command of his corps from him and gave it to the oldest division commander. He forbade the division generals to obey NEY, enjoined them to conform to the instructions emanating directly from the Chief of Staff and rendered them personally responsible for all infractions of his orders and signified to Marshal NEY to go to Spain and await there the will of the Emperor. NEY then wrote to his chief the following insubordinate letter :

"The Emperor having confided to me the command of the 6th Corps, no person other than His Majesty has the right to relieve me from the command of it. I protest then still against this new disposition; however, if the generals of the divisions of the 6th Corps obey you, I will go to Spain."

The generals obeyed. On his side in spite of two new protestations and in spite of the chagrin which he experienced by it, MASSÉNA maintained his decision. NEY left the army and went to Spain. Two years after, NEY himself being in command of three corps d' armée in Lusania, the chiefs of which were very nearly his rank, he could not make them recognize his authority, and he complained of it to the Major General to whom he wrote the following letter:

"It is my duty to declare to your Serene Highness that it is impossible to do much with the 4th, 7th and 12th Corps d' armée in the present, state of their organization. These corps are united by order but not in fact. Each of the generals in chief do very nearly what they judge convenient for their own safety. Things are at such a point that it is very difficult to obtain a position. The *morale* of the generals and in general of the officers is singularly shaken. To command thus is only to command half, and I would like better to be a grenadier. I pray you to obtain from the Emperor, either that I be general in chief alone, having under me only division generals of wings or that His Majesty be kind enough to relieve me from *this hell*. I have no need of speaking of my devotion; I am ready to spill all my blood but I desire to do it usefully. In the present state of affairs the presence of the Emperor would alone establish proper relations between the officers, because all wills cede to his genius and the petty vanities disappear before the Majesty of the throne."

Rivalry of command does not result alone from equality of grade but also from sentiments of egotism which exist in all armies, either in the hearts of men or even in certain corps or in certain arms. These sentiments are always culpable. They cause the ruin of troops. They prevent the chiefs from accepting in difficult moments the aid which is offered to them or to hasten by forced marches to the aid of a comrade engaged. In order to avoid such faults it is a duty to maintain in all the corps of officers a sentiment of comradeship and esteem, based upon honor, pride of a noble career, upon the conviction that officers of an army form only one and the same family, the union of which is one of the first conditions of success. Sometimes the principle of the unity of command is violated by the creation of a "second in command." The consequences of this innovation have always been unfortunate.

They have been appreciated very clearly by the Duke of Wellington in two letters which deserve to be cited.

WELLINGTON TO MARSHAL BERESFORD

FREUEDA, DEC. 2, 1812.

"I have always been impressed with the uselessness and inconvenience of having a *second in command* in an army. It is a pompous and sonorous title without defined functions or responsibility of any kind, and which at the same time makes very annoying pretensions. You know, I believe, that I have once had experience in this matter. Each officer in an army should have a duty clearly defined to do, and be responsible for his acts. Such is the position, as I understand it, of a general commanding a division or corps d'armé. A second in command has no duty that can be defined, save perhaps, to give advice for the executions of measures of which he will not be in the least responsible and ready to deny when he learns that they would not be looked upon with favor in England. Such an experience as this I have had at least once."

WELLINGTON TO COUNT BATHURST.

FREUEDA, JAN. 26, 1813.

"In my opinion the official title of Second in Command in an army, now that the custom of assembling frequently a council of war has disappeared and that the General in Chief is held strictly responsible for all the events, is not only useless, but prejudicial to the good of the service. A personage without defined duties who has only to give his opinion off-handed, and which he can change at will, would necessarily be an embarrassment in moments when it was necessary to make a decision. Whether a Second in Command is sent me or not, I am perfectly determined to act always after my way of seeing, considering that I will always be regarded as responsible for the results, whoever may be the person who may have advised the measure."

The principle of the *unity of the directory of thought* is then absolute, and once its application assured, the force of the command depends upon the personal qualities of the General in Chief, his character and certain

qualities, the union of which, often difficult to find in the same man, is not less for armies, one of the surest guarantees of success.

Often intelligence and capacity are regarded as the foremost qualities of a military chief. This is generally an error. First: There are no foremost qualities. The qualities necessary for a commandant of troops vary according to the circumstances in which he is placed. What is true, is, that with great soldiers the qualities of character surpass all others.

There are two which the Germans appreciate above all others, namely: *decision* and *good sense*. To take a clear resolution without hesitating and putting it practically into execution, is, in fact, with a chief, especially an army chief, an eminent virtue. It is what *VERDY DU VERNOIS* calls the *clearness of conception* and *energy in execution*. These qualities are met with sometimes in ordinary men, when they have acquired by study and reflection the means of discerning clearly the situation.

One of the most remarkable examples of the decision of an army chief was that which Prince FREDERICK CHARLES gave on the 2d of July, 1866, in the evening, when he resolved to attack the Austrian army. At this date the advance guards of the Prussian and Austrian armies established upon the right bank of the Elbe, were less than four and one-half miles from each other, but the former did not suspect that the latter was so near and so concentrated. On the side of the Prussians it was believed that the greatest part of the enemy's army occupied a position beyond the Elbe, the wings of which were supported upon the fortified places of Josephstadt and Königgrätz. The great headquarters had then no alternative than to attack the position or manœuvre in order to oblige its defenders to leave it.

However, the Chief of Staff of the first army, which was most advanced, realized during the day that it was indispensable to have information more complete. For this purpose, he caused small detachments to be sent out on different sides, which were principally directed toward Königgrätz. Patrols of officers well mounted were charged to gather details upon the forces and position of the enemy. One of these penetrated beyond the curtain formed by the outposts of cavalry, and found the height of Dub, near Bistritz, strongly occupied. It learned that the Brigade Brohaska was established there. Prisoners made known that four Austrian corps d'armé were near by.

An officer of hussars perceived great bivouacks and was able to note the presence of a corps d'armé at Sadowa.

This important news reached the headquarters of the first army between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening. It could have tried to transmit it to the great headquarters and await orders, but thanks to the decision of the General-in-Chief, it was otherwise.

Although the day was advanced, although the great headquarters had already sent its instructions for a general flank march toward Pardabitz, Prince FREDERICK CHARLES took immediately contrary measures. Great masses of the enemy were in his neighborhood. It was necessary then to concentrate his troops immediately in anticipation of what would take place on the morning of the 3d. Consequently, without taking into account the night or bad weather, the Prince dispatched to his different corps at 9 P. M. an order to be in position at 2 A. M. near the line of the Bistritz, and ready to attack the Austrian position.

After having caused these orders to be dispatched, his Chief-of-Staff went to Gitschen, where the great headquarters of the King was. He arrived there at 11 P. M., gave an account of the situation and of the disposition made, and asked the advice of the King. He hesitated no more than Prince CHARLES, and resolved to attack immediately with all his forces, without preoccupying himself to know if he had before him the entire Austrian army or only some corps.

The victory of Sadowa was due in great part to the energy and promptitude of their decisions. They had for result the taking of the initiative by the first army and causing the arrival at a opportune time of the second army on the right flank of the enemy's forces.

After decision, one of the qualities which contributes the most to success is a *resolute tenacity*. At the close of a day of combat, after a prolonged struggle, when both sides have been exhausted, the general who has the energy to cause the charge to be sounded and hurl upon the foe fresh troops which remain to him is nearly sure of success. This is particularly the advice of Gen. U. S. GRANT who at times has given the most remarkable examples of resolute tenacity. Gen. PERRIN says: "I have heard Gen. GRANT declare that there is a moment in every battle dearly contested, when the two opposing armies are nearly exhausted by their efforts and when it seemed that each could do no more—this was, according to him—the decisive crisis and the general in chief who had sufficient character to take the offensive was sure to conquer."

The resolute tenacity which the German officers displayed—especially in the offensive in 1866 and 1870—was one of the causes of their successes.

In this respect, moreover, there exists in their army traditions, of which they are proud and all try to perpetuate.

Marshal BLUCHER boasted of his *tenacity*, and wrote in 1815:—

"Paris is in my power; the French army retires behind the Loire and the capital is delivered to me. It is to the indomitable bravery and unequalled energy of our troops as well as my own *iron will* that this triumph is due. Lamentations upon the exhaustion of the troops were not wanting in pouring upon me, but I have remained deaf to all. I know by experience

that one should, and can only reap the fruits of victory by pursuing the vanquished without truce or respite."

At more recent epochs the Prussians have been cited as remarkable examples of this quality. That of General FRANSECKI, chief of the 7th division of infantry at the battle of Sadowa merits attention.

Placed at the extreme left of the line of battle of the first army in the Wood of Maslowed, engaged from 8 A. M. this division found itself towards 11 A. M. in presence of the enemy's masses, which unceasingly increased.

The masses belonged to two Austrian corps d'armée, the 2d and 4th, which had allowed themselves to be drawn in little by little and had finished by bringing into line fifty-one battalions and more than one hundred pieces of artillery.

In order to resist this powerful effort, the 7th Division could count only upon its own troops. Its center at first fell back and it was feared that the two wings would be separated. Soon companies were mixed and divided into groups, which under the leadership of their officers were forced to hold different points of the border; some found themselves threatened in front, on the flanks and in rear. They succeeded however in maintaining themselves in the northern part of the wood.

In the midst of alternate successes and reverses, says the Prussian account, the companies which fought in the thick wood had finished by intermingling completely. Besides, nothing could be seen in front of one; it was impossible then to give to the struggle a single direction and the chiefs were obliged to limit themselves in giving personally the example. Upon all points the officers assembled around them men whom they had at hand, no matter to what regiment they belonged, and brought them to the front. Troops which had been driven back from the woods were sent back again and those which were completely demoralized were gathered and placed in reserve. A great number of Austrian prisoners were sent to the rear and there arrived at the rear a large number of Prussian wounded and troops who had lost their chiefs. Already more than 2,000 men were *hors de combat*. General FRANSECKI had vainly asked for aid, but comprehending the importance of the point he occupied, he—by his example—caused to pass into the souls of all those who were around him the dogged resolution of defending to the last extremity the ground upon which they had spilled so much blood. The resistance continued. Soon happily the approach of the second army was announced and the cry "the Prince Royal arrives" running through the thinned ranks of the defenders of the wood, reanimated the exhausted troops. But this help was still far off. The 7th Division found itself at a most critical moment. It was necessary to send an officer towards the columns of the second army to ask immediate and urgent support. This officer should, to accomplish his

mission, pass at a gallop, through the lines of the enemy's skirmishers. He succeeded in his perilous undertaking, and in a few moments afterwards the Prussian Guard arrived and by a flank attack relieved General FRANSECKI.

The failure of the enemy to drive back the left wing of the first army and break its connection with the second army, was owing to the resolute tenacity of this general.

With certain nations, with the English for example, resolute tenacity has become a national virtue. WELLINGTON was one of those generals who by the firmness of his character, has contributed the most to it. He wrote to Lord CLARENDON in 1811 on this subject:

"No person can better appreciate than you the difficulties which I have had to struggle against, (during the expedition of MASSÉNA in Portugal) but I believe you do not know all. I have persevered in the system I believe best, in spite of the fact, that the opinion of every officer in the English army of Portugal was that I should evacuate the country, and embark for England. Whilst on the other hand the Portuguese civil authorities considered that I should maintain the war upon the frontier, instead of falling back to the lines of Torres-Vedrus, when we lacked for that, not only material strength, but even the means of providing for the needs of the only Portuguese troops which they had been able to set on foot. Nothing less than an unyielding firmness was necessary to me to resist during these nine months of discussions of contrary opinions. Add to this, that public opinion in England varied as the wind, and you will know that I could count only upon myself."

The wars at the commencement of the century offer many examples of this military virtue. Besides, was it not to it that NAPOLEON owed a great part of his success? The triumphs so constant and so complete of NAPOLEON, says ROCQUANCOURT, should be attributed:—

First—To his incomparable ability to create, assemble, organize and vivify the means of war, proportioned to the grandeur of his enterprises.

Second—To an activity which procured to him all the initiative of movements.

Third—To a rapidity of *coup d'oeil* and action, which allowed the enemy neither reflection nor time to oppose himself to his designs.

Fourth—To the best *employment* possible of the masses.

Fifth—To that *ascendency* which he exercised from the beginning, as much over his adversaries as over his own troops, and which only increased his greater authority, and his ulterior successes.

Sixth—To a *tenacity* which he knew how to *communicate to all* and which in him was as much an effect of reflection as a gift of nature.

He held it as a principle that, once engaged in action and as long as nothing was decided, he considered it better to continue the combat and consent to new sacrifices rather than render useless to the country, by premature retreat, the blood of men already killed.

This principle, far from being inhuman, has for result the avoidance of new sacrifices.

"Before ceding victory, wait until it is snatched from you," said NAPOLEON, "before retiring, wait until you are forced."

His personal opinion of the qualities of a commander should not be passed in silence :

"The first quality of a general-in-chief is to be cool headed, to estimate things at their just value; he must not be moved by good or bad news. The sensations that he daily receives must be so classed in his mind that each may occupy its appropriate place. Reason and judgment are only the result of the comparison of well-weighed ideas.

"There are men who, from some physical or moral peculiarity of character, make each thing a picture. No matter what knowledge, intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men are unfit to command armies, or to direct great operations in war.

"Generals-in-chief must be guided by experience or by their own genius. Men who have much genius and little character are the least proper—it is a ship whose rigging is out of proportion to its ballast. It is better to have much character and little genius. Men who have ordinary genius and a proportioned character will succeed often in this calling; there is necessary as much of base as of height. The general who has much genius and character—it is CESAR, HANNIBAL, TURENNE, Prince EUGENE and FREDERICK. It is the will, the character, the application and the audacity which has made me what I am."

Whatever may be the qualities which those entrusted with commanding may possess, it is not without interest to observe that in our time they should be more developed than formerly.

This fact is the consequence of the augmentation of armies, of the multiplicity of the elements of which they are composed, and the extension of the theatres of war

FREDERICK II. commanded armies of 30,000 to 50,000 men. NAPOLEON had under his orders considerable masses, but usually they operated under his eyes in compact masses. To-day a general-in-chief must direct two, three or four armies of 150,000 to 200,000 men each. Consequently, nearly a million men. In a battle, it would be difficult to find a point from whence he could perceive the whole of his troops and their movements. In all cases he is too far off to exercise a personal command over the wings. Often, when he sends an order, the situation that his order concerns is modified upon the arrival of the messenger who brought it. There result from this state of affairs the greatest difficulties, which call for faculties more powerful, greater habit of originating and above all a *will* more reflective and stronger than ever.

PENETRATING CAVALRY CHARGES.

EXPERIMENTS MADE IN CAMP KRASSNOE SSELO, RUSSIA.

(From the Russian *Invalid*, No. 129.)

TRANSLATED FROM THE "MILITAER WOCHENBLATT," NO. 82, 1888.

BY SECOND LIEUT. CARL KOOPS, 13TH INFANTRY.

IT is well-known that SUWOROW greatly valued the so-called penetrating charges of cavalry as a means of instruction, and always endeavored to have these charges resemble as much as possible, those made in actual warfare. This result he partly obtained by requiring opposing forces to pass through each others lines.

Adjutant General DRAGOMIROW has lately revived SUWOROW's idea of practicing charges. Although there are many adverse to this method, and pronounce it antiquated, DRAGOMIROW has succeeded in convincing the highest authorities of the correctness of his principle. The soldier must practice in time of peace, all that he is required to perform in time of war, and that only.

The Russian tactics prescribe that each manœuvre of a detachment shall conclude with a penetrating charge. But as nobody knew exactly how to execute them, that paragraph had been for a long while a dead letter.

Last summer, however, Grand Prince WLADIMIR, as commanding officer of all troops in Camp Krassnoe Sselo, made penetrating charges a part of the programme of exercises. Those charges were successfully executed in the presence of the highest authorities and a great many other officers.

The troops detailed for this exercise were a battalion of infantry, a battery, and a regiment of cavalry. In the commencement of the exercise, the troops were in line of battle. First line, the infantry, in rear of them the battery, and eight hundred paces in rear of it, the cavalry, in column of squadrons, dismounted and standing to horse.

The programme was as follows:

1. The cavalry to ride through the infantry at a walk and to return at a trot.
 2. The infantry to pass through the cavalry, first with the front rank in front, then with the rear rank in front.
 3. The cavalry to ride through the infantry and artillery while they are firing.
- In addition to the above, the following exercises were executed:
4. The infantry were mounted on the croups of the cavalry horses.

5. Infantry advancing rapidly by holding on to the manes of the cavalry horses.

The instructions of Grand Prince W^LADIMIR also drew attention to the fact that circumstances might arise which would not give cavalry in withdrawing, sufficient time to pass by the flanks of the infantry. In this case, the cavalry would be justified in passing through the infantry line; but it should never mask the artillery, as it is its duty to cover with its fire the retiring cavalry. Should skirmishers have been deployed, they must assemble in groups opposite the squadron intervals, and deploy again when the cavalry has passed. The instructions further directed that infantry in line should form column of companies by battalions, when the cavalry, for the purpose of pursuing the enemy, had to pass through the line of the infantry from the rear.

The first part of the programme was executed in the following manner:

The regiment of cavalry was formed in column of divisions, each squadron in column of double platoons; the artillery in line; the infantry in two lines, without interval between the companies, the second line 100 paces from the first. The infantry and cannoneers were then faced about, this brought them facing the cavalry.

The first division of the cavalry then advanced, each platoon in column of six formed to right. Having arrived at the battery, the cavalry halted and the troopers rode around the guns, and as near to them as possible, to accustom their horses to the sight of them. The second division now followed, and the first advanced to the lines of infantry and halted. Immediately before the arrival of the cavalry, the infantry formed column of platoons. The cavalry then marched between the columns of infantry and halted again. The infantry broke ranks, and the men going between the ranks of cavalry, patted and caressed the horses, at the same time the infantry buglers sounded their instruments and swung their arms wildly in the air. The return march was made in a similar manner, but at a trot.

To execute the second part of the programme, the infantry formed a column of platoons, left in front, and opened files to the right, with an interval of three paces between files. The cavalry assumed a corresponding formation, with the same interval between files. The infantry then advanced, the band playing and the men singing. On nearing the cavalry the infantry halted and executed "order arms" with much noise. The infantry broke ranks and mingled with the cavalry, executing the manual of arms, and throwing themselves on the ground, to rise again quickly; after that they passed through the cavalry shouting, "Provit Comrades." The infantry returned in a similar manner, the second line now in front.

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To execute the second part of the programme, the infantry formed a column of platoons, left in front, and opened files to the right, with an interval of three paces between files. The cavalry assumed a corresponding formation, with the same interval between files. The infantry then advanced, the band playing and the men singing. On nearing the cavalry the infantry halted and executed "order arms" with much noise. The infantry broke ranks and mingled with the cavalry, executing the manual of arms, and throwing themselves on the ground, to rise again quickly; after that they passed through the cavalry shouting, "Provit Comrades." The infantry returned in a similar manner, the second line now in front.

For the execution of the third part of the programme, the cavalry remained in the same formation; the artillery was still in their original place and formation; and the infantry marched 300 paces to the rear and doubled files, thus giving an interval of six paces between files. Each file now consisting of four men, had its first man at "order arms," those in rear at "charge bayonet." The cavalry now charged at full speed, first the artillery, then the lines of infantry. The troops attacked fired when the charging cavalry had arrived quite near them. The reporter of the "Russian Invalid" does not state how the horses behaved on this occasion, but an eye witness of a similar experiment made by the Russian cavalry states that, when the smoke disappeared, quite a number of horses, and some of them without riders, could be seen galloping about in rear of the original front. The infantry also had received the charge not without some accidents. In order to allay the fear caused by the fire delivered directly in their eyes, the horses were fed and caressed immediately after having passed the firing lines.

The execution of the fourth part of the programme. To mount the infantryman behind a trooper, the latter lets go the left stirrup. The infantryman grasps a lock of the mane with the left hand, inserts his left foot in the stirrup, takes hold of the cantle with his right hand, and then swings himself on the croup of the horse, behind the pack of which he takes hold. Some simple evolutions were executed, which were entirely successful. The infantrymen seemed to enjoy these exercises.

The fifth part of the programme was also successfully executed. The infantry advanced rapidly with the cavalry, by holding on to the stirrups or manes of the horses. Considerable distances could be passed over in this manner without much trouble to horse or rider. It was found best for the infantryman to conform to the movements of the horse.

The experiment was also made of using cavalry horses as draught horses for the artillery. Most of the horses did the unaccustomed work willingly; nevertheless, it was considered best to have some trained draught horses in each squadron.

The report on these exercises lays stress on the fact that the manner and means of execution were entirely in accordance with the third part of an article by Adjutant General DRAGOMIROW, "An Attempt at a Text Book to Prepare Troops for Actual Warfare." DRAGOMIROW, in this article, dwells with great emphasis on the necessity that troops of the different branches of the service should be accustomed to mutual support, and should consider themselves members of one body. Now this educational tendency finds full application in the above described exercises, which could equally well be called "making friends of the different arms of the service." Disregarding the existing antagonism between the different arms and even regiments of the same arm, and which is found

not in Russia alone, some troops, from stations garrisoned by their arm only, would never get acquainted with other arms, beyond seeing them at some distance during the manœuvres.

In the above exercises the penetrating troops greet each other. The infantryman caresses his brother soldiers' horse. The cannoneer feeds him with bread. An eye witness of these exercises stated that they generated an evident, and probably permanent, friendship between two riders of one horse. The fact that these infantrymen proved apt scholars in horsemanship, augmented the friendly feeling considerably.

The report further recommends that these exercises should be held whenever opportunity is favorable, and not at regular fixed times. It would be an undeniable gain to have horses trained to advance fearlessly against firing infantry and artillery.

At stations garrisoned by cavalry only, dismounted troopers could act as infantry. But that would never be more than a poor make-shift, in the opinion of the Russian reporter, as dismounted cavalry does not present the same appearance as infantry, and it would be contrary to the spirit of cavalry if they did present the same appearance.

These remarks of the reporter, who is an officer of considerable rank, reveal a reaction from the idea of considering a dragoon dismounted of equal fighting value with an infantryman.

The present controversies in the Russian army about discarding the bayonet of the carbines can also be considered in the same spirit.

In close connection with this are the experiments in utilizing the rapidity and strength of horses for rapid movements of infantry.

EXTRACTS.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL A. PLEASANTON, LATE COMMANDER OF CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, October 15, 1865.

The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-'62. It was most unfortunate, that, with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies. The highest military authorities have laid down, that, in the proper organization of an army, the cavalry should form from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry which composes it. This relation of the cavalry to the infantry is so important, in consequence of the necessary duties assigned to each in time of war, that it may fairly be said no army is fit to take the field unless these two arms are properly organized and bear the proper proportion to each other in respect to numbers; and it is also a strong fact, which the war has demonstrated, that the more closely these proportions are observed throughout the campaign the greater will be the success, and the greater will be the confidence reposed by the troops of the different arms in each other; which greatly tends to lighten their most arduous duties. It is a vicious organization that requires the infantry to supply the deficiencies of service for want of sufficient cavalry, or the reverse; or, that imposes upon a small body of cavalry the arduous and ruinous service that should only be borne by thrice their number.

With eighty thousand cavalry on the pay-rolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas; were unable to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring before our army had started in pursuit. Does any one now assert that those obstacles could not have been removed by twenty thousand cavalry, properly supported by that army? So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry that it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy.

I served with the Army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and, from what has since been done, I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring, in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect of the cavalry, would not have been forced upon us. McCLELLAN dreaded the rebel cavalry, and supposed that, by placing his army on a peninsula with a deep river on each side, he was safe from that arm of the enemy; but the humiliation on the Chickahominy of having a few thousand of the enemy's cavalry ride completely around his army, and the ignominious retreat to Harrison's Landing, are additional instances in support of the maxim, "that a general who disregards the rules of war finds himself overwhelmed by the consequences of such neglect when the crisis of battle follows."

While the cavalry arm was thus neglected in the organization of the army, the infantry force, which was upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand men, was kept in divisions until the army entered the field in the spring, when the corps formation was adopted; but so indifferently, however, that the command of the corps fell upon officers of no higher grade than that of brigadier general. This carelessness of assignment, by rendering every high officer uncertain of the position he held, was a fruitful source of the jealousies and dissensions that afterwards occurred among the commanders in this army, and which did so much to retard and frustrate the best devised plans that were attempted to be executed, and taken in connection with the useless superabundance of artillery with which at that time the army was supplied, and which was without higher organization than that of the battery, added to the other causes mentioned, prevented that unity of action, compactness, confidence, mobility, courage, energy, and enterprise in the army, which are so essential in the prosecution of successful warfare.

General HOOKER was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac to exhibit a correct appreciation of organization in an army. He consolidated and increased his cavalry, organized them into corps, supplied them with artillery, and was rewarded by some distinguished service that made the march of his army a triumph from Falmouth to Frederick City.

The campaign of Gettysburg, which he commenced so brilliantly, was afterwards conducted by his successor with such results as to produce the deepest mortification throughout the country. The doubt, hesitation, and fear of consequences displayed by General MEADE, were in striking contrast to the heroic valor so constantly and stubbornly exhibited by the army. Never did the cavalry, though few in numbers for the labors assigned them, perform more brilliant and successful deeds of arms than those which, after the battle of Gettysburg, brought to bay shattered, bailed, and beaten army at Falling Waters, on the banks of the Potomac, in July, 1863. The army was eager for the attack; they knew the end of the rebellion was within their grasp, but their commander, General MEADE, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General MEADE, caused the army to fall back from Culpeper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the Rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of generalship, and the Mine Run campaign showed so plainly that General MEADE was deficient in the qualities required for a commander, that it was not surprising to see Lieutenant General GRANT, a short time after, assume the personal direction of the Army of the Potomac.

It is a very important fact that the numbers of the cavalry in that army were then more nearly in the proper proportion to those of the infantry than at any other time in its history, and the noble record of the cavalry and of the army while under General GRANT can consequently be accepted as one of the results of observing that important principle of war—the proper organization of an army.

In reviewing this subject it is well to observe that the success of the Rebel army in Virginia, for the first two years of the war, was mainly due to its superior organization, and to the splendid corps of cavalry it was able to maintain. That army was not hampered with a surplus of artillery, and its numerous and efficient cavalry kept its commander well informed of our movements. But when the casualties of war reduced this cavalry faster than they could replace them, which was the case in the campaigns of 1863, the army was soon thrown upon the defensive, from which it was never after able to recover. We then deduce the following facts: that the Army of the Potomac was better organized in the later periods of the war than at the beginning, while the reverse was the case with the Rebel army. The successes of either army bore a marked correspondence to its superior organization to that of its opponent, at the time of achievement. The question then recurs, could not the war have been much sooner closed by giving to the Army of the Potomac a proper organization at the beginning? The government should now decide this question, and if responded to in the affirmative, make the necessary corrections to prevent similar evils in our military system hereafter.

CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.

In the campaign of the Peninsula I commanded the second regiment of United States cavalry until the army arrived at Harrison's Landing, when I was made a brigadier general of volunteers, and commanded a brigade of cavalry in the second action at Malvern Hill on the 5th of August, 1862, and also covered the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula. Throughout this campaign there was a decided want of vigor in the conduct of the army, and the first great mistake was made in permitting the rebels to occupy and re-enforce Yorktown before taking possession of it. Some thirty days' delay occurred in laying siege to Yorktown, when it might have been taken by assault the first few days after the army arrived before it; at all events, the importance of time at that period was such as to make an attempt worthy of a

trial. The time lost at Yorktown and on the Chickahominy gave the Rebels an opportunity to gather their forces to defend Richmond; and the error committed in placing the army on both sides of the Chickahominy enabled the enemy to cripple first our left wing at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, and afterwards our right wing at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, and by the moral effect of these partial actions caused the army to retreat to James river. There appeared no disposition throughout this campaign to bring the entire army into action as an army; there was no controlling spirit so decidedly strong as to effect the necessary concert of action in the different portions of the army, and, as a consequence, the battles that took place resulted from the enemy's successively massing heavier forces on our detached corps, which were outnumbered, beaten in detail, and compelled to retreat. It has been claimed that more troops should have been furnished the army for the purpose of taking Richmond; but the facts of the case do not support this assertion, as the troops that were in the army were never all used and fought in connection with and in support of each other, as should have been done. To have increased these large masses, without material change in the manner of fighting them from that which had been adopted, would not have changed the ultimate result from what it was, and would have only added to the embarrassments which already existed. Besides the causes already mentioned, there were numerous oversights and neglects bearing upon discipline, and which also had a serious influence upon the success of the campaign. Very little was done to excite the energy, emulation, and enthusiasm of the troops, while some measures were adopted that had a decided tendency to diminish these necessary qualities in a marked degree. At Yorktown an order from headquarters prohibited all music by bands and all calls by either drums or bugles, and they were not resumed until after the army had arrived at Harrison's Landing. When the large masses of men which composed the Army of the Potomac were moving among the swamps of the Chickahominy, without any of the enlivening sounds of martial music, or the various well-known calls of an army life, the effect was very depressing, and caused the soldiers to exaggerate the issue that required of them to lose the most agreeable part of their profession. The army, however, had gone to the Peninsula very enthusiastic, the soldiers always earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties; and although the field for the campaign had been badly selected, and there were numerous drawbacks to disappoint their hopes, there were also several occasions won by their valor when a bold, determined, resolute commander could have forced the result to a successful issue.

CAMPAIGN OF ANTIETAM.

In this campaign I commanded the cavalry division of the army, and took the advance from Washington city through Maryland and until the field of Antietam was reached, when I fought my command in front of the bridge leading from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and held the centre of our army throughout the battle. The same mistakes were made in this campaign that characterized that of the Peninsula. The army was not moved with sufficient rapidity or vigor from the Peninsula or through Maryland, and the enemy was again given time to prepare and concentrate. When the battle was delivered it was fought by detached commands in such positions as to be unable to give or receive assistance from each other. HOOKER'S, FRANKLIN'S, and SUMNER'S corps were on the right, too distant to receive support from the rest of the forces, while BURNSIDE'S forces were on the left, at least three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. FITZ JOHN PORTER'S corps was behind my position a mile and a half on the opposite side of the creek as a reserve, but it was never brought into action. Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army labored under from these arrangements, decisive victory could have been won at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th of September, if a strong attack had been made on Sharpsburg from the centre. My command had cleared the enemy from my front and were in high spirits, while the stubborn fighting of the army generally had told fearfully upon the Rebels. I therefore recommended this attack, and requested to be permitted to take the initiative in it. The proposition was not approved, and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then so far off, falling back, my guns could not reach them, and the battle ended so far as my command was concerned. On the next day the army was not permitted to advance, and on the 19th the enemy had crossed the Potomac and escaped. The Rebel army had suffered so much more than ours in this campaign, and their ammunition was so much exhausted, that I was convinced a rapid and energetic pursuit would have routed them, if it had not caused Lee himself to surrender. Colonel DAVIS, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, had, before the battle, destroyed all the ammunition belonging to LONGSTREET'S corps, and the heavy demands of the fight had nearly exhausted the supply for the rest of their army. This, with the disappointment of the rebel soldiers at the failure of their enterprise to invade Pennsylvania, were advantages which should not have been thrown away.

Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The Rebel force was then divided; LONGSTREET and A. P. HILL, with their corps, being at Culpeper, while STONEWALL JACKSON and D. H. HILL were in the Shenandoah valley at Front Royal. By crushing LONGSTREET at Culpeper the army would cripple that of the Rebels and would cut it off from Richmond. Culpeper should have been occupied. It was at this time that General BURNSIDE assumed command of the army, and unfortunately decided to march on Fredericksburg. The details of that campaign have already been so thoroughly examined by your honorable committee as to leave nothing to be said in reference to it except perhaps, that the cavalry bore no prominent part in it.

CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

In this campaign my command was the first cavalry division of the Army of the Potomac, the 1st Brigade of which during the battle was with General STONEMAN on his raid towards Richmond, in rear of LEE's army. With one brigade I preceded the 11th and 12th Corps as far as Chancellorsville. The movements of the 5th, 11th and 12th Corps across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were very fine and masterly, and were executed with such secrecy that the enemy were not aware of them, for on the 30th of April, 1863, I captured a courier from General LEE, commanding the Rebel army, bearing a dispatch from General LEE to General ANDERSON, and written only one hour before, stating to General ANDERSON he had just been informed we had crossed in force, when, in fact, our three corps had been south of the Rapidan the night previous, and were then only five miles from Chancellorsville. The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression, gave General HOOKER an undue confidence as to his being master of the situation, and all the necessary steps were not taken on his arrival at Chancellorsville to insure complete success. The country around Chancellorsville was too cramped to admit of our whole army being properly developed there, and two corps, the 11th and 12th, should have been thrown on the night of the 30th of April to Spottsylvania Court House, with orders to intrench, while the remainder of the army should have been disposed so as to support them. This would have compelled General LEE to attack our whole force or retire with his flank exposed, a dangerous operation in war, or else remain in position and receive the attack of SEDGWICK in rear and HOOKER in front, a still worse dilemma.

In the third day's fight at Chancellorsville General HOOKER was badly stunned by the concussion of a shell against a post near which he was standing, and from which he did not recover sufficiently during the battle to resume the proper command of the army. The plan of this campaign was a bold one and was more judicious than was generally supposed from the large force General HOOKER had at his command. There is always one disadvantage, however, attending the sending off of large detachments near the day of battle. War is such an uncertain game it can scarcely be expected that all the details in the best devised plans will meet with success, and unless a general is prepared and expects to replace at once, by new combinations, such parts of his plans as fail, he will be defeated in his campaign, and as these changes are often rapid, he cannot include his distant detachments in his new plans with any certainty, and the doubt their absence creates reduces the army he can depend on to the actual number of men he has in hand. If General HOOKER had not been injured at the commencement of the final battle, I am not certain his splendid fighting qualities would not have won for him the victory. It was in this battle that with three regiments of cavalry and twenty-two pieces of artillery I checked the attack of the Rebel general, STONEWALL JACKSON, after he had routed the 11th Corps. JACKSON had been moving his corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men through the woods throughout the day of the 2d of May, 1863, from the left to the right of our army, and about six o'clock in the evening he struck the right and rear of the 11th Corps with one of those characteristic attacks that made the Rebel army so terrible when he was with it, and which was lost to them in his death. In a very short time he doubled up the 11th Corps into a disordered mass, that soon sought safety in flight. My command of three cavalry regiments and one battery of six guns happened to be near this scene, and perceiving at a glance that if this rout was not checked the ruin of the whole army would be involved, I immediately ordered one of my regiments to charge the woods from which the rebels were issuing and hold them until I could bring some guns into position; then charging several squadrons into our flying masses to clear ground for my battery, it was brought up at a run, while staff officers and troops were despatched to seize from the rout all the guns possible. The brilliant charge of the regiment into the woods detained the Rebels some ten minutes, but in that short time such was the energy displayed by my command, I placed in line twenty-two pieces of artillery, double-shotted with canister, and aimed low, with the remainder of the cavalry supporting them. Dusk was now rapidly approaching, with an apparent lull in the fight, when heavy masses of men could be seen in the edge of the woods, having a single flag —

and that the flag of the United States—while at the same time they cried out: "Don't shoot; we are friends!" In an instant an aide-de-camp galloped out to ascertain the truth, when a withering fire of musketry was opened on us by this very gallant foe, who now dropped our ensign, displayed ten or twelve rebel battle-flags, and with loud yells charged the guns. I then gave the command "fire," and the terrible volley delivered at less than two hundred yards' distance caused the thick moving masses of the rebels to stagger, cease from yelling, and for a moment discontinue their musket fire, but they were in such numbers, had such an indomitable leader, and they had so great a prize within their reach, that they soon rallied and came on again with increased energy and force, to be met by the artillery, served well and rapidly, and with such advantage that the Rebels were never able to make a permanent lodgement at the guns, which many of their adventurous spirits succeeded in reaching. This fight lasted about an hour, when a final charge was made and repulsed; they then sullenly retired to the woods. It was at this time that General JACKSON was mortally wounded, and as the Rebel authorities have published he had been killed by his own men, I shall mention some facts of so strong a character as to refute this statement. Soon after the last attack I captured some of the Rebel soldiers in the woods, and they told me it was JACKSON's corps that had made this fight; that JACKSON himself had directed it, and had been mortally wounded, and that their loss was very heavy. I have since met Rebel officers who were then engaged, and they corroborated the above statement, and they added that it was known and believed among JACKSON's men that he had been mortally wounded by our own fire. Again, one of my own officers who had been taken prisoner in that engagement told me, after he was exchanged, that he had been taken up to JACKSON soon after his capture; that JACKSON questioned him about our force, and that he then was not far from our lines. This clearly proves that JACKSON was on the field in command, and had not been wounded up to and until after the fight had commenced. Now, when it is remembered, the entire front of my line did not occupy six hundred yards; that the opposing forces were in open ground, not three hundred yards from each other, and so close that no reconnaissance in front was necessary by an officer of JACKSON's rank, and taken in connection with the fact that the fierce characteristic of the attacks of the man did not cease until he was wounded, and were not renewed after he was, the conclusion is simple, natural and forcible that JACKSON commanded and fell in his attack on our guns. In justice to the high character, as a general, of JACKSON, I am free to admit that had he not been wounded, and had made another attack, as he undoubtedly would have done, he would have carried my position, for my losses had already disabled more than half my guns, and the few that were left could have easily been overpowered. There seemed a providential interference in JACKSON's removal at the critical time in which it occurred, for the position fought for by him commanded and enfiladed our whole army, and had he won it on the rout of the 11th Corps, the disaster to us would have been irreparable.

CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG.

I was placed in command of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac and made a major general of volunteers after the battle of Chancellorsville, and the campaign of Gettysburg began by my attacking the Rebel cavalry at Beverly Ford, on the Rappahannock river, on the 9th of June, 1863. The rebels were defeated and very important information was obtained relative to their proposed invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which General HOOKER acted immediately, and moved his army towards Maryland. On the 17th, the 19th and the 21st of June, 1863, I again attacked the Rebels at Aldie, at Middleburg and Upperville with such success that General LEE abandoned his design of crossing the Potomac at Poolesville, and moved the bulk of his army to Hagerstown, by the way of Williamsport, and from thence to Chambersburg. When our army had arrived at Frederick City, General HOOKER was relieved from the command and General MEADE was assigned in his place. General HOOKER left the army in fine condition and discipline and well in hand, and he had the confidence of the troops in his ability to command them.

General MEADE sent for me soon after his assignment and in discussing the subject of the campaign I mentioned that from my knowledge of the country obtained the year before, in the Antietam campaign, I considered the result of the present one depended entirely upon which of the two armies first obtained possession of Gettysburg, as that was so strong position that either army, by holding it, could defeat the other; that General LEE knew this and would undoubtedly make for it. But in the disposition of the army for the march I saw that General MEADE did not attach that importance to the subject that it deserved, and that he was more impressed with the idea that LEE intended crossing the Susquehanna river, and accordingly threw the bulk of his army too far to the east of Gettysburg. Seeing this I directed General BUFORD, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division, and who was ordered to Gettysburg, to hold that place at all hazards until our infantry could come up.

BUFORD arrived at Gettysburg on the night of the 30th of June, 1863, in advance of the enemy, and moved out the next day very early, about four miles on the Cashtown road, when he met A. P. HILL's corps of the enemy, thirty thousand strong, moving down to occupy Gettysburg: LEE thus doing exactly what I informed General MEADE he would do. BUFORD with his four thousand cavalry attacked HILL, and for four hours splendidly resisted his advance until REYNOLDS and HOWARD were able to hurry to the field and give their assistance. To the intrepidity, courage and fidelity of General BUFORD and his brave division the country and the army owe the battle-field of Gettysburg. His unequal fight of four thousand men against eight times their numbers and his saving the field, made BUFORD the true hero of that battle. While this terrible fight of the first day was raging, having been commenced by BUFORD in the morning and continued by REYNOLDS and HOWARD in the evening, General MEADE was seventeen miles off, at Taneytown, leisurely planning a line of battle on some obscure creek between that and Gettysburg, when he was aroused by a dispatch from BUFORD, through me, stating REYNOLDS was killed, the field was becoming disordered, and if he expected to save it the army must be moved up at once. The different corps were then directed to march on Gettysburg, but some were so distant, SEDGWICK in particular, that it did not arrive on the field until sundown of the 2d of July, after having marched thirty-five miles. General MEADE did not himself reach the field until one o'clock on the morning of the 2d, long after the first day's fight had been brought to a close.

On the 2d of July, 1863, that portion of the army that was on the field was placed in a defensive position, but General MEADE had so little assurance in his own ability to maintain himself, or in the strength of his position, that when the Rebels partially broke our line in the afternoon of the 2d he directed me to collect what cavalry I could and prepare to cover the retreat of the army, and I was thus engaged until 12 o'clock that night. I mention this fact now because when I was before your honorable committee and was asked the question whether General MEADE ever had any idea of retreating from Gettysburg, I answered that I did not remember, the above circumstances at that time being out of my mind, and it was only afterwards recalled by my staff officers on my return to camp.

On the 3d of July, 1863, the last day of the battle of Gettysburg, and immediately after the final repulse of the Rebels, I urged General MEADE to advance his whole army and attack them, but he refused to do so quite angrily, and his remarks showed that he did not or would not understand the events that were occurring around him. He directed me to send the cavalry and ascertain if the enemy were retreating, which was done at once, but as the cavalry was at some distance from the army, it was not until 8 o'clock the next morning that the first report of the cavalry on the Cashtown road was received, showing the enemy were twenty-two miles off, and getting away as fast as they could. The cavalry was continued in pursuit, but the remainder of the army did not leave Gettysburg for several days after the Rebels had left, and were then moved in such a leisurely manner as to show no great anxiety by the commander to overtake the Rebels. Very unexpectedly to the army and to the Rebels, the heavy rains caused the Potomac to rise so rapidly that LEE could not cross, and he was again brought face to face with the Army of the Potomac at Falling Waters. Every military reason demanded that the Rebels should be immediately attacked, for after three days' heavy fighting at Gettysburg it was a moderate conclusion to arrive at that the Rebels were short of ammunition, and could not sustain a protracted fight. General LEE admitted this afterwards in his official report, and expected to be attacked, when he says: "Our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition," and again, "the enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity; the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines." The Army of the Potomac having had all its wants supplied since the battle of Gettysburg, and with the prestige of that battle was eager for the fight, and was in good condition for it.

Here General MEADE again refused to fight and waited a whole day until the Rebels had succeeded in crossing the river and had again escaped.

The army thus lost the fruits of all its arduous toils, struggles and triumphs, and the country had entailed upon it a prolonged war for two years more, with its innumerable sacrifices of blood and treasure.

In reviewing the battle and campaign of Gettysburg, when we notice that General MEADE was absent from the first day's fight; that he was occupied with the idea of retreating on the second day, and after his indomitable army had repulsed and badly beaten the Rebel army on the third day, he refused to allow them to complete their victory, and still later, when fortune again unexpectedly thrust the Rebels in our power at Falling Waters, he doggedly refused to fight, but waited until they could escape, we are forced to the conclusion that General MEADE

EXTRACTS.

was unable to fight the Army of the Potomac as it should have been fought, nor could he avail himself of the advantages which the valor of his troops at times gave him, and that the honors of that campaign are not due to any generalship that he displayed, but to the heroic bravery, patriotism and perseverance of the army.

THE RETREAT FROM CULPEPER.

General MEADE had occupied Culpeper with his army about the middle of September, 1863, General LEE's army being south of the Rapidan.

The army had been at Culpeper about a month when General MEADE decided to make an offensive demonstration against LEE, for which purpose BUFORD's division of cavalry were ordered to cross the Rapidan at Germania Ford and then uncover Raccoon Ford, where NEWTON's corps was to assist him.

After BUFORD had started and was too far off to be recalled, General LEE put his army in motion towards our right, which so alarmed General MEADE that he made his preparations to retreat from Culpeper, and so precipitate were his movements that BUFORD's division was very near being cut off, while the army was hastily marched to the rear. General LEE finding he could move General MEADE so easily, urged him back as far as Centreville, and when the latter took up a position near that place, LEE contented himself with destroying the railroad we had left behind and retired on Culpeper.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.**REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, FROM APRIL 6, TO AUGUST 4, 1864, BY MAJOR GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN, U. S. A., COMMANDER.**

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF,
NEW ORLEANS, LA., May 13, 1866.

GENERAL:—I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, from April 6, 1864, to August 4, 1864:

WILDERNESS.

On March 27, 1864, I was relieved from the command of the Second Division, 4th Corps, Army of the Cumberland, to take command of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, and on the 4th of April, in General Order No. 144, current series, War Department, I was assigned to that corps, then lying in the vicinity of Brandy Station, Virginia.

The corps consisted of three divisions and twelve (12) batteries horse artillery, and in a few days after I joined was adjusted as follows: Brigadier General A. T. A. TORBERT to command the First Division; Brigadier General D. MCM. GREGG, the Second Division; and Brigadier General J. H. WILSON, the Third Division; the artillery being under the command of Captain ROBINSON, United States Army. The officers and men were in pretty good condition, so far as health and equipment were concerned, but their horses were thin and very much worn out by excessive and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty; the picket line almost completely encircling the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, if stretched out on a continuous line, of nearly sixty miles. The enemy, more wise, had been husbarding the strength and efficiency of his horses by sending them to the rear, in order to bring them out in the spring in good condition for the impending campaign; however, shortly after my taking command, much of the picketing was done away with, and we had about two weeks of leisure time to nurse the horses, on which so much depended; consequently, on the 4th of May, when the campaign opened, I found myself with about ten thousand (10,000) effective men, and the same number of horses in passable trim.

After carefully studying the topography of the country from the Rapidan to Richmond, which is of a thickly wooded character, its numerous and almost parallel streams nearly all uniting, forming the York river, I took up the idea that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry. I was strengthened in this impression still

more by the consciousness of a want of appreciation on the part of infantry commanders as to the power of a large and well managed body of horse, but as it was difficult to overcome the established custom of wasting cavalry for the protection of trains, and for the establishment of cordons around a sleeping infantry force, we had to bide our time.

On May 4th the army moved; GREGG's division taking the advance to Ely's ford on the Rapidan; WILSON's the advance to Germania ford on the same stream; TORBERT's covering the trains of the army in rear, holding from Mitchell's Station to Culpeper, and around Stevensburg, and strongly picketing the fords from Germania ford to Rapidan Station.

As soon as the 2d Corps reached Ely's ford, GREGG moved to Chancellorsville; and, upon the 5th Corps reaching Germania ford, WILSON made the crossing of the Rapidan, moved through Old Wilderness, and advanced to Parker's store.

On the 5th TORBERT joined me at Chancellorsville, and General MEADE ordered WILSON in the direction of CRAIG's meeting house, where he was attacked, and, after a sharp engagement, driven back, via Shady Grove church, to Todd's Tavern. It was necessary for him to take this route, as the enemy's infantry had advanced from the direction of Orange Court House, and had occupied Parker's store and the direct road back to our army.

When General MEADE discovered that WILSON was cut off, he sent word to me, near Chancellorsville, to go to his relief, and I immediately despatched General GREGG's division in the direction of Todd's Tavern, where he met WILSON, who was still being followed up.

The enemy's pursuing force was attacked by GREGG at this place, defeated, and driven to Shady Grove church, a distance of three or four miles.

It was now well understood that the enemy's cavalry at Hamilton's Crossing had joined General Lee's forces, and the necessity for my moving to that point, as ordered, was obviated.

As I was held responsible for the left flank of our army and the trains, I made such disposition of the troops under my command as to hold the line of the Brock road beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's tavern and Piney Branch church, but General MEADE, on false report, became alarmed about his left, and notified me in the following note that HANCOCK's left had been turned, and directed me to draw in my forces to protect the trains:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 6, 1864—1 o'clock P. M.

Major General Sheridan, Commanding Cavalry Corps:

Your despatch of 11:45 A. M. received. General HANCOCK has been heavily pressed, and his left turned. The major general commanding thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry so as to secure the protection of the trains:

The order requiring an escort for the wagons to-night has been rescinded.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

I obeyed this order, and the enemy took possession of the Furnaces, Todd's Tavern, and Piney Branch Church, the regaining of which cost much fighting on the 6th and 7th, and very many gallant officers and men.

On the 6th CUSTER fought at the Furnaces, and defeated the enemy, who left his dead and wounded in our hands.

TODD'S TAVERN.

On the 7th the trains of the army, under direction from headquarters Army of the Potomac, were put in motion to go into park at Piney Branch Church. As this point was held by the enemy I was confident that the order must have been given without fully understanding the condition of affairs, and therefore thought the best way to remedy the trouble was to halt the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich's, attack the enemy and regain the ground. This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, in which the enemy was defeated. GREGG attacked with one of his brigades on the Catharpin road, and drove the enemy over Corbin's bridge; MERRITT, who was in command of the first division during the temporary absence of TORBERT, attacked with his division, on the Spottsylvania road, driving him towards Spottsylvania, and DAVIES' brigade of GREGG's division made a handsome attack on the Piney Branch Church road, uniting with MERRITT on the Spottsylvania road. The pursuit was kept up until dark. GREGG's and MERRITT's divisions encamped in open fields in the vicinity of Todd's Tavern, with orders to move in the morning, at daylight, for the purpose of gaining possession of Snell's bridge, over the Po river. To accomplish this, WILSON, who was at Alsop's house, was directed to take possession of Spottsylvania early on the morning of the 8th, and thence move into position at Snell's bridge. GREGG and MERRITT were ordered to proceed to the same point; the former via the crossing at Corbin's bridge, the latter by the Block house.

Had these movements been carried out successfully, it would probably have sufficiently delayed the march of the enemy to Spottsylvania Court House to enable our infantry to reach that point first, and the battles fought there would have probably occurred elsewhere,

but upon the arrival of General MEADE at Todd's Tavern the orders were changed, and GREGG was simply directed by him to hold Corbin's bridge, and MERRITT's division ordered in front of the infantry column, marching on the road to Spottsylvania in the darkness of the night, the cavalry and infantry becoming entangled in the advance, causing much confusion and delay.

I was not duly advised of these changes, and for a time had fears for the safety of General WILSON's command, which had proceeded, in accordance with my instructions, to Spottsylvania Court House, capturing and holding it until driven out by the advance of LONGSTREET's corps.

The time had now come to leave the Wilderness, where we had successfully held the left of the army, and defeated the enemy's cavalry on the 5th at Todd's Tavern, and at the Furnaces; again on the 6th at the Furnaces, and on the 7th at Todd's Tavern. During the 8th I received orders to go out and engage the Rebel cavalry, and when out of forage, *of which we had half rations for one day*, I was to proceed to the James river, and replenish from the stores which General BUTLER had at Bermuda Hundred.

RAID AROUND RICHMOND.

Pursuant to this order the three divisions of cavalry, on the evening of this day, were concentrated in the vicinity of Aldrich's, on the plank road to Fredericksburg, and on the morning of the 9th commenced the march. It will be seen, upon examination of the map of Virginia, that there was but very little space for a large cavalry force to operate on the left of our army, from Spottsylvania to the Rappahannock, and that we were liable to be shut in; I therefore concluded to march around the right of LEE's army, and put my command, before fighting, south of the North Anna, where I expected to procure grain; where I was confident that while engaging the enemy's cavalry no timely assistance from his infantry could be procured, and whence, if not successful, I could proceed west and rejoin our army, swinging around towards Gordonsville and Orange Court House.

With this view we started, marching out on the plank road to Tabernacle Church, thence to the Telegraph road, thence down through Childsburg to Anderson's crossing of the North Anna. This movement was made at a walk, w th three divisions on the same road — making a column of about thirteen miles in length — marching by the flank of the enemy; I preferred this, however, to the combinations arising from separate roads, combinations rarely working as expected, and generally failing, unless subordinate commanders are prompt and fully understand the situation; besides, an engagement was imminent, and it was necessary that the force be well together.

As soon as the Nye, Po and Ta rivers, each giving an excellent defensive line to the enemy, were passed, all cause for anxiety was removed, and our ability to cross the North Anna unquestionable.

After passing the Ta river the enemy's cavalry came against the rear of my column, and General DAVIES, who had the rear brigade, was directed to fight as rear guard, following up the main column; it is with pleasure I say that he and his command performed this responsible and trying duty with courage and good judgment. About dark MERRITT crossed the North Anna at Anderson's ford; GREGG and WILSON encamped on the north side, engaging the enemy up to a late hour at night. After MERRITT's division crossed CUSTER's brigade was ordered to Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central railroad, where he captured 375 Union prisoners, taken by the enemy in the Wilderness; destroyed the station, two locomotives, three trains (100) cars, ninety (90) wagons, from eight to ten miles telegraph wire and railroad, 200,000 pounds of bacon, and other supplies, amounting in all to about one and a half million of rations, and nearly all the medical stores of General LEE's army. These stores had been moved from Orange Court House to this point, either because General LEE wished to have them directly in his rear — the road used for hauling from Orange Court House to Spottsylvania being on a parallel line to his line of battle — or because he contemplated falling back, or being driven back, to the North Anna.

On the morning of the 10th GREGG and WILSON were again attacked, but their crossing was covered by the division on the south side of the North Anna, and was effected without much loss.

An important point of the expedition had now been gained, and we had also obtained forage for our almost famished animals; our next object was to husband their strength and prepare to fight.

It now became apparent that the enemy, in following up our rear, had made a great mistake, and he began to see it, for, when we leisurely took the Negrofoot road to Richmond, a doubt arose in his mind as to whether his tactics were good, whereat he immediately hauled off from the rear, and urged his horses to the death so as to get in between Richmond and our column,

This he effected, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, six miles from the city on the Brook turnpike; consequently the march on the 10th was without much incident, and we quietly encamped on the south bank of the South Anna, where we procured all necessary forage, marching from fifteen to eighteen miles.

On the night of the 10th and 11th of May, DAVIES' brigade of GREGG's division was ordered to Ashland, and arriving before the head of the enemy's column, which had to make a wide detour to reach Yellow Tavern, drove out a force occupying the town; burnt a locomotive with train of cars attached; destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoined the main column at Allen's station, on the Fredericksburg railroad.

From Allen's the entire command moved on Yellow Tavern, MERRITT in advance, WILSON next, and GREGG in rear. The enemy here again made an error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to throw all my strength on that which opposed my front, and fight this force with a small rear guard.

MERRITT gallantly attacked the enemy at Yellow Tavern, and got possession of the Brook turnpike. The enemy, still confident, formed his line a few hundred yards to the east of this pike, enfilading it with his artillery fire, and making Yellow Tavern a hot place; but GIBBS and DEVIN held fast with their brigades, supported by artillery, and CUSTER charged the enemy's battery and line, supported by CHAPMAN's brigade of WILSON's division—in fact, by the whole of WILSON's division, GREGG having one brigade available to support.

CUSTER's charge, with CHAPMAN on his flank, was brilliantly executed: first at a walk; then at a trot; then dashing at the enemy's line and battery, capturing the guns and gunners and breaking the line, which was simple enough to receive the charge in a stationary position.

In this assault General J. E. B. STUART, commanding the enemy's cavalry, was mortally wounded.

GREGG about the same time charged the force in rear with equal success, and ended the engagement. We captured a number of prisoners, and the casualties on both sides were quite severe. After CUSTER's charge and the enemy's line was broken—one portion of which was driven towards Ashland, the other towards Richmond—a reconnaissance was sent up the Brook turnpike, towards the city, dashed across the south fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from the exterior line of the works, and went inside of them.

I followed up this party, and found between the two lines of works a road leading to that from Mechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around on this across the Mechanicsville pike, south of the Chickahominy, and encamp next night (12th) at Fair Oaks, and determined to make the movement, being influenced to some extent in doing so by the reports from colored people, during the afternoon, that General BUTLER's force had reached a small stream about four miles south of Richmond, on the south side, and that I possibly could help him by a demonstration. Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, we commenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th, and massed the command on the plateau, south of Meadow Bridge, at about daylight; torpedoes planted in the road—many of which exploded, killing several horses—being the only difficulty encountered.

At daylight on the morning of the 12th WILSON encountered the enemy's batteries on, or near, the Mechanicsville pike, and could not pass them. As soon as I was notified of this condition, CUSTER's brigade was ordered to make the crossing to the north side of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, but as the bridge was found to have been destroyed, and the enemy's cavalry posted on the north side, I ordered MERRITT's entire division to repair it, and to make the crossing at all hazards.

During the time thus occupied, the enemy gave the working party great annoyance by sweeping the bridge with a section of artillery; and MERRITT, to drive away this section and the force supporting it, crossed a small force of two or three regiments, attacked dismounted, and was repulsed; still the work on the bridge continued, and when it was finished, MERRITT crossed nearly all his division, dismounted, attacked the enemy, carried his line of temporary breastworks, and continued the pursuit to Gaines' Mill. Meantime the enemy advanced from behind his works at Richmond, and attacked WILSON and GREGG. WILSON was driven back in some confusion, but GREGG was ready, having concealed a heavy line of skirmishers in a bushy ravine in his front, and when the enemy marched to attack, with more display than grit, this unexpected and concealed line opened a destructive fire with repeating carbines, and some of WILSON's men at the same time turning in on their flank, the line broke in disorder, and went into security behind the breastworks defending the city. The six batteries of regular artillery were used by Captain ROBINSON, chief of artillery, with great effect, and contributed much to our success.

The enemy considered us completely cornered, but such was not the case, for while we were engaged, scouting parties were sent along the Chickahominy, and several fords found by them.

This attack and repulse ended the battle; for the balance of the day we collected our wounded, buried our dead, grazed our horses, and read the Richmond papers, two small newsboys having, with commendable enterprise, entered our lines and sold to the officers and men.

Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon the remaining portion of the command crossed the Chickahominy, at and between Walnut Grove and Gaines' Mills.

On the 13th the march was resumed, encamping at Bottom's Bridge; on the 14th we marched through White Oak Swamp, and went into camp between Haxall's Landing and Shirley, on the James river.

Our casualties on the march were 425.

All transportable wounded and a large number of prisoners were brought along to this point, and the former, through the kindness of General BUTLER's medical officers, quickly cared for on arrival.

From the 14th until the 17th, we rested in this camp, sending out scouting parties as far as New Market, in the direction of Richmond.

On the night of the 17th we commenced the return march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones' Bridge, and went into camp, on the 18th, at Baltimore Crossroads and vicinity.

The uncertainty of what had happened to the Army of the Potomac during our absence, made the problem of how to get back and where to find it somewhat difficult, particularly so as I knew that reinforcements had come up from the South to Richmond; I therefore determined to cross the Pamunkey River at the White House, and sent to Fortress Monroe for a pontoon bridge to be used for that purpose.

While waiting, I ordered CUSTER with his brigade to proceed to Hanover Court House, and, if possible, destroy the railroad bridges over the South Anna; GREGG and WILSON were sent at the same time to Cold Harbor, to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond as far as Mechanicsville, so as to cover CUSTER's movement; MERRITT, with the remaining brigades of his division, held fast at Baltimore Crossroads.

After GREGG and CUSTER started it was found on examination that the railroad bridge at the White House had been but partially burned, and could be repaired, and General MERRITT was at once put on this duty. By sending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man bringing back a board, it was made passable in one day, and on the 22d, when CUSTER and GREGG returned, we crossed, encamping that night at Aylett's, on the Mattapony river.

CUSTER encountered a large force of the enemy apparently moving from the direction of Richmond to LEE's army, and was unable to accomplish his mission.

GREGG occupied Cold Harbor and sent scouting parties, which encountered small squads of mounted men, to the vicinity of Mechanicsville, but nothing of great importance occurred.

At Aylett's we learned from citizens, and captives belonging to LEE's army, that the Army of the Potomac was at North Anna river, in the vicinity of Chesterfield Station.

On the 23d the march was resumed, encamping at Reedy Swamp.

On the 24th we rejoined the Army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

This ended the first raid, which occupied sixteen days.

We lost but few horses, considering their condition when we started. The average distance traveled per day did not exceed eighteen miles: the longest march being thirty miles.

The horses which failed were shot by the rear-guard, as they could have been easily recuperated and made serviceable to the enemy. I think the actual number lost would not exceed 300, perhaps not more than 250.

COVERING THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC'S CROSSING OF THE PAMUNKEY.

On the 25th General WILSON with his division was transferred to the right of the army, and made a reconnaissance south of the North Anna as far as Little river; the other two divisions remained encamped from the 24th until the 26th in the vicinity of Polecat Station.

On the 26th a movement of the army commenced in order to make the crossing of the Pamunkey river at or near Hanovertown. TORBERT's and GREGG's divisions, with RUSSELL's division of the 6th Corps, took the advance to secure the crossings, with directions to demonstrate so as to deceive the enemy as much as possible in the movement.

To accomplish this end, TORBERT was ordered to move to Taylor's Ford on the Pamunkey, and demonstrate until after dark as if the crossing was to be made at that point, then to leave a small guard, quietly withdraw, and march to Hanovertown ford, where the real crossing was to be made. General GREGG was ordered to Littlepage's Crossing on the Pamunkey to

demonstrate in the same manner, to retire quietly after dark, leaving a guard to keep up the demonstration, and march quickly to Hanovertown Crossing, taking with him the pontoon bridge.

RUSSELL took up the march and followed the cavalry.

On the morning of the 27th CUSTER's brigade of TORBERT's division made the crossing, driving from it about one hundred of the enemy's cavalry, and capturing thirty or forty; the balance of the division followed this brigade, and advanced to Hanovertown, where General GORDON's brigade of Rebel cavalry was encountered, routed, and driven in great confusion in the direction of Hanover Court House, the pursuit being continued to a little stream called Crump's Creek.

GREGG was moved up to this line, and RUSSELL encamped near the crossing of the river.

We had been successful in our mission, and, upon the arrival of the army, on the 28th, it crossed the Pamunkey behind our line, unimpeded.

ENGAGEMENT AT HAWE'S SHOP.

I was immediately after ordered to demonstrate in the direction of Mechanicsville in order to find out the enemy's whereabouts, and therefore directed GREGG's division to move out, via Hawe's Shop, on the Mechanicsville road, but when about three-fourths of a mile in advance of Hawe's shop it encountered the enemy's cavalry, which was dismounted and behind a temporary breastwork of rails, etc. GREGG vigorously attacked this force, which appeared to be the Rebel cavalry corps, and a brigade of South Carolina troops, reported 4,000 strong, armed with long-range rifles, and commanded by a Colonel BUTLER; these Carolinians fought very gallantly in this their first fight, judging from the number of their dead and wounded, and prisoners captured. The most determined efforts were made on both sides in this unequal contest, and neither would give way until late in the evening, when CUSTER's Michigan brigade was dismounted, formed in close column of attack, and charged, with GREGG's division, when the enemy was driven back, leaving all his dead, and his line of temporary works in our possession.

This was a hard-contested engagement, with heavy loss, for the number of troops engaged, to both sides, and was fought almost immediately in front of the infantry line of our army, which was busily occupied throwing up breast works. After dark, our own and the enemy's dead being buried, we moved to the rear of the infantry, and went into camp on the morning of the next day—the 29th—in the vicinity of Old Church.

In the battle of Hawe's Shop but one brigade (CUSTER's) of TORBERT's division was engaged; the other two, being posted on the Crump Creek line, could not be gotten up until relieved by the 6th Corps. They arrived in the afternoon, however, but did not become seriously engaged, only demonstrating on the right of GREGG.

OLD CHURCH.

After we had taken position at Old Church, WILSON's division was ordered to the right of the army, and GREGG's and TORBERT's pickets pushed out in the direction of Cold Harbor, which was occupied by the enemy in some force. As our occupation of this point was essential to secure our lines to the White House, which was to be our base, its possession became a matter of deep interest. The enemy appeared to realize this also, for he, at a very early period, took possession of it, and pushed a force up to Matapequin creek on the Old Church road, putting his front parallel with the Pamunkey—which was then our line to the White House, in order to make it dangerous for our trains.

This force encountered the pickets of the first division at Matapequin creek, but they held fast and fought gallantly until re-enforced by their division on the north side of the creek, which took up the contest. The fight then became general and was stubbornly contested, but the enemy finally gave way, and was pursued within one and a half mile of Cold Harbor. In this fight BUTLER's South Carolinians were again put in to receive the brunt, and many of them were killed and captured.

COLD HARBOR.

On the morning of the 31st I visited TORBERT and CUSTER, at CUSTER's headquarters—TORBERT's division having the advance—and found that they had already talked over a plan to attack and capture Cold Harbor, which I indorsed, and on the afternoon of the 31st the attack was made, and after a hard fought battle the town was taken. GREGG was immediately moved to the support of TORBERT, but the place was captured before any of his troops became engaged.

Cold Harbor was defended by cavalry and infantry, and on the Old Church side the enemy had thrown up temporary breastworks of logs and rails. The fight on the part of our officers

and men was very gallant; they were now beginning to accept nothing less than victory. After gaining the town I notified army headquarters to that effect, but that the enemy in additional numbers were arriving there; that I could not hold it with safety to my command, and that I would move out, and did so. Just after we had left, however, a despatch was received directing that Cold Harbor be held at all hazards, and I therefore immediately ordered its re-occupation, changed the temporary breastworks thrown up by the enemy, so as to make them available for our troops, dismounted the cavalry, placing them behind these works, and distributing the ammunition in boxes along the line, determined to hold the place as directed.

While this was being done the enemy could be heard giving commands and making preparations to attack in the morning.

Just after daylight, June 1st, he marched to the attack, and was permitted to come close in to our little works, when he received the fire of our batteries and repeating carbines, which were used with terrible effect, and was driven back in confusion. Still determined to get the place, after reorganizing, he attacked again, but with the same result.

About 10 o'clock the 6th Corps arrived, and relieved the cavalry, which moved towards the Chickahominy and covered the left of the line until relieved by HANCOCK's corps during the afternoon.

While the balance of the cavalry were engaged at Cold Harbor, WILSON's division was posted on the right of the army, near the headwaters of the Tolopotomy creek.

On being relieved by the infantry from the Cold Harbor line the two divisions moved down the Chickahominy, encamping for the night of the 1st of June at Prospect Church and vicinity, and on the 2d we moved down the Chickahominy still further, taking a position on the north side, at Bottom's Bridge; the enemy's cavalry occupying the south side, with artillery in position at the fords.

No movements took place on the 3d; the enemy shelled our position at very long range but did no damage.

On the 4th the 1st Division marched back to Old Church, and on the 6th the 2d Division was relieved at Bottom's bridge by one brigade of WILSON's division, and marched back to the same vicinity; thence both divisions moved to New Castle Ferry, where the trains which had been sent to the White House reached us, with supplies for a march, since called the TREVILLIAN Raid.

While GREGG's and TORBERT's divisions were operating on the left of the army, WILSON, who was on the right, engaged the enemy at Mechump's Creek on the 31st of May; at Ashland on the 1st of June, and on the 2d of June at Hawe's Shop — the scene of the battle of May 28th — and at Tolopotomy Creek. The battle at Ashland was brought about by McINTOSH's brigade, which had been ordered to that vicinity, for the purpose of covering a movement made to the South Anna to destroy the railroad bridge over that stream, and which was successful.

On the 6th of June I received instructions from General MEADE and the Lieutenant General to proceed with two divisions of my corps to Charlottesville, for the purpose of cutting the Virginia Central railroad, to unite if possible with Major General D. HUNTER, whom I expected to meet at or near Charlottesville, and bring his command over to the Army of the Potomac.

COVERING THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC'S CROSSING OF THE JAMES RIVER.

There also appeared to be another object, viz: to remove the enemy's cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy, as, in case we attempted to cross to the James River, this large cavalry force could make such resistance at the difficult crossings as to give the enemy time to transfer his force to oppose the movement. Two divisions being ordered to proceed on this raid, WILSON was detached by the following order, and took the advance of the Army of the Potomac on its march to the James river:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY OF POTOMAC,
NEWCASTLE FERRY, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL:—I am directed by the Major General Commanding to notify you that he will march from Newcastle Ferry at 5 A. M. to-morrow, taking with him the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions. During his absence you will report and receive your orders direct from Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

Your Division Quartermaster and Commissary will have to attend to the supplying of your command.

Orders have been issued directing the officers in charge at the White House to send all detachments of cavalry (mounted) belonging to the different cavalry divisions to report temporarily for duty with your command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. W. FORSYTH,
Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Staff.

From Major General J. W. Wilson, Commanding 3d Cavalry Division.

TREVILLIAN RAID.

On June 7th the command being prepared with three (3) days' rations in haversacks, to last for five days, two days' forage on the pommel of the saddles, one hundred rounds of ammunition, forty on the person and sixty in wagons, one medical wagon, eight ambulances and one wagon each for division and brigade headquarters, we crossed the Pamunkey, at New Castle, and encamped that night between Aylett's and Dunkirk, on the Mattapony river.

On the 8th we encamped two miles west of Polecat Station.

It was my intention to march along the north bank of the North Anna, cross it at Carpenter's Ford, strike the railroad at Trevillian Station and destroy it to Louisa Court House, march past Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, and destroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded.

We, therefore, on the 9th of June, resumed the march along the Anna—our advance guard, skirmishing, as it always did, with mounted men of the enemy and encamped on East-northeast Creek, near Young's Mills.

During this day I learned that BRECKINRIDGE's division of infantry was passing slowly up the railroad to Gordonsville, parallel to me, and that the enemy's cavalry had left their position on the south side of the Chickahominy and were marching on the old Richmond and Gordonsville road on Gordonsville. This information was confirmed by a party sent to cut the telegraph wire along the railroad during the night. On the 10th the march was resumed; we passed through Twyman's Store, crossed the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford and encamped on the road leading to Trevillian Station and along the banks of the North Anna.

During the night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy's scouting parties, which we had encountered more or less every day, indicated the presence of a large force.

On the morning of the 11th we resumed the march on Trevillian, meeting at once and driving the enemy's advance parties in our front. TORBERT had the leading division and at a point about three or three and a half miles from Trevillian Station, encountered the enemy in full force behind a line of breastworks constructed in dense timber. CUSTER with his brigade was ordered to take a wood road found on our left and get to Trevillian Station, or at least in rear of the enemy and attack his led horses. In following this road he passed between FIRZ LEE'S and HAMPTON'S divisions—the former being on the road leading from Louisa Court House to where the battle commenced, the latter on the direct road from Trevillian to the same point—and on, without opposition, to Trevillian Station, which he took possession of.

As soon as I found that CUSTER had gotten to the rear of the enemy, the remaining two brigades of TORBERT'S division were dismounted and formed line of battle, assailed the enemy's works and carried them, driving HAMPTON'S division pell-mell and at a run back on CUSTER at Trevillian, who commenced fighting in all directions. So panic-stricken was this division (HAMPTON'S) and so rapidly was it pushed that some of it was driven through CUSTER'S lines, and many captured.

While the 1st Division was thus engaged GREGG attacked FITZ LEE on the Louisa Court House road and drove him in the direction of Louisa Court House; the pursuit was continued until about dark.

HAMPTON'S division made its way in the direction of Gordonsville and was joined during the night by FITZ LEE, who made a detour westward for that purpose.

At night my command encamped at Trevillian Station, and from prisoners, of which we had captured about 500, I learned that HUNTER, instead of coming towards Charlottesville, as I had reason to suppose, was at or near Lexington, moving apparently on Lynchburg; that EWELL'S corps was on its way to Lynchburg, on the south side of James river, and that BRECKINRIDGE was at Gordonsville or Charlottesville, having passed up the railroad as hereto fore alluded to. I therefore made up my mind that it was best to give up the attempt to join HUNTER, as he was going from me instead of coming towards me, and concluded to return.

Directions were at once given to collect our own wounded and those of the enemy in hospitals, and to make provisions for their transportation back in ammunition wagons and in vehicles collected from the country. I was still further influenced in my decision to return by the burden which these wounded threw upon me, there being over 500 cases of our own, and the additional burden of about 500 prisoners, all of whom must have been abandoned by me in case I proceeded further; besides one more engagement would have reduced the supply of ammunition to a very small compass.

On the morning of June 12th we commenced destroying the railroad to Louisa Court House, and in the afternoon I directed TORBERT to make a reconnaissance up the Gordonsville road to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna, to the Catharpin road, as I proposed taking that route in returning, and proceeding to Spottsylvania Court House, thence, via Bowling Green and Dunkirk, to the White House.

In the reconnaissance TORBERT became heavily engaged, first one brigade, then another, then the last, the battle continuing until after dark. GREGG, during this time, was breaking up the railroad to Louisa Court House.

The result of TORBERT's fighting made it impossible to cross at Mallory's Ford without venturing a battle the next day, in which case the remainder of our ammunition would have been consumed, leaving none to get back with; therefore, during the night of the 12th, we moved back on our track, recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford on the following morning, unsaddled our horses and turned them out to graze, as they were nearly famished, having had no food for two days, and in the afternoon proceeded to the vicinity of Twyman's Store, where we encamped.

The enemy, excepting a small party which General DAVIES dispersed with one of his regiments, did not follow us.

I left near Trevillian three hospitals containing many Rebel wounded, and ninety of ours that were non-transportable, with medicines, liquors, some hard bread, coffee, and sugar; I regret to say that the surgeons left in charge were not well treated by the enemy, and that the hospitals were robbed of liquors and stores.

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpin road—upon which it was originally intended to move after crossing Mallory's Ford, and which would have saved much time and distance—and encamped at Shady Grove Church.

On the 15th we encamped at Edge Hill, on the Ta River, having passed over the battle-field of Spottsylvania; and on the 16th at Dr. Butler's Farm on the Mattapony, having marched through Bowling Green.

Being as yet unable to ascertain the position of the Army of the Potomac, and uncertain whether or not the base at the White House had been discontinued, I did not like to venture between the Mattapony and Pamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with wounded, prisoners, and about 2,000 negroes that had joined us, and therefore determined to push down the south bank of the Mattapony far enough to enable me to send them with safety to West Point, where I expected to find gunboats and transports.

Following this plan we proceeded on the 17th to Walkerton and encamped; and on the 18th resumed the march through King and Queen Court House, encamping in its vicinity.

I here learned that the base at the White House was not entirely broken up, and that supplies there awaited me; therefore, on the morning of the 19th, I sent the wounded, prisoners, and negroes to West Point, escorted by two regiments of cavalry, and turning, marched to Dunkirk on the Mattapony, a point at which the river was narrow enough for my pontoons to reach across.

On my march from Trevillian to this point, we halted at intervals during each day to dress the wounded, and refresh them as much as possible. Nothing could exceed the cheerfulness exhibited by them; hauled as they were in old buggies, carts, ammunition wagons, etc., no word of complaint was heard.

I saw on the line of march men with wounded legs driving, while those with one disabled arm were using the other to whip up the animals.

On the 20th we resumed the march at an early hour, to the sound of artillery, in the direction of the White House, and had proceeded but a short distance when despatches from General ABERCROMBIE notified me that the place was attacked. I had previously sent an advance party with directions to move swiftly, and to report to me by couriers the condition of affairs; from these I soon learned that there was no occasion to push our jaded animals, as the crisis, if there had been one, was over, and therefore moved leisurely to the banks of the Pamunkey opposite White House, and encamped, the enemy holding the bluffs surrounding the White House Farm.

On the morning of the 21st, GREGG's division was crossed over dismounted, and TORBERT's division mounted, and the enemy driven from the bluffs, and also from Tunstall's Station in the evening, after a sharp engagement.

I found here orders to break up the White House depot, and to move the trains over to Petersburg, via Jones's bridge.

I immediately commenced breaking up as directed and making my arrangements to carry over and protect a train of over nine hundred wagons, knowing full well that I would be attacked if the enemy had any spirit left in him.

On the morning of the 22d I sent TORBERT in advance to secure Jones's bridge over the Chickahominy, so that we could make the crossing at that point, and GREGG marched on a road parallel to the one on which the train was moving, and on its right flank, as it was the only flank requiring protection.

The train was not attacked, but was safely parked on the south side of the Chickahominy for the night.

On the morning after TORBERT had secured the crossing, the 23d, the enemy attacked his picket post on the Long Bridge road, with CHAMBLISS's brigade, and drove it in, but on its being reënforced by six companies of colored troops belonging to GETTY's command, the enemy was repulsed, and the picket post re-established. This brigade, I was told by the prisoners taken, was the advance of the rebel cavalry corps, and through it HAMPTON had been advised of our having already secured the crossing of the Chickahominy.

General GETTY had relieved General ABECRUMBIE, and was in command of a small infantry force, composed mostly of the odds and ends of regiments and batteries.

On the 24th the march was resumed, with directions to cross the trains at Bermuda Hundred, where there was a pontoon bridge; to reach this point I was obliged to march through Charles City Court House, thence by Harrison's Landing and Malvern Hill, the latter of which was occupied by the enemy; in fact, he held everything north of the James, except the *tête de pont* at the crossing.

TORBERT's division marched out on the Charles City Court House road as an escort to the trains, and when in the vicinity of the Court House, the advance guard encountered the enemy and drove him across Herring Creek, on the road to Westover Church. As soon as this attack was reported to me, orders were immediately given to park the train — the head of which was far beyond Charles City Court House — at convenient points on the road, and TORBERT was directed to push his whole division to the front to meet the enemy, while GREGG, who had marched on the road leading to St. Mary's Church for the purpose of protecting the right flank of the train, and who had also been attacked, was instructed to hold fast until all the transportation could pass Charles City Court House. The train was immediately after put in motion, and safely parked in the vicinity of Wilcox's Landing.

At St. Mary's Church GREGG was attacked by the entire cavalry corps of the enemy, and after a stubborn fight, which lasted until after dark, was forced to retire in some confusion, but without any loss in material.

This very creditable engagement saved the train, which should never have been left for the cavalry to escort.

During the night and next morning, the train was moved back through Charles City Court House, to Douthard's Landing on the James River, where it was ferried over, after which the troops were transported in the same manner.

REAM'S STATION.

Before the crossing was completed, General MEADE notified me to move rapidly to the support of General WILSON, who had been ordered on a raid to break the communication south of Petersburg by destroying the Southside and Danville railroads.

General WILSON's expedition had been successful until it reached the left of the army on its return, when it encountered, at Ream's Station, a large force of infantry, sent down the Weldon railroad from Petersburg, and being at the same time attacked on the flank by cavalry, the command was routed, and obliged to fall back across Nottoway River at Poplar Hill, whence a wide detour was necessary to reach the main army, in consequence of which, as the heat was intense, the loss in animals was great.

As soon as the orders from General MEADE were received, I hastened with TORBERT and GREGG, via Prince George Court House and Lee's Mills, to Ream's Station — where I found the 6th Corps — but was too late to render material assistance; I immediately, however, sent out parties to procure information concerning the expedition, and learned from them that it had crossed the Nottoway and was safe.

The results obtained in the destruction of the Southside and Danville railroads were considered equivalent to the losses sustained by General WILSON's division. Had an infantry force been sent sooner to Ream's Station, the raid would have been eminently successful.

General WILSON states in his report as follows:

"Foreseeing the probability of having to return northward, I wrote to General MEADE the evening before starting, that I anticipated no serious difficulty in executing his orders; but unless General SHERIDAN was required to keep HAMPTON's cavalry engaged, and our infantry to prevent LEE from making detachments, we should probably experience great difficulty in rejoicing the army. In reply to this note, General HUMPHREYS' chief of staff informed me that it was intended the Army of the Potomac should cover the Weldon road the next day, the Southside road the day after, and that HAMPTON having followed SHERIDAN towards Gordonsville, I need not fear any trouble from him." Still no timely relief was sent.

As soon as WILSON was found to be safe, I was ordered back to Light House Point and vicinity to rest my command, which had marched and fought for fifty-six consecutive days, and remained there from the 2d till the 26th of July, refitting and picketing the left of the army.

EXTRACTS.

While at this camp I received about 1,500 horses. These, together with about 400 obtained at Old Church by dismounting recruits, were all that were issued to me while personally in command of the cavalry corps from April 6 to August 1, 1864.

On the afternoon of July 26, I moved with the First and Second divisions of Cavalry, TORBERT's and GREGG's for the north side of the James River, in connection with the 2d Corps, and was directed, if an opportunity offered, to make a raid on the Virginia Central railroad and destroy the bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers and those over Little River.

DARBYTOWN.

We crossed the Appomattox at Broadway Landing, and on arriving at Deep Bottom, where we were joined by General KAUTZ's small cavalry division of the Army of the James, the command was massed to allow the 2d Corps to pass and to take the advance across the James.

Soon after the corps had crossed a small portion of it carried the enemy's works in front of the *tête de pont*, and captured four pieces of artillery.

The cavalry moved to the right of the 2d Corps and found the enemy occupying a strong line of works extending across the New Market and Central roads leading to Richmond, the right resting on Four-mile Creek.

His cavalry videttes posted in front of Ruffin's house on the New Market road were discovered by the 2d United States Cavalry, and driven back on their infantry line of battle, composed of two divisions. The high ground in advance of Ruffin's house thus gained was immediately occupied by the first division as a line of battle, and the second division placed on its right, covering the road from Malvern Hill to Richmond.

Immediately upon the formation of our line, the enemy advanced to the attack and drove the cavalry back over the ridge, on the face of which it quickly lay down in line of battle at a distance of about fifteen yards from the crest. When the enemy's line reached this crest, a fire from our repeating carbines was opened upon it, whereupon it gave way in disorder, and was followed over the plain beyond by the cavalry, which captured about 250 prisoners and two battle flags, besides killing and wounding very many.

This counter attack against infantry was made by the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions simultaneously, and our line re-established. During the engagement, which is called the battle of Darbytown, General KAUTZ was in support of GREGG on the right of the line.

The enemy, deceived by the long front presented by the 2d Corps and cavalry, was undoubtedly impressed with the idea that nearly all of our forces had been moved to the north side of the James, and at once transferred a large body of his troops from the lines at Petersburg to our front at Newmarket; as I understood, this transfer by the enemy was the object which the Lieutenant-General wished to attain, in order that the mine explosion of Petersburg might, to a greater certainty, result in the capture of the city.

On the afternoon of the 28th the 2d Corps withdrew to a line near the head of the bridge, and the cavalry was drawn back to a position on its right. In order to deceive the enemy still more, I sent during the night one of my divisions to the opposite side of the James, first covering the bridge with moss and grass to prevent the tramp of the horses being heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot in full view of the enemy, creating the impression that a large and continuous movement to the north side was still going on.

On the 29th nothing occurred during the day on either side, except a skirmish by some of General KAUTZ's command, in the vicinity of Malvern Hill; but, after dark, the 2d Corps was hastily and quietly withdrawn to the south side, to take part in the engagement which was expected to follow the mine explosion. I was directed to follow, and withdrew by brigades from my right, successively passing them over the bridge. This movement was one involving great anxiety, as, when the 2d Corps moved, the space at the mouth of the bridge occupied by me was so circumscribed that an offensive movement in force by the enemy must have resulted in the annihilation of my whole command.

Shortly after daylight on the 30th the recrossing had been effected, and by 10 o'clock my advance division was well over to the left of our army in front of Petersburg; but as the mine attack had failed, it was not necessary to carry out the part assigned to the cavalry.

The movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our part of the plan connected with the mine explosion was well executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the command.

On the 1st of August I was relieved from the personal command of the cavalry corps, and ordered to the valley of the Shenandoah. TORBERT's and WILSON's divisions were directed to join me there.

It will be seen by the foregoing narrative that the idea advanced by me at the commencement of the campaign, viz, "that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry," was carried into effect immediately after the battle of the Wilderness.

The result was constant success and the almost total annihilation of the Rebel cavalry. We marched when and where we pleased; were always the attacking party, and always successful.

During the period herein embraced, I am led to believe, on information derived from the most reliable sources, that the enemy's cavalry was superior to ours in numbers; but the *esprit* of our men increased every day, while that of the enemy diminished.

In these marches, and in others afterwards performed in connection with the Valley and Appomattox campaigns, we were obliged to live to a great extent on the country. Forage had to be thus obtained for our horses, and provisions for our men, consequently many hardships were necessarily brought on the people, but no outrages were tolerated.

I do not believe war to be simply that lines should engage each other in battle, as that is but the duello part—a part which would be kept up so long as those who live at home in peace and plenty could find the *best* youth of the country to enlist in their cause, (I say the *best*, for the bravest are always the *best*.) and therefore do not regret the system of living on the enemy's country. These men and women did not care how many were killed or maimed, so long as war did not come to their doors, but as soon as it did come in the shape of loss of property, they earnestly prayed for its termination.

As war is punishment, and death the maximum punishment, if we can, by reducing its advocates to poverty, end it quicker, we are on the side of humanity.

In the foregoing brief sketch I have been unable to give in detail the operations of the cavalry, and will have to trust to the subordinate reports to make up the deficiency. In consequence of our constant activity, we were obliged to turn over our wounded and prisoners whenever and wherever opportunity offered, and oftentimes without receipts; I am also, therefore, unable to furnish an accurate list of either my casualties, or prisoners captured from the enemy. I think my casualties, from May 5th to August 1st, will number between 5,000 and 6,000 men; and the captures in prisoners will exceed 2,000.

We sent to the War Department from the 5th of May, 1864, to the 9th of April, 1865, the day on which the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered, 205 battle flags, captured in open field fighting; it is nearly as many as all the armies of the United States, combined, sent there during the Rebellion. The number of field pieces captured in the same period was between 169 and 170; all in open field fighting.

These captures of flags, colors, and artillery were made during the campaign, the operations of which I have just related; the Shenandoah campaign, the march from Winchester to Petersburg, and the Appomattox campaign.

To the 6th and 19th Corps, General CROOK's command, which, with MERRITT's and CUSTER's divisions of cavalry, composed the Army of the Shenandoah, and to the 5th and 6th Corps, which operated with me on the Appomattox campaign, a proportionate share of these captures belong.

It will be seen by this report that we led the advance of the army to the Wilderness; that on the Richmond Raid we marked out its line of march to the North Anna, where we found it on our return; that we again led its advance to Hanovertown, and thence to Cold Harbor; that we removed the enemy's cavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy by the Trevilian Raid, and thereby materially assisted the army in its successful march to the James River and Petersburg, where it remained until we made the campaign in the Valley; marched back to Petersburg, and again took its advance and led it to victory.

In all the operations the per centage of cavalry casualties was as great as that of the infantry, and the question which had existed, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" was set at rest.

To Generals D. McM. GREGG, TORBERT, WILSON, MERRITT, CUSTER, DEVIN, J. IRWIN GREGG, MCINTOSH, CHAPMAN, DAVIES, and GIBES, to the gallant officers and men of their commands, and to the officers of my staff, I return my sincere thanks.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,

Major General United States Army.

Brevet Major General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, Headquarters Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.

General SHERIDAN's report of subsequent operations will be published in the next number of the JOURNAL.

DISCUSSIONS.

DISCUSSION ON LIEUT. SCHENCK'S PAPER.

General MERRITT: — I cannot with the time at my disposal for the study of the subject, undertake to enter into the discussion of the question contemplated by Lieutenant SCHENCK's paper, the reading of which I have listened to with great interest. This discussion should be made by artillery officers. Of one thing I can assure the members of this Association, and that is, that the battery commanders during the war of the rebellion, such as GRAHAM, WILLESTON, WOODRUFF and TAYLOR, whatever difficulties they may have encountered, never failed to keep pace with the cavalry in the longest and most rapid marches, and always found the cavalry willing to lend a helping hand in tight places. These batteries were equipped with the Napoleon guns, so called, and the three inch rifles. Their commanders were justly proud of the service with the cavalry, and the cavalry seemed to feel special proprietary rights as to the batteries. It was a most encouraging and commendable state of affairs, and honorable to all.

Captain WHIPPLE: — The writer of the article on "A Horse Artillery Gun," seems to have made a paper which I read before the Association an excuse for his own.

Though it was entitled "The New Field Artillery Gun and Carriage," he assumes (probably for the sake of argument), that the piece is advanced as a typical gun and carriage for horse artillery service, and that there was no intention on the part of the Ordnance Department of supplying any other.

I think it was thoroughly understood, when I was asked to prepare and read my paper, that I was to describe simply a light field gun with which I was known to be familiar. As it was the lightest modern field gun in the service, it was necessarily liable to be used as a horse artillery gun, and to that extent it was so referred to in my paper; but it was nowhere stated that a more suitable gun for this service was not recognized as necessary, or would not be supplied by the Ordnance Department when funds for that purpose were available.

Lieutenant SCHENCK objects that in my paper the weight of the element, either gun or caisson, does not appear and is left to conjecture; and then proceeds to supply my deficiencies and to give my authority for the statement that "the weight of the gun is such as to permit of its use for horse artillery purposes" by quoting the weights of a limber and caisson which were not those referred to by me and which I purposely omitted.

The limbers and caissons, the weights of which he uses in his calculations, were experimental and made some years ago from plans proposed by the Board of Light Artillery officers. Those referred to by me are of much later design and, though I do not know the weights, others besides Lieutenant SCHENCK appreciate the importance of mobility in field material, and I have no doubt the experienced officers charged with their construction have very considerably lightened them.

Besides general denunciation of the entire system, Lieutenant SCHENCK emphasizes certain features in the gun and carriage as peculiarly objectionable.

He questions the selection of the French instead of the wedge fermeture and claims that by far the larger number of artillery officers favor the latter. In this opinion I simply differ with him.

He utterly condemns the brake, stating that no reasonable wheel could stand the strain produced by it. I have seen hundreds of rounds fired when the brake was applied to wheels, some of which were imperfect, and I have never known a wheel to show, in consequence, the least sign of fatigue.

He claims that when the brake is used on the march the piece must be halted before it can be removed; but he will find a statement to the contrary in the last official description of the carriage, though, of course, only with reference to its use in the light battery.

He objects, and as strongly, to the method of strengthening and stiffening the axle by the use of boiler-plate, instead of "tying the ends of the axle to the trail," as is the foreign practice, and forgets or ignores the fact that the first two modern carriages made in this country were so constructed and were utter failures.

His proposition to reduce the number of spare wheels seems reasonable and I entirely agree with him.

The table which he presents, showing loads per horse for horse artillery, makes the gun and carriage I described weight 21 pounds per horse less than the Russian gun; 52 pounds per horse less than the English gun; and 56 pounds per horse less than the German gun, though the weight of the limber he has used is probably too great.

His own comparisons alone would seem, therefore, to justify my statement that the weight of the new 3-10 inch gun and carriage was such as to permit its use for horse artillery purposes.

Captain MURRAY: — Lieut. SCHENCK's paper, though entitled "A Horse Artillery Gun," appears in reality to be a very severe criticism upon the new No. 3^r. 2 field gun, ostensibly due to Capt. WHIPPLE's statement that "from its lightness, it, 'the 3^r. 2 gun,' is suitable though not specially designed for horse artillery."

With Lieut. SCHENCK's *absolute denial* of this statement, I cannot agree; for I am positive that, in years not long passed, most excellent work was done by our horse artillery with a far worse gun.

There can be no question but that the best gun for horse artillery will probably be one specially designed for the service and that, as the principal role of horse artillery is its use with cavalry, it should never under any circumstances, prove a drag upon that arm. As stated by Lieut. SCHENCK, the load a horse can draw without over exertion or injury, while marching with cavalry, evidently furnishes a proper "measure of mobility" for horse artillery and in designing gun for this service, this measure should be constantly kept in view.

According to Lieut. SCHENCK's table of "Loads per Horse for Horse Artillery," it appears that, omitting the two obsolete guns, the gun which he denies as *absolutely unsuitable* for horse artillery, is third in respect to lightness of load per horse in the list of six given. From this it must be inferred that the weight of the 3^r. 2 gun and its carriage is not the principal objection to it, or if so, then American horses and roads must be very poor indeed when compared with even those of Russia. The least load per horse given, obsolete guns excepted, is 570 pounds; yet Lieutenant SCHENCK proceeds to show, by some course of reasoning which I have not undertaken to unravel, that the maximum load per horse, in this country, should be 520 pounds. This, according to the table, is 140 pounds less per horse than is required in the German horse artillery and I can hardly believe that the condition of the roads and the nature of the soil of our country calls for so great a difference. If Lieutenant SCHENCK is correct in his statement as to what the load per horse should be, then, it appears to me, the designers of all the horse artillery guns he refers to were wrong in their calculations and the horses in all foreign services are greatly overloaded.

To discuss in detail the merits or demerits of Lieutenant SCHENCK's criticisms, would require more time than is at my disposal, I will therefore simply state that I agree with a few, and disagree with many of his assertions. Among the former may be mentioned: that the weight of the carriage of a horse artillery gun should be a minimum, consistent with strength; that the number of spare wheels carried is too great; and that the weight of all projectiles for the gun should be the same. Among the latter: that horse artillery serving with infantry should be held in reserve until some supreme moment; that the weight of the present carriage for the 3^r. 2 gun is that given; that the "Novelty" brake is so pernicious a device as stated, that it had anything to do with the weight of the new wheel, or that an "ordinary" brake should be substituted therefor; that the stiffening of the axle by boiler plate is so great an evil or so vicious in mechanical principle as contended, or that better results would be obtained by tying the trail to the ends of the axle and thus bringing into play the "terrible" [tensile] strength of the metal; finally that the majority of artillery officers prefer the *wedge* to the *French* formature.

Upon careful consideration of the whole paper, it appears to me as if Lieutenant SCHENCK had made a "mountain out of a mole hill," as he seems to have taken it for granted, because the statement to which he takes exception was made by an ordnance officer, that the Ordnance Department intends to saddle the 3^r. 2 gun on the artillery for horse artillery purposes. Not believing this, I see no special reason for joining him in his war upon the 3^r. 2 gun; for I am satisfied that it is not quite so "mean" a gun as he stated and I am equally confident, even after struggling with his most *weighty* arguments, that, in a very great emergency, it might prove sufficiently suitable to warrant its temporary use as a horse artillery gun.

REVIEWS.

CAVALRY INSTRUCTION.

BY CAPTAIN R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL,

13TH HUSSARS.

While we are, in most respects, standing still in our own cavalry, cultivating the *nil admirari* spirit of men who, because their corps *has* shown prowess in war, are unwilling to believe that there is aught more to learn, our brothers-in-arms across the water are industriously striving to keep in the front line of progress and self-improvement. Precept and example, theory and practice, are judiciously combined to keep officers and men in a constant state of military training. Rust and decay are impossible where the military machine is thus kept constantly oiled and in movement. Drill books and manuals of instruction are not only written, but are *applied* on the drill grounds and fields of manoeuvre, not sent to company and troop commanders to be stored away in the dusty obscurity of orderly room book shelves. One of the most admirable of these books for the cavalry arm and to which our attention has been called of late, is the little work of Captain R. S. BADEN-POWELL, 13th English Hussars, entitled "Cavalry Instruction." It is published by HARRISON & SONS, London, and its success may be inferred from its now being in its third edition.

The plan of instruction pursued by this little manual seems so excellent for its purpose that it merits more than a passing word of comment. The object of the book is to assist the cavalry officer in the instruction of non-commissioned officers of his squadron, combining theory and practice in such a manner that the principles taught should be as thoroughly impressed on the minds of the pupils as if imparted by actual war itself.

The course is brief, extending over only four weeks. The theoretical instruction is held indoors each afternoon; the application of each afternoon's lecture taking place next morning, the principles previously learnt being thus applied while fresh in the mind and fixed indelibly by the practical field work. The subjects embraced in the course are only those of direct importance to the practical soldier of any grade, and though the course might be well gone over by the officer himself, the language, colloquial and devoid of technicalities, is addressed to the comprehension of the most ordinary intelligence among the non-coms. The reason for this and that rule is often given to the soldier and his attention drawn to cases in the more recent wars, illustrating the advantage of it. The interest of the men is thus kept alive and the lessons relieved of the tedium of dry, tactical essays, such as our own barrack-room recitations generally are. In other words, the spirit of Captain BADEN-POWELL's method of instructing his men is in accord with the idea that the modern soldier is no longer an unthinking, dull machine, but a rational being, upon whose individual reason and intelligence his own army is almost entirely dependent in war. His manual is the result of General Order No. 30, Horse Guards, March 1, 1884, prescribing a month's instruction for soldiers in certain duties.

The following are some of the clauses of this order, as applied to the Horse Guards:

MARCH 4, 1884.

As a corollary to General Order, No. 30, of this year, each squadron of cavalry will be annually put through a course of instruction by its own officers. The following instructions will regulate the training which will take place between the 1st of March and the 30th of June, and which will include only trained soldiers and first-class recruits:

1. The course will be limited to one month.
2. Only one squadron of each regiment will at a time be under instruction.
3. A syllabus of the course of instruction is annexed and will be furnished to all concerned.
4. This course will be generally adhered to, but where special circumstances, such as the absence of proper training grounds, necessitate a deviation from it, general officers will make such alterations as may appear expedient, taking care that the whole period of instruction is fully utilized.
5. Considerable scope is left to commanding officers in arranging details, to which their careful attention is directed. In making their arrangements, the principle will be followed that each elementary subject must be in turn completely mastered before another is proceeded with. When mastered, it will afterwards be only incidentally reverted to in combination with more advanced subjects.
6. During the inclement weather, and where no special accommodation or drill shed is available, instructions will be given in the barrack room by means of lectures, explanations and questions.
7. Every available officer, non-commissioned officer and man will be present with his squadron and relieved of all other duties while under instruction, with the exception only of bandsmen, one servant for each officer, and such non-commissioned officers as are exempted from the annual course of musketry (see Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction), and men of over seventeen years' service. No leave or furlough whatever will be granted, except in peculiar cases of emergency, to any one belonging to the squadron when struck off for duty.
8. Men in hospital, prison, etc., who are unable to attend with their troops, will, as soon as available, join, mounted on their own horses, the next squadron struck off for training.
9. To ensure every man and horse being properly accounted for, the daily statement (appendix) will be kept and forwarded to the general officer commanding on the completion of the training of each squadron.
10. Where regiments are broken up in consequence of squadrons being detached from headquarters, or where the nature of the duties will not allow of one squadron per regiment being struck off for training without reducing the number of nights in bed for men of other squadrons below three, general officers commanding will make the best arrangements in their power for carrying out the spirit of these regulations.
11. To enable officers to give instructions of real value, each day's work should be carefully prepared previously by the squadron commander, and an outline of it given to the other officers and non-commissioned officers of the squadron.
- The squadron commander will allot to the officers under him the various branches of instruction in such manner as he may consider most conducive to the effective training of the squadron.
12. Each practice in field training will be based on a definite supposition and object, and will be carried on as far as possible under the conditions of actual warfare.
13. Explanations will in all cases precede practice on the ground and should form an important part of the instruction.
14. Instruction will extend over at least four or five hours daily, and for practical work on the ground short parades should be avoided, a period of from two to three consecutive hours being generally desirable.
17. Whenever practicable, general officers will personally supervise the troops under training, and test the merits of the instruction imparted by exercising squadrons against one another.
18. At the end of a month's course, the officer commanding the regiment will put the squadron through a searching examination, testing the knowledge of all ranks with the drill and duties in which they have been instructed during the training.

The following is a general memorandum (or syllabus) of the course prescribed, showing the division of time and subjects:

FIRST WEEK.

Instruction of the squadron mounted.

Preparation for the attack.

Execution of the attack: Cavalry *vs.* cavalry; cavalry *vs.* artillery; cavalry *vs.* infantry (Cavalry Regulations, Part II, Secs. 8 and 9 of Part III).²

Escorts to guns and convoys (Part IV, Cavalry Regulations).

Field trumpet and bugle sounds.

*NOTE: —These references apply to Cavalry Regulations, 1879.

SECOND WEEK.

Dismounted service.

Elements of defence of posts, explained on the ground where facilities exist, comprising improved obstacles, the principles of the defence of banks, hedges, ditches and walls (Sec. 5, paragraphs 1 to 15, Manual of Elementary Field Engineering).

Marches (Part IV, Sec. 10, Cavalry Regulations).

Duty of covering a body of troops on the march.

Advanced guard: Its formation and conduct on a road, a plain, entering a village and approaching a defile.

Flanking parties: Collision with the enemy.

Rear guard: Its formation, object, and conduct in advance and retreat (Instructions for Cavalry Advance and Rear Guards, Chapter I).

THIRD WEEK.

Reconnoitering, its object; ordinary patrols by day and night in close and open country; reconnoitring a defile, wood, village and river; flanking patrols (Chapter III, Instructions for Cavalry Advance and Rear Guards.)

Outposts, general principles; division of squadron; advance line of vedettes, their posting, orders, visiting and relief; detached posts; picquets, their object, position, strength and telling off; patrols; supports; protection of flanks and connection between several units; procedure on attack; preparation of picket for defence; withdrawal and retreat. Disposition at night, when understood, to be practiced after dark (Chapter II, Instructions for Cavalry Advance and Rear Guards).

FOURTH WEEK.

Camping: To unpack, pitch, strike and pack tents; telling off and exercise of cooking, latrine, water, ration and wood parties (Regulations for Encampment).

Construction of field kitchens and latrines, trenching of camp and water supply (Paragraphs 1 and 2, Sec. 18, Manual of Elementary Field Engineering).

Bivouacs and their protection, (Idem., paragraph 15).

Picketing.

TOPOGRAPHY.

FIRST DAY.

INDOORS.—Object: Nature of map. Scale: North Point.

Draw and explain map on board. Draw conventional signs, and give out signs to copy.

Explain hills: Dictate a sketch.

SECOND DAY.

OUTDOORS.—Draw road sketch; also note one in field book and plot it on return.

OUTDOORS.—Class take notes of a road and plot it on return to barracks; exhibit specimen road sketches to each man and make him read them.

THIRD DAY.

(1) INDOORS.—Landscape sketch reproduced as map; class in turn read portion of map aloud; illustrate, taking directions by sun, each man writes down instructions from map for man to find his way. Heads of reports.

(2) OUTDOORS.—Set map with ground; men in turn find way for party by map; compare contoured map with ground represented. Find bearings by sun. Test paces of horse.

FOURTH DAY.

MORNING.—Outdoors. Measuring heights, distances, gradients. Principles of drawing field sketch with rules and compass using base.

INDOORS.—Teach how to copy map, (1) by tracing, (2) with squares. Give specimen sketch on board to be copied with squares. Dictate suitable report in accordance with special idea. Dictate skeleton of road for fifth day.

FIFTH DAY.

Proceed along a road, using the above skeleton map, filling in details as they go; make special sketch and report in accordance with a special order. Verbal memory report of return road to be expected.

AFTERNOON.—Indoors. Class draw fair copy of morning's sketch and report. Correct these and show specimens of sketch and report.

SIXTH DAY.

Send men out individually with instructions for each pair and road sketch to show him the way. Omissions to be filled in, and sketch and report of special feature to be prepared. Fair copy in afternoon.

Captain BADEN-POWELL, acting on the above order and memorandum, has divided the course into twenty-four lessons, assigning to each day the definite subjects to be discoursed, the theoretical instruction being held in the afternoon, as already stated, and the practical application of it taking place next morning. A portion of each afternoon's session is also devoted to questions on the previous day's work. These questions are definitely stated and numbered, so that the book combines the advantages of a teacher's manual to that of a compendium of military knowledge.

It is impossible in a review of this length to quote sufficiently from this admirable little manual to give an idea of the value of its information and the simple, practical language in which it is conveyed. We commend the book (obtainable from HARRISON & SONS, London, or from Secretary of Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth) to be perused by United States cavalrymen.

S. C. R.

HARPER'S PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR.

MCDONALD BROS., CHICAGO.

This admirable work consists of two large folio volumes, containing 1,000 of the maps, plans, scenes, portraits, etc., which appeared in *Harper's Weekly* during the Civil War. It is a most candid and impartial military and political history and numbers among its contributors the late President GARFIELD, General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, General GEORGE H. THOMAS, General WARREN and other prominent officers, both National and Confederate. In the perfection of this work all the National and Confederate official documents were at the disposal of the editors and were most freely used. The pages of the history are of the same size as *Harper's Weekly*, and among the illustrations are the following: Over 300 portraits of distinguished soldiers and statesmen, mostly from photographs taken during the war; nearly 100 maps, plans and sketches of battle-fields; nearly 600 sketches of sieges, battles, charges, hospitals, military prisons, camp life, vessels of war, naval engagements, reviews, receptions, etc. This history should be found in every library, else its war literature will be incomplete.

MISCELLANEOUS.

As I understand it to be the privilege of members of the Association to make proper "plaints and pleas" through THE JOURNAL, the writer would like to call attention to the state of cavalry instruction at Fort Leavenworth school. This school has now reached an extended sphere of instruction which embraces in its scope nearly all the practical branches of military education. Reconnoissance and scouting, topography, engineering, strategy, tactics, riding — all these are *practically* taught, except the latter. That there should be at a school thus intended to fit officers for the practical duties of the staff and line, no course of riding seems, at the first glance, absurd. It would be, were it not that the actual effects of such a deficiency are so seriously damaging to the school. Many officers of infantry now come to this school totally unused to the saddle. During their course they are frequently obliged to take the field, mounted, in practical work of marches, scouts, advanced guard, etc., — work that often requires them to be on horseback a whole day at a time. Instead of having a proper riding dress, and a horse and equipment permanently assigned to him, such an officer mounts any animal some troop commander can spare him, and unequipped and untrained for riding himself, starts forth to the mimic war, every yard a humiliation, and every mile one of torture. Can anyone expect this officer to enjoy, or take any interest in, duty under such circumstances? Can he display dash, enterprise and efficiency as a chief of scouts, or commander of advance guard? There have been, as is well known, recent cases at the school where officers not trained in riding and engaged in this duty, have been actually unable, through their lack of practice in the saddle, to follow such operations after a few hours hard riding.

This field work in the minor operations of war is already giving advantages to the young officers of the school which is of incalculable advantage, and which they can enjoy nowhere else in our army. It is safe to say that with the advantage of its surrounding typography and the interest the instructors of the school are taking in this work, this school will eventually afford instruction of this sort equal to that of the best European schools. But in order to do it most effectually, the officers *must be horsemen* to some extent, at least. The school then should have as one of its first necessities, a riding hall and the necessary number of horses. Thirty horses would be sufficient for the purpose. The riding hall should be one worthy of a large school of application under a wealthy government — no mere make-shift needing continual repairs. It should be of stone fully 100 yards by 33 yards, provided with plenty of windows, good lighting facilities for early morning work in winter, and two large mirrors at the ends, that officers may see and correct false positions in the saddle. Such a hall, *with the aid of prison labor*, would cost, say, \$10,000. The horses, at \$150 apiece, would be \$4,500, making the total cost of the whole department in the outset only about \$15,000. This surely is a mere *bagatelle* in comparison with the good to be achieved, or with the expense lavished in foreign armies upon their courses in riding. It may be cited, for example, that the French School of Application for Cavalry at Saumur, has four large riding halls — three of them larger than the one here proposed — and 918 horses. The latter comprise many expensive animals of different breeds. The annual expense of maintaining the very small squad of horses named above would not be \$500. They could be either distributed among the troops of cavalry stationed here and cared for by the men of these troops, or else by a detachment of cavalry like the one at West Point. The plan is feasible and cheap, and besides its great importance to the school itself, would be hailed with delight by troop commanders who are now compelled to destroy the efficiency of their horses and men by mounting the school officers in their various duties. We hope this plea may arrest the eye of the person for whom it is intended and that those facilities may be soon given us. The present C. O. of the school fully appreciates the necessity of them, and nearly a year ago submitted estimates for a riding *shed*. Let us have a permanent structure of proper size instead. No money for the army could be better spent.

It is a gratifying thing to look over the list of membership of the Cavalry Association and note the additions it has received in the past few months, but it is hard to understand why any cavalry officer of our army should fail to appreciate its benefits to his corps, and withhold his name from the list of members. The admission fee is trivially small. The JOURNAL has already demonstrated its value to our cavalry service by the papers it has given to its readers, and the two main objects of the Association — the advancement of the future professional interests of the cavalry, and the writing of a history of its past achievements, should, we think, secure the cooperation of every cavalryman in the service. The inducement which such a professional medium as the JOURNAL offers for the writing of professional papers is clearly evidenced by the contents of the present number. It may be asserted, perhaps, that had the JOURNAL accomplished nothing more than the bringing to light of a half a dozen critiques as able as some it has already published, it would have fulfilled no mean mission towards the Cavalry Association.

But whatever it may have already accomplished, it can and will do more in the future with the proper support. Officers of cavalry of rank and experience on northern and southern sides have promised to contribute papers upon the "raids, strategic marches, campaigns and battles engaged in by the cavalry during the late war," and the record they will form of the achievements of the arm during the war, cannot fail to be of interest and value to our cavalry to-day. In fact, they will form the *only* record extant of such achievements, the history of the Union cavalry, especially, being entirely unwritten.

The writer of this, writing as he does purely through a desire to see the cavalry arm prosper, would like to say for the benefit of those officers who hesitate to join the Association, that the brunt of the work relating to the Association and its JOURNAL, has fallen, thus far, upon a little band of cavalry officers at Fort Leavenworth, who have by their subscriptions, their pens and their presence at the weekly or bi-weekly meetings, gallantly supported the Association through its infancy. The Secretary has without any reward, save the professional satisfaction of having served his arm, labored most untiringly in its behalf. The work — correspondence, copying and proof reading — thus imposed upon him, would have kept fairly employed a government clerk. While a few thus demonstrate their willingness to labor for a common good, it is certainly not extravagant to request some cooperation on the part of their comrades-in-arms. Let those who have not done so present their names for membership, and use their pens to express their ideas or experience, where they feel competent to do so.

Branches should be established at all cavalry posts — no better or more interesting employment of a literary sort could be devised for our officers than the writing and discussion of written papers concerning the use of cavalry in war, sketches of its leaders, etc., and especially when such matter concerns our own service. Cavalry officers are also requested to consider the columns of the JOURNAL as a medium for any suggestions concerning the needs of the cavalry service they may have to offer from their different posts.

R—.

LEGATION DE FRANCE,
AUX ETATS-UNIS.
WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 1, 1888.

To Brevel Major General W. Merritt, Commander Department of the Missouri:

SIR: — I have just received through Lieutenant HEIN, a certificate of associate membership in the United States Cavalry Association. I beg to present you my thanks for the honor thus conferred upon me.

Let me add that I am very anxious to make myself useful to your associates, and you will place me under obligation any time you give me the opportunity to do so. * * *

Very respectfully, Sir, your most obedient servant,

MAJOR LOTTIN,
Military Attaché of France.

CAVALRY SOCIETY OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
TREASURER'S OFFICE,
206 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, October 25, 1888.

Secretary United States Cavalry Association:

DEAR SIR:—I am very late in acknowledging the receipt of the JOURNAL of your Association, which you so kindly sent me, but I wanted to find time in the midst of my business engagements to read it carefully, which I have done with great pleasure and profit.

It is not one of the least of the blessings that followed our war of twenty-five years ago that it set the army to thinking, and as a result we have your Association, which appears to be doing good work, if its published JOURNAL is any indication.

My service with the cavalry in our war has given me great interest in all that relates to that branch of the service, and I should like therefore to join your Association, if it is permissible to take in those of us who served in the volunteer cavalry; and I forward enclosed application and \$2.00 entrance fee. I was First Lieutenant in the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, which was organized by Colonel RUSH, as a regiment of Lancers, but during the greater part of my service I was an aide-de-camp on the Cavalry Corps Staff of the Army of the Potomac, with General PLEASANTON, and afterwards with General SHERIDAN.

Respectfully,

GERRARD IRVINE WHITEHEAD.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE REVIEW, AUGUST, 1888.

Certain cavalry operations at Gettysburg deserve more conspicuous permanent land-marks on that field than they have yet received. The positions held by one or two regiments and by General GREGG's troops at certain periods of the battle have been indicated by suitable shafts of granite. The most important spot, however—that upon which BUFORD contested the enemy's infantry advance on the morning of the first day and by his masterly handling of dismounted cavalry made it possible for the Army of the Potomac to select a position and gain at the start an advantage which it maintained throughout that herculean struggle—is yet without even a finger-post to catch the traveler's eye.

As everything connected with this historic field grows in interest with the lapse of time, surely the ground of the initial operations upon the success of which so much depended (not only regarding the single battle, but perhaps the result of the War) should bear some enduring monument of its glorious past.

The useful if not brilliant part taken by the Regular Brigade on the left flank on the third day should not go unmarked. While the casualties at that point were not large, yet it was the fitting consummation of a month's campaign of daily and bloody encounters with the enemy's cavalry—foemen indeed worthy of any brave man's steel—in which the losses of the Regular Brigade bore witness to the stubborn nature of the conflict. The mobility of the arm gave a serial character to the operations of the Regular Brigade which come under the general head of "The Gettysburg Campaign," and can be most suitably commemorated upon a granite block, to be erected on the extreme left of the Union line.

We understand that the Chairman of the Gettysburg Memorial Committee (Colonel TAYLOR) has already recognized the propriety of placing a suitable monument where BUFORD "opened the ball" with musical crack of carbine and shriek of shell, and it would seem a proper matter for the encouragement of the U. S. Cavalry Association, if only for the reason that the incident illustrated, on a large scale, one of the boldest and ablest uses of American cavalry in modern times.

Through the machinery of the same body perhaps the regular cavalry might contribute toward the erection of an obelisk in memory of the marches, bivouacs and combats which led MERRITT's brigade up to one of the decisive battle-fields of history.

Let no more money be expended in *regimental* field-marks, but let the offerings be merged into a fund for the division and brigade mentioned, so that a trifle from each individual cavalryman may contribute to an important memorial.

EXCHANGES.

UNITED STATES.

Public Service Review.
Journal Military Service Institution.
Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute.

ENGLAND.

Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institute.
Illustrated Military and Naval Magazine.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India.
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.

FRANCE

Revue du Circle Militaire.

BELGIUM.

Revue Militaire Belge.

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Harmon, John A.	2d Lieut. 7th Cavalry
Harris, M.	Captain 1st Cavalry
†Hasbrouck, H. C.	Major 4th Artillery
†Haskin, W. L.	Major 1st Artillery
Hatch, Edward, Col. 9th Cav.	Bvt Maj. Gen'l U. S. A., late Commander Cavalry Division.
Hatfield, C. A. P.	Captain 4th Cavalry
Hayes, E. M.	Captain 5th Cavalry
†Hayes, W. C.	1st Cleveland Troop, O. N. G.
†Hazleton, W. C.	Late Captain 8th III. Cavalry
Hedekin, C. A.	2d Lieut. 3d Cavalry
Hein, O. L.	1st Lieut. 1st Cavalry
†Heizman, C. L.	Major M. D.
Henisee, A. G.	Captain 6th Cavalry
Henry, Guy V.	Major 9th Cavalry. Bvt Col. U. S. A.
Heyl, E. M.	Lieut. Col., Insp. General
Hodgson, T. G.	1st Lieut. 6th Cavalry
†Hoff, J. Van R.	Captain M. D.
Holbrook, W. A.	2d Lieut. 1st Cavalry
Howze, R. L.	2d Lieut. 6th Cavalry
Hoyle, G. S.	1st Lieut. 1st Cavalry
†Hoyle, G. S.	1st Lieut. 18th Infantry
Hughes, M. B.	Captain 9th Cavalry
†Hughes, R. P.	Colonel, Insp. General
Hughes, W. N.	2d Lieut. 13th Infantry
Hunt, L. P.	1st Lieut. 10th Cavalry
†Huntington, C. P.	Captain L. H. Squadron W. N. G.
Hunnt, G. G.	Lieut. Colonel 10th Cavalry
Isley, C. S.	Capt. 7th Cavalry
†Irons, J. A.	1st Lieut. 20th Infantry
Irwin, F. J.	2d Lieut. 2d Cavalry
Jackson, A. B.	2d Lieut. 9th Cavalry
Jackson, J., Capt. 1st Cav.	Bvt Major, U. S. A.
Jackson, H.	Captain 7th Cavalry
†Jackson, J. B.	1st Lieut. 7th Infantry
Jarvis, N. S.	1st Lieut. M. D.
Jenkins, J. M.	2d Lieut. 5th Cavalry
Johnson, C. P.	2d Lieut. 10th Cavalry
Johnson, J. B.	Captain 3d Cavalry
Johnston, J. A.	1st Lieut. 8th Cavalry
†Jones, J. H.	Late 1st Lieut. 4th Cavalry
Jones, Roger.	Brig. Gen'l, Inspector General
Jones, T. W.	1st Lieut. 10th Cavalry
Kautz, A. V., Col. 8th Inf.	Bvt Maj. Gen'l, U. S. A., late Commander Cav. Division Army James.
Kellogg, S. C., Capt. 5th Cav.	Bvt Lieut. Col., U. S. A.
Kelly, J.	Captain 10th Cavalry
†Kelton, J. C., Colonel	Ass't Adj't. Gen'l, Bvt Brig. Gen'l, U. S. A.
Kendall, H. F.	1st Lieut. 8th Cavalry
Kendall, H. M.	Captain 6th Cavalry
†Kennedy, J. A.	L't H. Squadron, W. N. G.
Kennedy, W. B.	Captain 10th Cavalry
†Kennon, L. W. V.	2d Lieut. 6th Inf. A. D. C.

Kerr, J. B.	Captain 6th Cavalry	Morgan, G. H.	1st Lieut. 3d Cavalry
†Ketcheson, J. C.	Late 8th Ills. Cavalry	†Morris, C. W.	Lt. Horse Squadron, W. N. G.
Keyes, A. S. B.	Captain 10th Cavalry	Moylan, M.	Capt. 7th Cavalry
King, C.	Captain U. S. A.	Munford, Thos. T., Gen'l, late Col.	2d C. S. Va. Cavalry.
Kingsbury, F. W.	1st Lieut. 2d Cavalry	Murray, A.	Capt. 1st Artillery
†Kline, J. G.	Major 24th Infantry	Murray, C. H.	1st Lieut. 4th Cavalry
Knight, John T.	2d Lieut. 3d Cavalry	†Myers, H. E.	1st Lieut. 1st Cleveland Troop, O. N. G.
†Knoerenchild, J., 2d Lieut.	Lt. Horse Squadron, W. N. G.	Nolan, J. E.	2d Lieut. 4th Cavalry
Knox, T. T.	1st Lieut. 1st Cavalry	Nordstrom, C. E.	1st Lieut. 10th Cavalry
Kuehler, L. M.	2d Lieut. 6th Cavalry	Norvell, S. T.	Capt. 10th Cavalry
†Koops, C.	2d Lieut. 13th Infantry	†Nowell, W. A.	1st Lieut. Lt. Horse Squadron, W. N. G.
Kramer, Adam	Captain 6th Cavalry	Nowlan, H. J.	Capt. 7th Cavalry
Landis, J. F. R.	1st Lieut. 1st Cavalry	†Noyes, C. R.	1st Lieut. 9th Infantry
Lawton, H. W.	Major, Inspector General	†O'Connell, J. J.	Capt. 1st Infantry
†Lee, John G.	Major, Korean Army	†O'Connor, C. M.	1st Lieut. Adj't 8th Cavalry
†Lemay, D.	V. S.	Olmstead, J. A.	Capt. 9th Cavalry
Leoser, C. McK., late Capt.	2d Cav., Bvt Col. U. S. A.	Otis, E.	Capt. 6th Cavalry
Lewis, Thomas J.	1st Lieut. 2d Cavalry	Overton, G. E.	Capt. 6th Cavalry
†Lincoln, James Rush, Commandant Iowa Agricultural College.		Paddock, G. H.	1st Lieut. 5th Cavalry
Lochridge, P. D.	2d Lieut. 2d Cavalry	Paddock, J. V. S.	1st Lieut. 5th Cavalry
Lockett, J. B.	1st Lieut. 4th Cavalry	Paddock, R. B.	2d Lieut. 6th Cavalry
†Loew, H. J.	Light Horse Squadron, W. N. G.	†Page, C.	Colonel, M. D.
London, R.	1st Lieut. R. Q. M., 5th Cavalry	†Parker, D. W.	Late Lieut. 6th Cavalry
†Lottin, V.	Major, Mil. Attaché of France	Parker, James	Captain 4th Cavalry
†Lovell, R. A.	1st Lieut. 14th Infantry	Parker, M. D.	1st Lieut. 9th Cavalry
Luff, E.	Captain 8th Cavalry	†Parsons, E. B.	Late Col. U. S. Volunteers
Macaulay, N. P.	Capt. M. D.	†Patterson, G. T. T.	1st Lieut. 14th Infantry
Macdonald, G. H.	2d Lieut. 1st Cavalry	Payne, J. A.	1st Lieut. 19th Infantry
Mackay, J. O.	1st Lieut. 3d Cavalry	†Penrose, C. B.	Capt. S. D.
Macomb, A. C.	2d Lieut. 5th Cavalry	Perrine, H. P.	Capt. 6th Cavalry
Mann, J. D.	2d Lieut. 7th Cavalry	Pershing, J. J.	2d Lieut. 6th Cavalry
†Martin, G. W.	2d Lieut. 18th Infantry	Pitcher, Jno.	1st Lieut. 1st Cavalry, A.D.C.
†Martin, J. P.	Lieut. Col., Asst. Adj't Gen'l.	Pond, G. E.	Capt. Q. M. D.
†Martin, H. McLane	San Francisco	†Potter, C. L.	2d Lieut. Corps Engineers
Mason, S. A.	Capt. 4th Cavalry	†Pratt, Sedgwick	1st Lieut. 3d Artillery
McClellan, H. B., Major, late A. General	Stu-	†Preusser, H.	Lt. Horse Squadron, W. N. G.
arts C. S. Cavalry Corps.	arts	†Quinn, H. S.	Lt. Cav. troop, Kansas City
McElerand, E. J.	1st Lieut. 2d Cavalry	Rafferty, W. A.	Capt. 6th Cavalry
McClure, N. F.	2d Lieut. 4th Cavalry	Rawolle, W. C.	Capt. 2d Cavalry
†McCravy, W. C.	Lt. Cav. Troop, Kan. City.	Read, G. W.	1st Lieut. 5th Cavalry
†McCook, A. McD., Col.	6th Inf., Bvt. Maj. Gen'l U. S. A.	Rice, S.	2d Lieut. 7th Cavalry
†McCreery, G.	Captain M. D.	Richards, J. R.	1st Lieut. 4th Cavalry
McDonald, J. B.	2d Lieut. 10th Cavalry	Richter, A.	Lt. Horse Squadron, W. N. G.
†McIntosh, H. S.	2d Lieut. L. Cav. Troop, Kansas City	Richter, R. G.	2d Lieut. Light Horse Squadron, W. N. G.
†McIntyre, F.	2d Lieut. 19th Infantry	Ripley, H. L.	1st Lieut. 3d Cavalry
Merritt, W., Brig. Gen'l.	U. S. A., late Commander Cavalry Corps	Robertson, S. C.	2d Lieut. 1st Cavalry
Mizner, J. K., Lieut. Col.	8th Cavalry, late	Robins, E.	2d Lieut. 3d Cavalry
Col. 3d Michigan Cavalry.		†Robinson, S. Q.	Capt. M. D.
Montgomery, R. H.	Captain 5th Cavalry	Rodenough, T. F., Col.	Bvt. Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Moore, F.	Capt. 9th Cavalry	Late Colonel 18th Pa. Cavalry	

LIST OF MEMBERS.

Sanford, G. B., Major 1st Cav., Bvt Lieut. Col., U. S. A.	Volkmar, W. J.	Major, A. G. D.
†Sanger, J. P., Capt. 1st Art., Bvt Major, U. S. A.	Vroom, P. D.	Capt. 3d Cavalry
†Satterlee, C. B.	Wade, J. F.	Colonel 5th Cavalry
Sayre, Ferrand.	Wagner, A. L.	1st Lieut 6th Infantry
†Schenck, A. D.	Wagner, H.	Captain 1st Cavalry
†Schoeffel, Geo. J., Captain L't Horse Squadron, W. N. G.	Wainright, R. P. P.	1st Lieut. Adj't, 1st Cavalry
Schofield, C. B.	Waite, H. De H.	1st Lieut. 5th Cavalry
Schuylar, W. S.	Walcutt, C. C.	2d Lieut. 8th Cavalry
Scott, W. S.	Wallace, W. M.	Captain 6th Cavalry
†Seaman, G. B., L't Horse Squadron, W. N. G.	Ward, F. K.	Captain 1st Cavalry
†Sharp, H. G.	Waterman, J. C.	2d Lieut. 7th Cavalry
Shipp, W. E.	Watts, C. H.	1st Lieut. Adj't, 5th Cavalry
Shunk, W. A.	†Webster, H.	Past Asst. Engineer, U. S. N.
Sibley, F. W.	Weeks, H. S.	Captain 8th Cavalry
Slocum, H. J.	Wells, A.	Captain 8th Cavalry
Slocum, S. L. H.	†Wetherill, A. M., 1st Lieut. R. O. M., 6th Infantry.	
†Smith, A. J.	Wesendorff, M.	Captain 1st Cavalry
Smith, Sebree.	*Wetmore, W. B.	Late Lieut. 6th Cavalry
Smith, W. H.	Wettlang, L.	Light Cavalry Troop, K. C.
Spaulding, E. J.	†Whiton, J. S.	L. H. Squadron, W. N. G.
Spencer, I. E.	Wheelan, J. N.	Captain 2d Cavalry
Sprole, H. W.	†Whipple, C. W.	Captain Ord. Corps
Squires, H. G.	†Whipple, C. H.	Major, P. D.
Stanton, Wm.	Whipple, H. S.	2d Lieut. 10th Cavalry
Stevens, C. J.	Whitehead, G. W., late 1st Lieut. 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry and additional A. D. C.	
Stevens, E. G.	Cavalry Corps, Army Potomac.	
Stotzenberg, J. M.	Whiteside, S. M.	Major 7th Cavalry
Stuart, Cecil.	Wilkinson, J. W.	1st Lieut 7th Cavalry
†Sullivan, J. M., 2d Lieut. Cav. Troop Kan. C'y	Willcox, E. F.	1st Lieut. 6th Cavalry
Sumner, E. V., Maj. 5th Cav., Bvt Lieut. Col. U. S. A., late Col. 1st N. Y. M. Rifles.	Williams, R. A.	Capt. 8th Cavalry
Summer, S. S.	Williamson, G. McK.	2d Lieut. 6th Cavalry
Swift, E.	Wilson, J. H., late Maj. Gen. Commanding Cavalry Corps Sherman's Army.	
Swigert, S.	†Wilson, Jos. Lapsley, 1st Lieut. 1st Phila. City Troop.	
Tate, D. Lysle.	†Wilson, T. H.	2d Lieut. 2d Infantry
Taylor, F. B.	†Winding, Geo. L.	L. H. Squadron, W. N. G.
Thayer, A.	Winn, J. S.	2d Lieut. 2d Cavalry
Tupper, T. C.	†Winsor, H.	Late Capt. 6th Pa. Cavalry
Tompkins, C. H., Col. Q. M. D., Bvt. Brig. Gen'l U. S. A.	Wint, T. J.	Capt 4th Cavalry
Tompkins, S. R. H.	Wisser, J. P.	1st Lieut. 1st Artillery
Traub, P. G.	Wood, A. E.	Capt. 4th Cavalry
Trout, H. G.	Wood, E. E.	Capt. 8th Cavalry
Upham, F. K.	†Woodhull, A. A., Maj. M. D. Bvt. Lieut. Col. U. S. A.	
Upham, J. J.	Woodson, A. E.	Capt. 5th Cavalry
†Vance, F. L.	Wright, E. S.	2d Lieut. 9th Cavalry
Viele, C. D.	Young, S. B. M., Maj. 3d Cav., Bvt. Col. U. S. A.	
†Vizay, R. W.	late Col. 4th Pa. Cavalry.	
Lgt. Horse Squadron, W. N. G.	Zogbaum, R. F.	New York City

DECEASED MEMBERS.

Col. W. J. Elliott, Brevet Major General U. S. A.

Capt. C. H. Rockwell, 5th Cavalry.

Capt. J. C. Dunlap, Kansas City Light Cavalry.

Major H. J. Farnsworth, Inspector General.

† Associate member.

* Life member.

